THE Public Interest

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Reforming the Draft
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COMMENTS

What Is "Community Action"?

DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN

Of the many programs of the Great Society, none began with wider approval or larger expectation than the war on poverty. It was, after all, the first major initiative of the new administration, an earnest of undiminished energies and continued determination to see through the era bravely begun a thousand days earlier. Now it is the first such program to become the object of controversy, conflict, and, in some measure, disappointment. This in itself would seem to be a familiar enough sequence in the course of human affairs. But there is something more involved here — something having to do with the way we rush into things, and possibly offering a caution for the future.

At the center of the controversy are the Community Action Programs established under Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act. The provision that these programs should provide "maximum feasible participation" of the poor has occasioned endless dispute and name calling. Even the once mildly approbative term "middle class" has been transformed into an epithet, as factions pounce on one another in the burgeoning bureaucracies of the acronymic neighborhood organizations that have sprung up in one after another city across the land. Indeed, the period of organizing now being well advanced, a second generation of conflict has begun as the organizations themselves begin attacking other institutions. But in the meantime, the reputation of the program for trouble-making has caused dismay in

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some circles in Washington, and Federal support is being sharply reduced. Since many program activists assumed they were expected, even required, to *make* trouble, the confusion is multiply confounded.

It is hard to foresee what the future holds, save that it is sure to involve yet more muddle and trouble and dismay – unless some of those in a position to lead come to see that the enterprise has been flawed from the beginning by radical differences of understanding *within* the federal government as to what the program is all about. For it is fair to say that, in a sense, Washington gave the cities of the nation an assignment they could not possibly carry out.

The question goes to the definition, meaning, and intent of the Community Action Programs. What are they supposed to do? Are they to make trouble – or prevent trouble? Create small controversies in order to avoid large conflicts – or engender as much conflict as they can? Hire the poor, involve the poor, or be dominated by the poor? Improve race relations or enhance racial pride? What is it Washington wanted?

The simple answer to these complicated questions is that Washington wanted a great many things that could not simultaneously be had.

The history of an idea

As was necessarily the case with any program submitted to the Congress in the first weeks of 1964 (the poverty message was sent on March 16), planning for it began in 1963, as part of the general preparation for the forthcoming legislative year, which was of course to be a Presidential election year. On October 30, 1963, Walter W. Heller, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, addressed a memorandum to cabinet members likely to be concerned, telling them: "As you know, Ted Sorensen has asked me to pull together for the President's consideration a set of measures which might be woven into a basic attack on the problems of povery and waste of human resources, as part of the 1964 legislative program." A small group was then set up in the Council to organize the effort; and soon the trouble began.

The Council experts saw the problem in terms of a life cycle, as follows:

"Poverty"
leads to
"Cultural and Environmental obstacles to *motivation*"
which lead to
"Poor health, and inadequate education, and low mobility limiting *Earning Potential*"
which lead to
"Limited income opportunities"
which lead to
"Poverty."

There clearly was no one "right" place to break in: to succeed, an

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effort needed to be directed at all points simultaneously, involving prevention, rehabilitation, and amelioration, according to the level of poverty involved.

It was decided that the most effective way to break this vicious circle was by means of Coordinated Community Action Programs, which would attack the problem in terms of three specifications: (1) "specific local areas of poverty;" (2) "well-organized local initiative, action, and self-help under Federally-approved plans and with Federal support;" and (3) "action programs to evaluate and coordinate existing Federal, State, local and private programs and to test and demonstrate new ones." Heller proposed this in a memorandum of December 20th. The Economic Opportunity Act that was sent to the Congress twelve weeks later was essentially a combination of this proposal with the Youth Employment Act (Job Corps, Neighborhood Youth Corps) that had been a major Democratic bill for some years preceding, but which – despite strong support in the Senate – had not succeeded in getting through the House.

Four definitions

By the time the legislation incorporating the Community Action Program was submitted to the Congress, the problems that were to plague it were already implicit in the form of at least four distinct – and, generally speaking, incompatible – understandings of what constituted "community action." Allowing for some oversimplification, these may be classed as follows:

The Bureau of the Budget Concept: – With the multiplication of Federal programs over the past generation, persons involved with the overall impact of these programs have become increasingly concerned with the ways in which they relate to one another at the local level. For such persons, Community Action Programs are seen as a device for coordinating such programs so as to have maximum effect. The guiding principle is *efficiency.* Community Action Programs may begin by costing money, but in the end they save it.

The Alinsky Concept: – Although community organization was a common feature of much New Deal legislation, at the time the poverty program was being assembled the major ideological force behind the idea was coming from a variety of individuals and groups who – drawing on such disparate sources as sociological theory, trade union practice, and accumulated evidence that the poor are more readily mobilized in opposition to things than in support of them – had become convinced that the most important need of the poor was to acquire power, and a sense of power, by means of community organization. This was to be achieved by inducing conflict: "to rub raw the sores of discontent," in the well known phrase of its most distinguished advocate and practitioner. Clearly, the guiding principle here is not efficiency, but conflict, not coordination, but – in the first instance, at least – disruption. Beginning in 1961, the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime had begun supporting such programs in various cities (the Ford-Foundation-

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supported Mobilization For Youth in New York being one of the better known examples), and these ideas came to be well represented within the Federal establishment.

The Peace Corps Concept: – From the time of the Point Four program, the American government has been sponsoring programs of community development in backward nations throughout the world. At first, these programs tended to be in the hands of anthropologists or technicians; but with the election of President Kennedy they attained an extraordinary personification in the Peace Corps volunteer, a college-educated American youth living in a village somewhere, helping natives organize themselves to market crops, raise chickens, or put a tin roof on the school house. That the cost per volunteer for this program was very heavy (their small wages being nothing, for example, next to the administrative costs of getting them to and from their posts) and that a highly selective and, by and large, already well-situated class of young people were getting the benefit of this novel Year Abroad, did not in the least matter to the American taxpayer: the program was and is a great popular success, and the idea of doing something of the sort through Community Action Programs with the "underdeveloped peoples of the United States" came as a direct and obvious carry over. Here, of course, the guiding principle is neither efficiency nor conflict, but simply *the provision of services*, with an expected "fall-out" of enhanced local capacities for self-help.

The Task Force Concept: – The poverty program sent to the Congress was the work of a small task force assembled under the direction of Sargent Shriver from among the political executives of the administration. The point of view of this group was pragmatic, experimental, and, given the individuals involved, somewhat intellectual in the sense of an awareness of various currents of thought and a certain skepticism about them all. The task force wanted a program that would pass the Congress, help win the Presidential election, and eliminate poverty, in perhaps that order. It seemed clear that Community Action Programs could contribute to all those goals, and the task force wished to maximize that contribution. From the outset it was concerned that not all the jobs go to "social workers." If a problem of the poor was unemployment, as many as possible of the jobs created by the program should go to the poor to alleviate that problem – quite apart from any consideration of community dynamics (though this consideration was never lost sight of). Just as important was the fact that, if rural Southern Negroes were to be assured any benefits from the program (recall that this was a period before the passage of either of the Civil Rights acts), some provision had to be made for including the poor. This posed no great problem. The very first draft of the Poverty bill, drafted overnight after a task force meeting of February 23rd, provided under Title II that the term "Community Action Organization" means one "which is developed and conducted with the maximum feasible participation of the residents of the areas" involved. This is virtually the exact language of the final act.

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For the task force, however, the guiding principle was not efficiency, nor conflict, nor yet services, but *political effectiveness.* The occasionally-to-be-encountered observation that Community Action Programs are a Federal effort to recreate the urban, ethnic political machines that Federal welfare legislation helped to dismantle, would not misrepresent the attitudes of the task force. By and large the task force consisted of men who had had some contact with such machines, and had perceived their usefulness and functions even as some had fought them. The task force wanted programs that would work so as to help the President, the party, and the poor, and readily assumed that the more persons involved, the more this was likely to occur on all three fronts.

Pluralism run riot

Thus the program began with this potential – this certainty – that it would be interpreted in different and often incompatible ways. It was never clear that the persons to be in charge of the program perceived these differences, and no hint of them emerged in the Congressional hearings on the bill. Confusion became inevitable when the program was staffed – in more or less equal proportion – with representatives of each of the four principal points of view (and some perhaps yet undisclosed) – and not, moreover, as a means of actually giving representation to different factions, but out of an apparent and near-to-universal obliviousness to the very existence of different "factions."

Toss a rock in the lobby of the Office of Economic Opportunity headquarters in Washington today, and one will hit, at random, a steely-eyed budget examiner intent on a systems analysis of health services in Hough, a bearded youth determined to overthrow the "entrenched autocracy" of the Democratic Party machine in some Eastern industrial slum, a former regional director of the Peace Corps worried about Comanche reaction to the latest batch of VISTA volunteers, and a Negro lawyer concerned how to double the number of Head Start projects in his home state before the next election.

There would be no great harm in this diversity were it not that the varying impact of the program on localities has been unsatisfactory to almost everyone involved. In some measure the system has permitted "users" to select program elements most compatible with their own style. (Thus, the City of Chicago is just about the champion procurer of goods and services for the poor from the Poverty Program bin.) But in most other respects it has led to misunderstanding, confusion, and a sense of betrayal, most typically in the person of a Mayor who organizes a Community Action Program only to find it dedicated to the proposition that he is a fascist-racist-bourgeois-fink. How is he to know that name calling is supposed to be good for the underprivileged soul? To the extent that Community Action Programs of the militant sort have introduced a radical political style to the poorest ethnic groups, they have probably succeeded in alienating

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– or at least encouraging distrust on the part of – more settled working class groups. Conflict doubtless can stimulate a sense of personal value and integrity in the poor – but it can also lose allies that are needed.

The bitter dispute that erupted over the opening of Intermediate School 201 in Harlem this fall provides an instructive instance. Whatever the wisdom of the school and municipal authorities responsible for the new school, their good intentions cannot usefully be doubted. An enormously expensive, air conditioned, beautifully designed school is built in a poor area of the city, and staffed by an elite corps of teachers with heavy representation of the ethnic groups of the area. When this was done at Benjamin Franklin High School in the same area in the early 1940's, it was hailed in the neighborhood as a master stroke of fighting-for-their-people by Mayor LaGuardia and Congressman Marcantonio. This time, the move was greeted by bitter and disorderly protest, in which the employees of the local Federal Community Action Program (MEND) took an active part. The community demanded control of the school personnel on terms that the school teachers could hardly accept; and when the demands were rejected, the New York *Times* reports, "the street agitation . . . was flagrantly anti-white and anti-Semitic."

The real point is this: if, for example, conflict is clearly anticipated as one outcome of the Community Action Program, there would be some reserve of patience and understanding to enable those affected to get over the rough spots and bad bounces, such as the ruckus in Harlem. But such intent has never been clear. *No* intent has been clear. It would seem that this has been a major sticking point with the liberal Democratic members of the House Committee on Education and Labor, who appear to have been the ones principally responsible for cutting back appropriations for the Community Action Program. These are men willing to take a good deal of heat for a decent social objective: but they expect to be warned about it in advance, so that they can make up their own minds what risks they will take, and not have the issue settled for them by an anonymous enthusiast rubbing other people's sores – and not infrequently at a salary of twenty and thirty thousand dollars plus per year. Similarly, Congressman Powell might have occasion to wonder whether his own disestablishment was not in considerable measure brought on by the "Black Power" antics of those whom, intentionally or otherwise, he befriended through a program that did not in the least announce such risks when first presented to him.

If there is a lesson here, it is somewhat as follows: government intervention in social processes is risky, uncertain – and necessary. It requires enthusiasm, but also intellect, and above all it needs an appreciation of how difficult it is to change things and people. Persons responsible for such programs who do not insist on clarity and candor in the definition of objectives, and the means for obtaining them, or who will settle for a short and happy life in office, do not much serve the public interest.

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A Hard Year for Economic Policy

ROBERT M. SOLOW

This has been a hard year for those who make, or think about, economic policy. In January, the official forecast of the Council of Economic Advisers was that Gross National Product for 1966 would be $722 billion, plus or minus $5 billion (though I suspect that in their capacity as technicians they would have preferred a somewhat higher number even then). It now looks as if the actual figure for the year will be in the neighborhood of $740 billion. The discrepancy is not quite as big as it looks, because perhaps $6 billion of it represents a purely statistical revision of the data. But it is still big enough to make a difference.

The government's forecast was by no means conspicuously bearish when it was worked out toward the end of 1965. But it was obsolete about the time the ink was dry. By February most economists had begun to fear that the expansion was moving too fast and would spill over into unacceptable price increases; they called for a tax increase and some reduction in public expenditure. By summer some of them reversed themselves on the ground that the moment had passed and belated deflation might simply precipitate a downturn in 1967. In the fall, most economists approved the President's proposal to suspend the 7 percent investment credit and probably believed that a further tax increase was desirable, and inevitable. (The only opposition to suspension of the investment credit came from its beneficiaries in industry — who bitterly opposed the introduction of the credit in 1962 until they realized how lush it might be.)

Perhaps I ought to declare myself. I was one of the last to desert the expansionist position in the spring. The cause of economic expansion, surprisingly, needs all the friends it can get. There always seem to be a hundred reasons against economic expansion and only one reason in favor. Having fought, I switched; it now seems to me that the prospects for a prolonged increase in output and employment are best served by some temporary cooling-off of the economy, and that will take more than just suspension of the special investment incentives.

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The limits of forecasting

All this backing and filling and changing of minds seems unedifying. There is no shortage of onlookers to point out that it all goes to show that economics is not an exact science. That is true enough; nobody knows it better than the professional, and I'd have thought that everyone else knows it too. To leave it simply at that, however, is to miss an important lesson. The imperfection of economic forecasting is only one of the reasons for all this uncertainty. Another important reason is that the objective situation has changed from time to time in the course of the past twelve months; there is no point, for example, in expecting economists to anticipate changes in the rate of military spending before they have been announced to the public, or even before the Defense Department knows. We are still guessing about the first half of 1967.

There is even more to it than that. It is precisely when economic analysis and economic policy are pretty successful, when the economy is poised near where it ought to be, that it becomes impossible to foresee with any delicacy exactly what will be required next. Under those circumstances, which were more or less the circumstances of the beginning of the year, occasional small-scale reversals of policy are inevitable. They are inevitable because to track a nearby target you have to follow even its small movements, while to track a distant target the main thing is to keep moving in the obviously right direction. (I have never succeeded in getting the water to come out of a shower at just the right temperature.)

The truth is that, given the complicated character of economic policy objectives and the limited number of policy tools really available, it is far from clear even after the fact what would have been the best policy to follow during 1966. An earlier tax increase would undoubtedly have relieved some inflationary pressure during the year, and it would have been even more important as insurance against a burst of price increases in 1967. On the other hand, it would also have meant less production during the year, and less employment, in an economy that is really straining its capacity in only a few spots. If hindsight reveals only a slight preference for the earlier tax increase, how can it have been an easy decision in advance?

This proposition has an equally important corollary. Minor deviations from the best policy are not terribly costly. If fiscal and monetary policy turn out to be a little tighter than the evolving situation demands, then there will be a little unemployment that might have been avoided, a little production foregone. That's hardly good; but the policy can be corrected and the damage stopped. If policy turns out to be a little too expansionary in the event, then prices may rise a little too much without enough compensation in the form of increased output. It is doubtful that a rise in the price level can be reversed, but it can be limited. In neither case need a lot of harm be done, provided policy is flexible enough to turn around and correct the inevitable misjudgments.

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Another hard year ahead?

The danger is that the flexibility will not be there. Obviously, the longer a reversal of policy is postponed, the greater the social cost of an initial error. Less obviously, deviations from overall economic balance may become cumulative and therefore harder to reverse. Thus, for example, the real reason for wishing that a tax increase had been voted early in the year is not that the 2 percent increase in the Consumer Price Index between January and July is so serious in itself – it isn't – but because the rise in prices *and* the airlines settlement *and* the juicy profits together may have set off a train of inflationary expectations that will not easily be damped.

Of course the main reason the President waited so long was his unwillingness to propose an unpopular tax increase in an election year. I suppose that's deplorable, but it is hardly unexpected. There may have been a secondary reason: the American propensity to turn any minor question of economic policy into an ideological struggle over sound money, or free enterprise, or the integrity of the dollar. One kept hearing that Inflation would be a Campaign Issue. Maybe so; perhaps I am peculiar in finding it remarkable that people should get so excited over a small increase in prices at a time of considerable prosperity. In any case, if minor shifts in policy can get swollen into such mighty Issues, then the flexibility that is needed in economic policy-making will be hard to come by. To advocate a reversal of policy is to admit you were wrong.

Barring some major change in the exogenous facts, there does not seem to be a recession in the cards for the first half of 1967. Some of the persistent belief that one is coming seems to rest on nothing more than the principle that what goes up must come down. No doubt there will be economic fluctuations in the future; but (even if it were true) the principle that what goes up must come down would be about as much use to an economist as to an outfielder. One tends to forget that predicting a downturn six months or a year before it occurs may be a worse error than failing to recognize it until a month after it has happened. Nevertheless, 1967 may be another hard year for economic policy. If prices continue to rise, and even accelerate, and Inflation continues to be an Issue, there will be a seductive temptation to tuck in a little recession early in the game, so that the economy can be coming on strong again in time for the 1968 elections. Everyone should want to see that temptation resisted. But it is no easy matter to find a feasible tax-expenditure program that can stabilize prices without dragging down the real economy.

Marginal blessings

"Informal controls" can still help. There is probably no point in trying to reconstruct the wage-price guidelines right now. They could not survive the combination of a visible increase in consumer and wholesale prices, tight labor and commodity markets, and fat profits.

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To rebuild them in a form suitable for the current situation would require a coordinated program for bringing the price creep to a halt; that would undoubtedly be too elaborate for American policy machinery. (Many observers think the guidepost notion never did have an effect on wages and prices. I think they are very likely wrong. If the guideposts did have an effect, then the fact that they have now collapsed doesn't make the policy a failure. It was clearly worthwhile to buy time for expansion; the only thing one can haggle over is the price.) When the time is ripe again, guideposts will be back. But there are other ways in which the government can bring to bear its influence and its weight as a buyer and seller. For example: there is likely to be a lot of pressure on beef prices during the next year. After all those years of jacking up the price of food to consumers, the Department of Agriculture ought to have learned something about how to keep them down. There are a few other sectors of the economy where government policy might try to attack the causes of out-of-line wage and price increases rather than the increases themselves. This piecemeal approach is terribly unesthetic, but no modern mixed economy seems to be able to do without it. None of them seems to have been able to make a great success of it either. There just are no great successes to be had in the business of learning to live at full employment. We must be satisfied to count marginal blessings.

This may account, in part, for the fact that economic issues seem to be less central politically than they used to be. There is not a lot of political mileage in the finer points of stabilization policy. As Irving Kristol suggested in the last issue, there is plenty of room for the parties to differ over distributional questions: how much of the country's resources to devote to the poverty program or to education; how to allocate a tax reduction or apportion a tax increase between rich and poor. And no doubt the voters will want to punish genuine mismanagement of fiscal policy. But the minor adjustments are a different matter: among the institutions quickest to support the Administration's September stabilization program were the AFL-CIO *and* the Chase Manhattan Bank.

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Fathers without children

ELLIOT LIEBOW

In the springtime, on a Sunday afternoon, Richard's four-year old son lay seriously ill in Ward E of Children's Hospital. He and the other twelve children in the ward, almost all from low-income Negro families, were being visited by some twenty-five relatives and friends. Not a single man was among the visitors.

The men had their reasons. Some had separated from their wives and children and did not know their children were hospitalized. Others knew but couldn't or wouldn't make it. Richard had intended to go, but something came up; he would probably go tomorrow, and anyway he never did like being in a hospital, not even to visit someone else.

But whether the fathers were living with their children or not, the result was the same: there were no men visiting the children in

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Ed. Note: – *"Tally's Corner" is located in downtown Washington, D.C. It would be within walking distance of the White House, if anyone ever thought to walk there. Some two dozen Negro men – unskilled, casual, menial workers, when employed – use this corner as a hangout, drifting from poolroom to beer joint to alley to lodgings. Elliot Liebow spent over a year as a "participant observer" of this group on a research project sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health. His report on their lives and circumstances will be published by Little, Brown and Company in book form next year, under the title,* Tally's Corner. *A somewhat different version of this article will form a chapter of that book.*

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Ward E. This absence of the father is one of the chief characteristics of the father-child relationship.

The father-child relationship, however, is not the same for all the fathers who hang around Tally's Corner, nor does a given relationship necessarily remain constant over time. Some fathers are not always "absent" and some are less "absent" than others. Moreover, the same father may have relationships of different intensity with his different children at the same time. The spectrum of father-child relationships is a broad one, ranging from complete ignorance as to the child's existence to continuous, day-by-day contact between father and child. The emotional content of the relationships ranges from what, to the outside observer, may seem on the father's part callous indifference or worse, all the way to hinted private intimacies whose intensity can only be guessed at.

The spectrum of fatherly responsibility

Leaving aside, for the present, the emotional and affective content, father-child relationships among low-income Negro families can be grossly sorted out and located along a spectrum based upon the father's willingness to acknowledge paternity, his willingness to acknowledge responsibility and to provide financial support, as well as the frequency and duration of contact. At the low end of the spectrum are those relationships in which the children are born of casual, short-term, even single-encounter unions; at the high end are legitimate children of married parents, all of whom live in the same household. Since the majority of streetcorner men do not live in the same households as their children, the majority of father-child relationships among the group at Tally's Corner appear at the low and low middle bands of the spectrum. The number falls off quickly as one approaches the other end.

At the low end of the spectrum there may be no father-child relationship at all. In some cases, the father may not know he is the father of the child, and in others, even the mother may not know who the father is. Here, too, at the low end, are those fathers who acknowledge possible or actual paternity but who have had no subsequent contact with mother or child. Such seems to be the case with many of the men who, while still in their teens, had a baby "back home" (i.e., down South). Thus, Richard says that a girl told him he was the father of her child. He did nothing about it and neither did she "because there was nothing she could do." (He explained that "back home" a Negro woman in such a predicament has no legal recourse. If she files a paternity suit, the judge asks her if the putative father forced himself on her. When she admits he did not, the judge dismisses the case.) Richard subsequently saw the mother and child on the street during a visit back home but did not speak to them. His sheepish laugh

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seemed a mixture of masculine pride and guilty embarrassment as he admitted that the child looked startlingly like himself.

Somewhat further along the spectrum are the relationships of Wesley and Earl with their children. Each has a child "back home" in the Carolinas and each acknowledges his paternity. Wesley has visited his home town and has seen the mother of his child once or twice since the birth of the baby. Wesley and the child's mother are on friendly terms, but Wesley gives her nothing and she asks for nothing. Earl's child also lives with its mother, but Earl and the mother have remained fond of one another. Earl sees her regularly and sometimes sees the child too, on those two or three times a year he goes back home. If he has spare cash, he leaves it with her for the baby.

In the middle range of the spectrum are the father-child relationships of those once-married men who, though separated from their wives and children, remain accessible to them. These men admit to a financial responsibility for their children, provide emergency and sometimes routine financial support, and are more or less informed about their children's well-being. Contacts between the men and their separated families are almost always initiated by the mothers, usually for the purpose of getting money for the children. Sea Cat's wife calls him on the telephone in his rooming house to tell him when she is coming. Sometimes she brings one or both of their children, sometimes not. Stoopy's wife does not usually call. She comes on Saturday mornings, brings the two children along and stays for an hour or two.

Relationships in this middle range are by no means limited to legitimate children. Tally is the father of Bess's 18-month-old son. For a time, at least, their relationship was indistinguishable from Sea Cat's and Stoopy's relationships with their wives and children. On Tally's payday, Bess would sometimes call the beer joint and ask that Tally be told she would be there that evening. Tally would meet her on the corner, pay her taxicab fare, then give her five or ten dollars for a doctor, a pair of shoes, or other extra expenses for the child.

In those few cases where the child is cared for by the father's mother or other members of his family, the father-child relationship seems to be closer than when the child is with the mother or a member of her family. Such a child regularly carries the father's family name. The father provides at least partial financial support. He is often informed of the child's special needs and general well-being and, even where they are separated by great distances, father and child have sustained face-to-face contact with one another one or more times during the year. Sweets, for example, has a child "back home." The child is being raised by Sweets's mother. Occasional letters are exchanged during the course of the year, and there are birthday cards and gifts for the child. Sweets manages to get down there for one or two weekends a year, and, during the summer, his mother

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and his child come to spend a week or two with him in Washington. Tonk's relationship with his 7-year old daughter, also "back home" where she is raised by Tonk's mother, is an even stronger one. They exchange letters and gifts and, at school's end, she comes to spend the whole summer with him. Stanton's daughter lives with his "sister" (actually she is no blood relation) only two blocks from where Stanton lives. The daughter remains his financial responsibility and, depending on circumstance or need, she moves in with him occasionally for short periods of time.

At the high end of the spectrum are those relationships where father and child are regular members of the same household. In such cases, even when the father and mother are not formally married to one another, there is no question but that the child carries the father's family name. Whether his wife is working or not, and unlike the men who are separated from their children, the father who is living with his children is, in his own eyes and in the eyes of those around him, charged with the day-to-day support of his wife and children. Father and child, as members of the same household, are in more or less continuous contact.

Looking at the spectrum as a whole, the modal father-child relationship for these streetcorner men seems to be one in which the father is separated from the child, acknowledges his paternity, admits to financial responsibility but provides financial support irregularly, if at all, and then only on demand or request. His contacts with the child are infrequent, irregular, and of short (minutes or hours) duration.

The paradox of estrangement

When we look away from these more formal aspects of father-child relationships and turn to their quality and texture, a seeming paradox emerges. The men who do not live with their own children seem to express more affection for their children and treat them more tenderly than those who do live with them. Moreover, the men are frequently more affectionate toward other men's children than toward their own.

Fathers who live with their children, for example, seem to take no pleasure in their children and give them little of their time and attention. They seldom mention their children in casual conversation and are never seen sitting or playing with them on the steps or in the street. The fathers do not take their children to tag along while they lounge on the streetcorner, nor do they, as they see other fathers in the neighborhood do, promenade with their children on Easter Sunday or take them for walks on any other Sunday or holiday. When the father walks into the home, the child may not even look up from what he is doing, and the father, for his part, takes no more notice

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than he receives. If their eyes happen to catch one another's glances, father and child seem to look without seeing until one or the other looks elsewhere.

Perhaps this routine absence of warmth and affection accounts for the way in which an off-hand gesture by the father can suddenly deepen the relationship for the child, for however brief a time. John casually distributed some small change among his six children. His wife Lorena describes what happened: "He give Buddy and the others a dime. You'd think Jesus had laid something on them. They went all around the neighborhood bragging their daddy gave them a dime. I give them nickels and dimes all day long and they don't think anything about it. But John, he can give them a dime and they act like he gave them the whole world."

Since father and child are seldom together outside the home, it is in the home that casual gestures bespeaking paternal warmth and tenderness are most likely to occur. Leroy and two friends are in Leroy's house passing the time. Leroy sits on the bed and absent-mindedly strokes the head of his small son lying next to him. In Richard's house, Richard distractedly rolls a ball or marble back and forth across the floor to his four-year old son, at the same time going on with his drinking and talking; or he casually beckons to his son to come stand between his knees and, with one hand around the child's waist, the other around a can of beer, he goes on talking.

The easy manner with which the fathers manage these intimacies suggests that they have occurred before. But the child does not manage them casually. He is excited by these intimacies, and the clear delight he takes from them suggests that he assigns to them a special quality and that they are by no means routine. Indeed, physical contact between father and son seems generally to be infrequent. When it does take place, it is just as likely to be a slap as a caress.

Compared with fathers who live with their children, separated fathers who remain in touch with their children speak about them more often and show them more warmth when father and child are together. For separated fathers, the short, intermittent contacts with their children are occasions for public display of parental tenderness and affection. When Bess brought the baby along on her money-collecting visits, she and Tally would sometimes remain on the corner with Tally holding the baby in his arms, cooing at or nuzzling the baby as he and Bess talked. On a Saturday morning, after a visit from his wife, Stoopy stands on the corner with three other men, watching his wife disappear down the street with their two school-age children on either side of her. "There goes my heart," says Stoopy, "those two kids, they're my heart." The other men nod understandingly. They would have felt and said the same thing had they been in his place.

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These are fathers whose children are raised by the mothers. Even closer to his child is the father whose child is raised by the father's mother or other members of his family. For him, too, the child is "my heart," "my life," or "the apple of my eye." Parental pride and affection are even more in public evidence when father and child are together. When Tonk's daughter arrives for her summer stay, Tonk walks around holding her hand, almost parading, stopping here and there to let by-standers testify that they didn't know Tonk had such a pretty girl, such a smart girl, or a girl who has grown so much so quickly. No, Sweets won't be around tomorrow afternoon; he has to take his daughter shopping for some clothes. He swears he didn't recognize her when his mother first walked up with her. It hadn't even been a year and he almost didn't know his own kid. If she hadn't called him "Daddy" he would still not have known, that's how big she got. And (with pride) she wants to be with him all the time she's here, go everywhere he goes.

But after the brief visit is over, father and child each goes back to his own life, his own world, in which the other plays so small a part that he or she may be forgotten for long stretches of time. "Out of sight, out of mind" is not far off the mark at all as a description of any of these separated father-child relationships.

The paradox of affection

There are many ways to explain this seeming paradox in which fathers who live with their children appear to be less warm, tender, and affectionate in their face-to-face relationships with their children than separated fathers. The most obvious, perhaps, is that the separated father, like the proverbial doting grandfather or favorite uncle, not charged with the day-to-day responsibility for the child, with the routine rearing and disciplining and support of this child, can afford to be attentive and effusive. Since his meetings with the child are widely spaced, he comes to them fresh and rested; since the meetings are brief, he can give freely of himself, secure in the knowledge he will soon go back to his own child-free routine.

No doubt, factors such as these are at work here and do account, in part, for the differences between fathers living with and those not living with their children. But one of the most striking things about the relationship between the streetcorner men and children is that the closest of all relationships are those where the men do live with the children, where they have accepted day-to-day responsibility for the children, but where they have done so on a voluntary basis — that is, where the children are not their own.

Not all streetcorner men who took on the role of stepfather or adoptive father were able or even attempted to establish a warm personal relationship with the children they were living with, but

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some of them were better able to achieve and sustain such relationships than any of the biological fathers. Thus, Robert, who had been living with Siserene and her four children for a year and a half, had become, in that time, a primary source of aid and comfort to the children. When they fell or were hit or had an object of value taken from them, they ran to Robert if he was there. He comforted them, laughed with them, and arbitrated their disputes. He painted pictures for them, made plywood cut-outs of the Seven Dwarfs for them, and brought home storybooks.

Before and after Leroy and Charlene had their own child, Leroy looked after Charlene's little sisters and brother to such an extent that both their mother and the children themselves came to rely on him. Together with Calvin, a frail and ailing 40-year-old alcoholic and homosexual who looked after the children in exchange for a place to live, Leroy bathed the children, braided the girls' hair, washed their clothes at "the Bendix" (laundromat), played with them, and on their birthdays went shop-lifting to get them gifts. Even more than to Leroy, the children were attached to Calvin. When he could summon the courage, Calvin often interceded on their behalf when their mother was dealing out punishment. There was little that Calvin did not do for the children. He played with them during the day when they were well and stayed up with them at night when they were sick. During one period, when he had resolved to stop his homosexual practices (he had been married and a father), he resumed them only on those occasions when there was no food or money in the house and only long enough to "turn a trick" and get food for the children. When this did not work, he raided the Safeway, despite his terror of still another jail sentence. He was proud of the part he played in their lives, and he played it so well that the children took his love and support for granted.

It would seem, then, that differences in father-child relationships do not depend so much on whether the man is in continuous, as against intermittent or occasional, contact with the child, but on whether the man voluntarily assumes the role of father or has it thrust upon him.

The man who lives with his wife and children is under legal and social constraints to provide for them, to be a husband to his wife and a father to his children. The chances are, however, that he is failing to provide for them, and failure in this primary function contaminates his performance as father in other respects as well. The more demonstrative and accepting he is of his children, the greater is his public and private commitment to the duties and responsibilities of fatherhood; and the greater his commitment, the greater and sharper his failure as the provider and head of the family. To soften this failure, and to lessen the damage to his public and self esteem, he pushes the children away from him, saying, in effect, "I'm not even

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trying to be your father so now I can't be blamed for failing to accomplish what I'm not trying to do."

For the father separated from his children, there is no longer the social obligation to be their chief support. His performance as father is no longer an issue. His failure is an accomplished fact. But now that he is relatively free of the obligations of fatherhood, he can, in his intermittent contacts with his children, by giving money for their support and by being solicitous and affectionate with them, enjoy a modest success as father in precisely those same areas in which he is an established failure.

This is even more clearly seen in the man who lives with a woman who has had children by another man. For these men, obligations to the children are minor in comparison with those of fathers living with their children. Where the father lives with his own children, his occasional touch or other tender gesture is dwarfed by his unmet obligations. No matter how much he does, it is not enough. But where the man lives with children not his own, every gentleness and show of concern and affection redounds to his public and private credit; everything is profit. For him, living with children is not, as it is for the father, charged with failure and guilt. Since his own and others' expectations of him as father are minimal, he is free to enter into a close relationship with the children without fear of failure and uninhibited by guilt. It is as if living with your own children is to live with your failure, but to live with another man's children is, so far as children are concerned, to be in a fail-proof situation: you can win a little or a lot, but, however small your effort or weak your performance, you can almost never lose.

Fathers and children

In addition to the very gross factors so far considered in father-child relationships, any one of a number of other factors may pull father and child closer together or push them further apart. Looking only at separated fathers, for example, who are in the majority on the streetcorner, it seems as if their relationships with their children depend to a striking degree on the father's relationships with the adult who is taking care of the child. Thus, as has been suggested earlier, fathers (e.g., Tonk and Sweets) whose children are living with the father's mother or other members of his family seem to be closer to their children than those (e.g., Sea Cat, Stoopy) whose children are living with the mother or members of her family. And when the child is with its mother, as in the great majority of cases, the frequency of contact between father and child clearly depends more on the father's relationship with the mother than on his relationship with the child himself. It is almost as if the men have no direct relationship with their children independent of their relationship

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with the mother. Whether in different states or in different sections of the same city, these children are never sent to spend a weekend, a Sunday, or even a few hours alone with their fathers. If, like Earl, the father does visit the child's household, it is primarily to see the mother rather than the child. As a rule, children born of short-term unions see their fathers only if and when the father and mother maintain or re-establish a personal relationship.

The dependence of the father-child on the father-mother relationship is clearly evident in the follow-up of Tally's relationship with Bess and their son. We have here, too, a picture of the way in which the father-child relationship can change over time.

After the birth of their baby, and after she and Tally had stopped going out together, Bess came to the corner only on Tally's payday (Wednesdays), sometimes bringing the child along, sometimes not. But as Bess and Tally rediscovered their attraction for each other, she began to bring the baby regularly, coming now on Friday or Saturday evenings and sleeping over with the baby in Tally's room until Sunday night or Monday morning. On these weekends, Tally sometimes took the boy out for a soda or, on one occasion, marched up the street with the child on his shoulder, proudly announcing that Bess had "sent the men to get a loaf of bread." But after a few weeks, Tally and Bess had a fight. Bess stayed away from the neighborhood, and Tally's contacts with his son — dependent as they were on his relationship with Bess — ended abruptly.

The incidental, derivative character of the father-child relationship is not something which arises only after the birth of the child and the separation of the parents. It is rooted in values which, even before conception, boldly and explicitly assert the primacy of the man-woman relationship over a possible father-child relationship, and this primacy continues in effect over the actual father-child relationship when a child is born.

Children as liabilities

Although the relationship with children is secondary to the man-woman relationship, streetcorner men do want children quite apart from the generalized desire to have a family and be the head of it. A man who has no children may want a child to confirm his masculinity; another may want his girl or wife to conceive in order to reduce the chances of her "cheating" or "cutting out"; and still another man may want a particular woman to have his baby because this may guarantee a continuing relationship with this woman.

Fathers and non-fathers alike also see children as liabilities. The principal liability is the financial one. On the one hand, everyone agrees that a man ought to support his children; on the other hand, money is chronically in short supply. To the men, including those who

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do not, in fact, contribute to their children's support, children are real, imagined, or pretended economic liabilities. Having to buy food, shoes, clothes or medicine for a child, or having to make a support payment, serve equally well as reason or excuse for asking to borrow money or refusing to lend any. Everywhere one turns, the consensus is that "children, they'll snatch a lot of biscuits off the table [children are expensive]." So and so had a baby? "Children, they'll snatch a lot of biscuits off the table." So and so is shacking up with a woman with three kids? "Children, they'll snatch a lot of biscuits off the table." The more numerous the children, of course, the greater the liability.

Children — one's own as well as someone else's — are also seen as liabilities in the all-important world of man-woman relationships. Where eating, sleeping, child-rearing, and lovemaking are frequently confined to a single room, children render privacy a scarce commodity. Not only do they constitute a standing deterrent to secrecy (so essential to the maintenance of clandestine relationships), but they may severely limit the man's freedom of action in other ways as well.

Tonk, for example, made no secret of the fact that having his seven-year-old daughter with him for the summer was not an unmixed blessing. Tonk and his wife Pearl had no children. Pearl wanted the child to remain with them permanently, but Tonk insisted on her returning to his mother in the fall, complaining that he has to take care of his daughter when Pearl is not home (she worked nights), and that to do this on a year-round basis would seriously compromise his freedom.

Tonk knew whereof he spoke. A few days later, on a Saturday night while Pearl was at work, Tonk went for a ride with William and two women, taking his daughter with him. The next day, serious trouble arose when the little girl pointed to one of the women and told Pearl, "She's the one who was in my daddy's arms."

Children threaten not only exposure of illicit relationships but also active interference. Indeed, when Tonk and Earlene were kissing in the car, his daughter kept trying to pull them apart, screaming at Earlene that "You're not my mother! You're not my mother!"

Older children, in this respect, are bigger nuisances. Clarence lived with his wife and children but saw a great deal of Nancy. Their relationship was a stormy one. Once, when Nancy and Clarence were fighting, Nancy's 12-year-old son hit Clarence with a baseball bat. This occasioned no surprise to the men on the street and little sympathy for Clarence. The slapstick aspects of it aside, most of the men merely shrugged their shoulders. After all, it was common knowledge that a liaison with a woman who has a half-grown son is a dangerous one. Clarence had gone into it with his eyes open.

Women are painfully aware that men see children as liabilities and that a women who has children may find it difficult to establish a

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satisfactory relationship with a man. Richard and Shirley are having a fight and Richard has told Shirley she is free to take the children and leave. Shirley is crying hard: "Where can I go? To my mother's grave? To the D. C. morgue where they burned [cremated] my sister last month? You know I'm all alone, so where can I go? Nobody wants a woman with three babies."

Lorena voices a sentiment widespread among woman in her contemptuous assessment of men as fathers. In a kitchen discussion with Shirley and Charlene, she dismisses men's protests of love and concern for their children by citing their failure to follow through in action and concludes that, in fact, men regard children as liabilities. "They [men] say they love them. Shit. If they love them, would they let them go hungry? In raggedy-ass clothes? They don't love them. Children are just a tie to a man."

Women are especially resentful of men's instrumental use of children, their use of children as tools for punishment or control in the man-woman relationship. The mother-child relationship, generally conceded to be far closer than the bond between father and children, renders the mother especially vulnerable to such tactics. One woman dreads a fight with her husband because the children will suffer for it. She knows and he knows that he can "get" her by slapping the children around. Another woman, separated from her husband, gets only occasional financial support from him but she is afraid to take him to court for fear that, in order to get back at her, he would go to jail rather than send her money for the children. Leroy regularly uses his small son Donald as a sword of Damocles to control Charlene. Sometimes, during the course of a fight, he denies that Donald is his son and, secure in the knowledge that she has no place to go, he throws Charlene and the child, together with their belongings, out of the apartment (room). When the initiative lies with Charlene and she, in turn, threatens to leave him, Leroy forces her to remain by refusing to let her take the child. At other times he simply threatens to take Donald "back home" and give him to his grandmother to raise.

Fathers and grandfathers

When one looks at the same men as sons rather than as fathers, the father-child relationship appears to be a far more distant one. Just as Tally, or Stoopy, or any of the others do now, their own fathers probably spoke warmly of their children to their friends, admitted that they should be doing more for their children, and considered that, under the circumstances, they were "doing what I can." But from the child's point of view — and he sees even more from the vantage point of adulthood — the father is the man who ran out on his mother, his brothers and sisters, and himself; who had, perhaps, to be taken to court to force him to pay a few dollars toward the

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support of his wife and children; and who, even when he was home, is perhaps best remembered with a switch or belt in his hand.

The men seldom refer to their fathers spontaneously. A group of men can reminisce for hours without the word being mentioned. Many men seem never to have known their fathers: "I don't remember him," "He left [or died] before I was born," or simply, "Shit."

Sea Cat, who was born and raised in the neighborhood, and whose mother continued to live there, never mentioned his father at all. Leroy was raised by his grandparents. His mother and father lived in the same city, but Leroy, who remained close to his mother, mentions his father only to fix relationships or to set a scene.

Richard's father left the family while Richard was still a small child. His father operates a beer joint in Carolina and Richard has seen him on occasion, while passing through the town. His father has never seen Richard's wife or children. Richard and his father never did get along. "We just don't see eye to eye."

Tally's father also left his wife and children when Tally was a small child. "He was a racketeer, a gambler. He never worked a day in his life." When Tally was about nine or ten he was sent to stay with his father and stepmother in Birmingham. He doesn't remember why he was sent there or how long he remained. All he remembers is that his father once gave him a terrible beating.

A nightgown for mother

Sometimes a brief encounter may throw light on both sides of the father-child relationship. In the episode reported below, we catch a glimpse of the man as son, husband, and father.

Preston is in his middle thirties. Dressed in old Army khaki, with his hands thrust in his pockets as he leans against a lamppost or the store-front, he is a regular fixture at the Downtown Cafe. Sometimes when the cafe is short of help, Preston is called to fill in. Such was the case this day when I took a seat at the bar. Preston brought me a beer and started the conversation.

"You know, I had a lot of trouble since I seen you last."

"What kind of trouble?"

"My mother died."

"I'm sorry to hear that."

"Yes, she died three weeks ago. I've been drinking myself to death ever since. Last week I drank up every cent I made before I got it. I don't know what to do. I've been thinking of killing myself."

" You just need a little more time. Three weeks isn't very long for something like this. You'll straighten out."

"Maybe I will, maybe I won't. My mother was all I had. I been thinking I'll go to the pet shop and get a cat."

"How about your father?"

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"Fuck that mother. I don't even want to think about him."

"Do you have any kids?"

"What good are they? They're in Germany and Japan. I've been thinking I'll get married. But that's no good unless you get a girl who understands you."

He took a box from beneath the counter and asked me to open it. Inside was a flimsy nightgown decorated with bright-colored flowers. With tears in his eyes, he explained that he had bought this for his mother for her stay in the hospital but never got to give it to her. On the night of the day he bought it, he got a call from the Washington Hospital Center to come immediately. He ran all the way but his mother was already dead. Preston did not remember the subsequent events very clearly. He said he began drinking very heavily that night and either that same night or the next morning he had to go to the D. C. Morgue to identify his mother's body. When the morgue attendant pulled the sheet back from his mother's face, Preston smashed the attendant in the mouth. He held up the scabby knuckles of his right fist as evidence.

"Why'd you hit him?"

"Because he showed me my dead mother."

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Crime in the streets

JAMES Q. WILSON

Each year the FBI publishes its *Uniform Crime Reports;* each year the reports show crime rates increasing; each year the alert is sounded to warn Americans of our growing lawlessness.

Occasionally, an article appears in a scholarly journal suggesting that the data on which the *Uniform Crime Reports* are based are inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading; that the real crime rate is not known and may never be known (the FBI, after all, must rely on local police and sheriffs for its information); that the FBI sensationalizes what data do exist; and that there are reasons to believe that the crime rate is not really increasing at all.

The scholarly critics, on the whole, have the better of the argument – even if the public and the news media seem unaware of this fact. This superiority of the scholars is not surprising – it is the function of the FBI to help protect Americans and to encourage and support local law enforcement agencies; it is the function of scholars to doubt, to demand proofs, and to examine evidence critically. But this division of labor has also meant that our law enforcement agencies and our scholars have tended to talk past one another. And many of the scholars, having satisfied themselves that they are right and the FBI is wrong, have mistakenly concluded that nothing more need be

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said on the matter – if there is no massively rising "crime wave," then nothing need be done about crime.

It is only in the past year or so that there is some sign of a meeting of minds—if not an agreement—between the law enforcement alarmists and the academic skeptics. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice has worked with scholars and FBI officials in studying how to improve crime reporting methods. More importantly, it is carrying out a nationwide household survey to ascertain how much crime of what kind is really occurring.

Due to appear soon after the first of the year, the Commission's report will contain a vast amount of new information, including an estimate of the amount of unreported crime, the probability of becoming a victim of crime (or of becoming a criminal!), and the relationship between crime and age, race, income, and the like. But we need not wait for the report to find some facts about American crime on which most people, in and out of the FBI, substantially agree.

Some facts about crime

"Crime" is mostly theft, and petty theft at that. The serious crimes that people think of when they fear to walk big-city streets at night – murder, rape, aggravated assault – make up only a tiny fraction (perhaps ten percent) of all "serious" crimes (the other crimes defined by law enforcement agencies as "serious" are robbery, burglary, auto theft, and larceny of items valued over $50).

The rates of some of these serious crimes – for example, murder and rape – have been fairly constant over the last few decades, and may even have declined. This may surprise some avid newspaper readers, but it is unquestionably so: at least with respect to murder, our statistics are fairly reliable – murders are reported, counted, and (in 90 percent of the cases) solved.

The crime rates which do appear to have gone up are theft (burglary, larceny, auto theft, and robbery) and assault. I say "appear," for it is here that the argument begins. Burglary rates may increase statistically, not because more things from homes and stores are stolen, but because more things in homes and stores are insured. The spread of theft insurance, and the willingness of insurance companies to pay off (at least on minor claims) with little or no proof of actual burgling, creates temptations to collect for missing items (or even items that are not missing, but that the owner wishes were). Larceny – which is defined as stealing things that do not require one to enter private premises surreptitiously, and includes the snatching of purses, the picking of pockets, rifling coin telephones and parking meters, and shoplifting – may also reflect not so much the presence of more criminals as more opportunities for "criminal" activity. Sometimes it really is criminal; other times it is more accurately described as merely

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illegal. A prosperous society multiplies public telephones and parking meters; until the belated advent of theft-proof devices, the more such instruments installed, the more chances for picking up loose change. Our department stores and supermarkets, packed to the rafters with the products of the world's richest society, offer tempting targets for people who want (and think they are entitled to pick up) more things than they can afford. This, incidentally, seems to be one main reason why big-city theft rates are higher than those in small towns and rural areas – it is not that the city dweller is less virtuous, it is only that he is more prosperous; thieves go to cities for the same reason businessmen and shoppers do – that's where the loot is.

Prosperity affects theft rates in other ways. The more bicycles we can afford to buy our kids, the more bicycles there are lying about in front yards, waiting to be "borrowed." The more fancy accessories – stereo tape players, built-in-bars, bucket seats – we can afford to pack into our cars, the more such things there are to pilfer from unlocked (or insecurely locked) autos. Moreover, the FBI counts as larceny – a "serious" crime – the theft of anything valued over $50. This definition has remained unchanged for several years. This means that as inflation, or improvements in quality, push up the price of common possessions past the $50 mark, thefts that were not counted at all, or which used to be counted in another category, are suddenly counted as "Part 1 larceny" – and the "serious crime" rate shoots up. As Albert Biderman has pointed out in a recent paper, soaring crime rates – as defined by the FBI – may in fact be nothing more than a slightly different way of measuring a soaring gross national product.

Some questions about crime

But when the average American thinks of crime, he is likely to think, not of a stolen bicycle or shoplifting, but of "crime in the streets" – muggings, purse-snatchings, strong-arm robberies, and other felonious assaults. Even the social scientists who write articles demonstrating that the alleged "crime wave" is a statistical illusion or simple myth are likely to tell their wives (or even themselves) that, if they live near such big-city universities as Chicago, Columbia, or Pennsylvania, they should not walk the streets alone after dark.

No one knows what reality lies behind the official statistics on violent assaults. The rates are going up – but different interpretations can be put on these figures.

In part, it may be that we are more shocked by violence than we used to be – we are richer, better educated, and less comfortable in the presence of the lower classes, the foreign, or the rowdy – and are therefore quicker to call the cops. A barroom fight that once was settled in the alley is now reported, by the saloon keeper or his nervous patrons, to the police, and thus becomes an "assault."

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Another possibility is that we are indeed in greater jeopardy, because we have made it easier for lower class persons (common crime is, as the sociologists would have it, strongly and inversely correlated with socio-economic status) to move freely about the city. Crime-prone groups – especially recent immigrants to the city, not yet assimilated to the mores of urban life – were once confined to high-density ghettoes by ethnic segregation, by the fact that manual workers had to live within walking distance of their places of work, and by police employed by the respectable people to keep the undesirables cordoned off in one section of town. Now the flight to the suburbs has made it easier for the lower classes to find housing in many parts of the city; the automobile has made it possible for them to live some distance from where they work (and, of course, to flee more swiftly from the scene of a crime); and the police have been under strong pressure to treat everyone equally – which means, in this case, not to arrest a suspicious looking character until *after* he has committed a crime. As lower class people have spread out through the city, crime has spread out through the city. Those members of the middle class – professors, elderly couples, artists, certain businessmen and public officials – who have elected to stay behind in the city have suddenly found themselves the victims or witnesses of criminal acts which once the lower class perpetrated in lower-class privacy, amongst themselves.

There is another common – though in my opinion, erroneous – explanation for the urban crime wave. Some well-intentioned people believe that crime figures are inflated by the propensity of the police to arrest Negroes for every little infraction – and often for no infraction at all. If the police didn't discriminate against the Negro in this way, the argument goes, the crime figures would be lower and, in addition, the Negro would lose his undeserved reputation for having a higher crime rate than whites.

Nobody who has spent much time with the police in Negro sections of our big cities could accept this argument. Far from discriminating against the Negro by arresting him for every infraction, however minor, the police, if anything, discriminate against him by *not* arresting him for many crimes, including some serious ones. Partly this is the result of the situation within the Negro community itself – there is indisputably more unreported crime in Harlem, or Watts, or Roxbury, or the South Side of Chicago than there is in a white, middle-class neighborhood. Residents of lower-class Negro neighborhoods tolerate more disorder, are less trusting of the police, and are less willing to inform on their neighbors than are residents of higher-status neighborhoods, Negro or white. (The vast majority of Negro murders and assaults are inflicted on other Negroes.) And, partly, this lower arrest rate is the result of the view, common in at least some big-city

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police departments, that Negro crime is "less serious" than white crime – what in a white neighborhood would be booked by the police as a felonious assault may be booked in a Negro neighborhood as a simple assault ("a cutting") or merely as disorderly conduct. This results in an understatement of the extent of criminality. But since this kind of understatement has doubtless persisted for decades now, it is not likely to have any effect on reported crime rates.

Some further facts about crime

In sum, we have crime statistics which we know are misleading; but we cannot say how much they mislead us or how important this misleading is. We do know that there is an official tendency to exaggerate the prevalence of crime. We also know – for what consolation it is worth – that street crime follows some regular patterns. Aggravated assaults, for example, are rarely practiced by unknown, cold-blooded assailants on innocent victims. On the contrary, two-thirds of such assaults involve hot-blooded assailants venting their fury on family or friends who themselves ought probably to share in the blame for the event. Such assaults tend to happen in the summer months and in private or semi-private places – homes, hotel rooms, and bars. The private nature of most such assaults is shown by the difficulty the police have in making a charge of felonious assault stick – although three-fourths of reported assaults result in an arrest, and four-fifths of the arrests result in formal charges being preferred, only a third of those charged are convicted of the same charge. Friends and relatives tend to drop charges, or change their stories once tempers have cooled.

Robberies tend to be more common in the winter months, especially just before Christmas. In November and December, women go out at night carrying purses filled with cash with which to buy presents. Robbers go right out after them. Most persons charged with robbery carry a weapon; the rest rely on strong-arm tactics. There were over a hundred thousand robberies last year, and though this accounts for less than five per cent of all serious crimes, a hundred thousand robberies is no laughing matter. (Unlike crimes against the person, most robberies and most thefts generally are not solved.) On the other hand, if one takes into account the growth in population, it is not certain that the situation is any worse than it used to be, say, fifty years ago. Our statistics for past periods are just too unreliable to enable us to make neat *per capita* estimates of crime rates.

A person is twice as likely to be robbed as he is to be killed in an automobile accident. Again, one doesn't know whether this is better or worse than things used to be – though one is aware that the number of fatalities in auto accidents has come to be widely regarded as a national scandal. Unlike burglary, robbery rates are probably

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not inflated by claims made purely for insurance purposes (why go to the trouble of having to make up a story about an assailant, and his description, when it is so much easier to report that your watch was "stolen" from your house while you were at the grocery store). Unlike larceny, robbery rates do not depend on the value of the article stolen, nor is robbery motivated by irresistible temptation – while a perfectly normal teenager might grab a transistor radio lying unattended on the front seat of an open convertible, there is nothing normal about a man who grabs a radio at the point of a knife from the hands of an innocent wayfarer.

Of those arrested for robbery (an arrest occurs in only about a third of the cases), two-thirds are under the age of twenty-five. Better than half are Negro. Young people account, in fact, for two-thirds or more of all theft crimes (indeed, they account for almost ninety percent of all auto thefts). These figures must be used with caution, since we don't know – and can't know – whether those arrested are typical of all criminals. Two-thirds of those arrested for crimes against the person, by contrast, are over twenty-five. Stealing is something that kids do; murder, manslaughter, and felonious assault appear to be things that adults do.

More youth, more crime

This last fact is far more important than would appear at first sight. Recognizing and developing its significance is one of the major contributions of the 1965 report, entitled *Prevention and Control of Crime and Delinquency,* submitted by the Space-General Corporation to the California Youth and Adult Correction Agency. Their analysis is based on the ages of persons arrested for various offenses. As such, it is of course biased somewhat by whatever biases exist in determining what kinds of persons will be arrested, but on the whole the bias does not seem to be serious, particularly if one examines separately arrest trends for adults and juveniles.

What Space-General did was quite simple – instead of calculating crime rates by dividing the number of crimes by the total population, they divided the number of crimes by the number of people within the age group (14-29) which produces most serious crime, at least according to arrest records. (In 1965, the FBI reported that over 72 percent of those arrested for a "serious" crime were between the ages of 13 and 29. If you add in those under the age of 13, the proportion rises to nearly 82 percent.) Figured the first way, the crime rate in California appears to be increasing, just as it is in the nation as a whole. But figured the second way, there is hardly any increase in the rate at all over the period 1960-1965. And if we consider only violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) instead of all "serious" crimes, the increase all but disappears.

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Why, then, are there more serious and violent crimes every year? *Simply because there are more young people every year, and because young people have always had a higher crime rate than adults.* Because the size of the younger age group is increasing twice as fast as that of the older age group, over the next ten years California can expect an increase in the number of serious crimes of 55 percent. (The "crime-susceptible" age group will at the same time increase in size by 110 percent.) *What appears to be a crime explosion may in fact be a population explosion.* Eventually, if birth rates decline (as they have been doing recently), the number of people in the crime-susceptible age group will no longer be so disproportionally larger than the number of people in other, older age groups. At that time, the crime rate figured on the conventional basis – number of crimes divided by the total population – will come down. For the present, the only sure way we know of fighting crime is birth control.

The Space-General Report is a rough first approximation to a sophisticated study of this problem, and its findings are not altogether well-supported. The President's Crime Commission will undoubtedly offer fresh information on this matter, but there is a limit to what it can say with confidence. We can never know for sure what age groups *commit* certain crimes; we can only know what age groups are *arrested* for them. The police today may be arresting young people that they once handled informally with "curbstone justice," thus producing higher arrest rates – and more records of "teenage crime" than previously. It may also be that a more thorough study will show that crime rates, *even after* adjustment for age differences, are increasing – though some preliminary studies by Marvin Wolfgang, of the University of Pennsylvania, suggest that, if there is any such increase, it is not nearly so dramatic as is often suggested.

But the significant point is that we must be cautious about what inferences we draw from the number of crimes being reported. Despite the indisputable increase in the *number* of crimes and the apparent, though probably exaggerated, increase in the overall *rate* of crimes, there is as yet no good evidence to justify the assertion that American society is becoming more criminal or less moral. Man for man – even young man for young man – we are, I suspect, *less* likely to commit a truly serious crime today than twenty or thirty years ago. This should not be so surprising – after all, we are a richer, better educated, more homogeneous society than ever before. People who complain about "crime in the streets" are prone to draw from crude crime statistics the conclusion that America is, morally, going to hell in a handbasket. It is important, therefore, to demonstrate that, statistically, we are a long way from hell, and in fact may not even be in that particular handbasket.

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Crime producers and crime consumers

This does not, however, close the subject, as some academics seem to think. Of what comfort is it to a man who been hit over the head and has had his wallet stolen to be told that, statistically, crime rates are not really increasing, that the reason he is lying there in the gutter with a bloody head and an empty pocket is simply that there are now more teenagers in New York, Chicago, or wherever – and that, individually, even those teenagers are probably now more law-abiding? As a noted criminologist, Stanton Wheeler of the Russell Sage Foundation, has recently written: "Personally, it concerns me more whether my wife or children are assaulted at all, than it does whether they are assaulted by a Caucasian, a Puerto Rican, or a Negro ... The important question would seem to be whether or not the rate has gone up for victims in *my* category." (My italics.) Dr. Wheeler calls for "consumer-oriented" crime statistics that will tell, say, a middle-income white resident of mid-town Manhattan what his chances are of being hit over the head, in place of "producer-oriented" crime statistics that simply tell the theoretician how many heads our society is hitting per capita in any particular year.

Dr. Wheeler's formulation has the virtue of assuming that, as individual citizens, we naturally take the victim's point of view. It has the additional virtue of causing us to wonder whether some of us, at any rate, are now *consuming* more crime, even though our society, as a whole, may be said to be *producing* less. The anomaly would be explained by the fact that consumer and producer used to be one and the same person – i.e., the lower classes. Now, it is suggested, the middle classes are consuming more of the declining crime production of the lower classes.

The Space-General report has some guesses as to what victim-related crime statistics would look like, at least for Los Angeles. On the basis of crime and arrest data, the report calculates the odds of being the victim of a serious crime in various parts of the city and gives the income levels of those neighborhoods. Unsurprisingly, the odds in favor of being the victim of a violent crime decline very quickly with increases in neighborhood income – the chances are nearly six per thousand population of being a victim of violent crime in an area with a median family income of under $5,500 a year, but less than one in a thousand in areas with incomes over $8,000 a year. In order to make sense of these statistics, we should need comparable figures for twenty or thirty years ago. Unfortunately, such figures do not exist and it will require a major research project to assemble a meaningful sample. Until this research is done, we shall not be able to say whether the present anxiety in the middle classes about crime is related to an increase in their victimization or simply to an increasing middle-class intolerance of crime.

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What is to be done?

Meanwhile, what can be done about the increase in crime, short of locking up everyone under 30 years of age? On present evidence, the social scientist's answer would have to be: not much. Walter Miller has reviewed most of the literature on the control and prevention of delinquency, including that on the glamorous programs involving detached workers, and has concluded that there is at present little or no evidence that any of the efforts have reduced delinquent behavior (which is mostly stealing) very much or for very long. (At breaking up and pacifying juvenile *gangs,* such programs are often quite useful; but kids don't need gangs in order to steal – indeed, they seem to prefer to steal alone, or in twos and threes.) This may change – there are delinquency-prevention programs underway which have not yet been fully evaluated; but it would be foolish to be too sanguine about this prospect. As far as violent crime goes, even the police despair, since so much of it takes place in private or semi-private places which police patrols cannot reach until it is too late. A murder or an assault can – and does – take place inside an apartment no matter whether there are one, two, or ten policemen outside on the sidewalk.

On the whole, more can probably be accomplished by making more secure the scene of the prospective crime than by operating farther back in the causal chain and reaching toward the criminal (or would-be criminal) himself. It is hard to identify criminals until it is too late; and unless they are identified, a lot of resources and effort will be wasted on the wrong people. Making cars harder to steal (with jump-proof ignitions), making doors and windows harder to open from the outside, putting merchandise displays under better and more continuous surveillance, making it easier for pedestrians to summon aid through warning signals of various sorts, rendering coin boxes and parking meters tamper-proof, improving street and doorway lighting – all of these measures, while hardly panaceas, might be very useful, and they certainly ought to be appealing to a gimmick-conscious society.

In the long run, only broad social changes will have substantial effects. Belton Fleisher, in a recently-published book, *The Economics of Delinquency,* concludes, after a careful econometric analysis, that economic factors – especially family income, and, to a lesser extent, unemployment – have strong effects on delinquency rates. Hollywood movies to the contrary notwithstanding, higher incomes reduce – though they do not eliminate – delinquency. Reducing unemployment also tends, with certain important exceptions and qualifications, to reduce delinquency. Fleisher estimates that a $500 increase in annual income for families in high delinquency areas would cut juvenile arrests by about five per one thousand population. Stated

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another way, "a 10 percent rise in incomes might well result in a 20 percent decline in delinquency." Interestingly, in the equations used to estimate the value of the various potential predictors of delinquency, race was statistically insignificant once income had been taken into account. *It is being in a low income group, not being a Negro, that seems most important in disposing persons toward the kinds of crimes committed by juveniles.* No comparable data exist for violent crimes, nor can we say with confidence how much crime is caused by narcotics addicts seeking money with which to feed their habit.

So it is possible that continued (and enhanced) prosperity, coupled with levelled-off birth rates, may gradually bring the crime rates down. But this is only in the very long run. The forecast for the next twenty years is that the crime problem will become worse: in absolute numbers, there will be more crimes; the rate for the population as a whole will go up (though not necessarily for specific age groups within that population); and, at least in the big cities, the "victim rate" in middle-class neighborhoods will remain high or get higher.

How will the American people react to this? One suspects that they are not going to be pacified by statistics, even accurate ones. It is not uncommon, after all, for a situation to become less tolerable – even intolerable – though it is not, in fact, getting worse. Nor are they likely to rest content with the long view of the social scientist. The American people have just decided that they will not "put up" with so many automobile deaths and injuries. What if they make a similar decision about crimes against the person?

It is possible that the issue of "crime in the streets" can become the major domestic issue of the far right, replacing "communist subversion" and even "socialism." Of its potential appeal, there can be little doubt – just as there can be little question of its potential danger. A less implausible or rigid candidate than Barry Goldwater could make such an issue – with its obvious implications for a Supreme Court that has allegedly "shackled" the police, for a federal government that "encourages" disobedience and even violence, and for intellectuals who want to "mollycoddle" or "explain away" immorality – a major element in a serious bid for power. This is not a problem about which American liberalism has hitherto had much to say – except to demand "citizen review boards" and to criticize the FBI. But unless liberalism can show an eagerness to cope with this problem – even if it only means spending more money on larger police forces – it will become a notable victim of crime in the streets.

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Is scarcity dead?

KENNETH E. BOULDING

Economics is first and foremost the science of scarcity. Its problems only arise if there is not enough to go around. This is why it is a dismal science. Now, there is a fundamental conflict, which has gone on through almost all of recorded history, between the heroic and the economic, between greatness and prudence, between extravagance and sobriety, between glory and common sense. Economics is the good, gray, rational science. After the charge of the Light Brigade, economics asks the reason why. Byronic frenzy may inspire us to say, "Let joy be unconfined"; the economist says, "you'll have to pay for this tomorrow." Even when St. Francis urges us to give and not to count the cost, the economist says that *somebody* has to count the cost; and when someone wants a Great Society, the economist asks, "Who is going to pay for it?" It is no wonder that the economist is not very popular.

At this point someone is sure to come up and say, "Oh, but we have changed all that. Science and technology have produced the Age of Affluence. Scarcity has been abolished. Let us eat, drink, and be merry; there is plenty for all. Between science, automation, and systems engineering, we can produce all we need with a fraction of the labor force; and today not even the sky is the limit."

This view seems to me to involve delusions of grandeur and a totally unwarranted euphoria derived from the careless observation of a few special cases. It is true, of course, that where there is eco-

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nomic development, where the total to be distributed is increasing, then it is possible that the more there is of yours, the more there is of mine, too. We can all indulge in the delightful "positive-sum game" of getting richer together. It is true, too, that the process of economic development in a very real sense diminishes not only scarcity, but also the urgency of rational choice. This is the essential point that Galbraith is making in *The Affluent Society*, and it is perfectly valid. One of the principal delights of being rich is that we do not have to economize so much – that is, we do not have to devote so much time and attention to the careful balancing of gain against loss at the margin, to what Wordsworth decried as "the lore of nicely calculated less or more." There is a familiar proposition in economics that the richer we are, the less is the marginal utility of money – i.e., the less significance for our welfare does the expenditure of an extra dollar have. We can expand this proposition to say that the richer we are, the less is the marginal utility of a unit of general resources, and the less it matters, in effect, whether we make mistakes in allocation. A rich society can afford to be careless and magnificent: another billion dollars is only two thousandths of the GNP, so why not spend it? Furthermore, even though unemployment is now down below 4 percent, we should be able to get it down to 3 percent; there is thus still a good deal of slack in the economy and, by absorbing this, we could easily raise the GNP by five or ten billion; under these circumstances, practically anything we want to do is virtually costless, since it simply comes out of unemployed resources. Come on in, everybody, the water's fine!

Skeletons at the feast

By this time, any economist who defends scarcity looks like a Prohibitionist at a country club. Truth, however, requires me to inaugurate an anti-euphoria campaign. In the face of the "Scarcity is Dead" theology, which is now celebrated with such enthusiasm, the economist needs to remind the celebrants of a few skeletons at their feast.

In the first place, there is no evidence that we are undergoing anything very unusual in the way of technological change and economic development. If we take, for instance, the indices of output per man-hour calculated by the Department of Labor, we find that in the last eighteen years the average rate of increase of output per man-hour has been 3.4 percent per annum for the total private sector; 5.9 percent in agriculture and 2.8 percent in the non-agricultural industries. The only thing here which approaches the spectacular is the remarkable increase in agriculture, though even this is only a speeding up of what has been going on for more than a hundred years. In spite of automation, the rate of increase in output per

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man-hour in non-agricultural industries is not spectacular; and as agriculture is a constantly declining proportion of the total economy, its impact on the total gets smaller all the time. It is, indeed, one of the paradoxes of economic development that the more successful any segment of the economy is in achieving rapid technological progress, the more it is likely to decline in importance. Hence there is a constant tendency for the more stagnant sectors of the economy — such as government, education, the service trades, and so on — to increase in the proportion (of resources used, etc.) which they bear to the total. In this way, a rapid technological change in one sector of the economy has, as it were, the seeds of declining influence in it.

Furthermore, the American economy is by no means the most rapidly developing in the world. It is indeed quite a long way down the list. Direct productivity measures are not easy to come by for comparative purposes, but in cases where the proportion of total resources employed is approximately constant, the rise in the gross national product per head is at least a good first approximation of the rate of technical change. On this score, the record of the United States in the last twenty years is by no means impressive. In the 1950's, there were 45 countries who had a higher rate of economic development than the United States. This figure is a little unfair, because the 1950's were, to some extent, a period of relative stagnation for the United States and of unusually rapid development in other countries; the record of the 1960's will unquestionably look rather different. Nevertheless, in the last twenty years, some countries, notably Japan, West Germany, and some other European countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain, have achieved rates of development which are unprecedented in human history. A sustained rate of development of 8 percent per annum per capita, as in the case of Japan, for instance, represents almost a quantum jump from anything which has happened before. In the period before the Second World War, no country sustained a rate of increase in per capita GNP of more than about 2.3 percent. The difference between 2.3 percent and 8 percent may be dramatically illustrated by pointing out that, under conditions of what might be called successful prewar development, the children are twice as rich as the parents — i.e., per capita income approximately doubles every generation — while at 8 percent per annum, the children are six times as rich as the parents. Whether this can be kept up for more than a generation is, of course, a question.

The two scientific revolutions

Even when we have made all these downward adjustments, however, the fact remains that we seem to be in the presence of a new phenomenon which is associated with what might be called the second phase of the impact of the scientific revolution on economic

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life. The first phase was the period from, shall we say, 1860 to the Second World War, in which we began to get the science-based industries such as electrical engineering, chemical engineering, the nuclear industry, and so on. (Before 1860, the impact of science on the economy was very small. The so-called Industrial Revolution of the 18th century was in fact the tag-end of the long process of developing folk-technology of the Middle Ages.) The impact of science on economic life, in the second phase, since 1945, is reflected in very widespread scientific technologies in a great many sectors, in agriculture, in virtually all forms of industry, in organization and in information processing, and so on. It is this second phase of the impact of science on economic life that produces those 8 percent per annum rates of growth, whereas 2 to 3 percent per annum was characteristic of the first phase. On this criterion, the United States is still in the first phase, and is in a very real sense a backward country; or, we might say more politely, a developing country of the second rank, in spite of the fact that we are, by reason of our past growth and history, still by far the richest country in the world. If present trends continue, however, we will not remain in this relatively privileged position for very long. I have calculated what I call the "overtake dates." That is, at what dates would various countries overtake the United States in per capita real GNP if the growth of all countries continued at the rate of the 1950's (see Table below). In the 1960's, of course, the picture looks rather different. The rate of economic growth in the

OVERTAKE DATES FROM THE 1950's

	Per Capita GNP, 1957 $ U.S.	Rate of Growth 1950-1960 %	Year in which Country overtakes U.S. in Per Capita GNP
United States	2577	1.6	
West Germany	927	6.5	1979
Switzerland	1428	3.7	1986
Japan	306	8.0	1992
Italy	516	5.2	1999
France	943	3.5	2011
Netherlands	836	3.6	2014
Sweden	1380	2.6	2020
Norway	1130	2.6	2040
Denmark	1057	2.6	2047
Belgium	1196	2.3	2069
United Kingdom	1189	2.2	2086
Canada	1947	1.2	Never

Sources: Bruce M. Russett, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, p. 155
Angus Maddison, *Economic Growth in the West*, p. 30

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United States has increased — mainly, however, because we have been absorbing unemployed resources, not because our rate of technological progress has increased. Rates of growth in many other countries, especially in the "socialist camp," have declined, perhaps because of certain horizons which socialist organizations tend to impose, especially in agriculture. The table of overtake dates, therefore, was obsolete as soon as it was calculated. Nevertheless, it represents a certain possibility which cannot be ignored, and certainly any blithe and unthinking optimism about the future of economic development in the United States would be quite unjustified.

The best that can be said about economic policy in the last twenty years is that we could have done worse. The level of unemployment which we have tolerated has probably prevented a more rapid spread of technological improvement, and the fact that it has been concentrated so heavily in two segments of the population, the Negroes on the one hand and young people on the other, is enough to offset much that has been done in these twenty years towards the integration both of youth and of the Negro into the larger society. One should not, of course, overlook the genuine accomplishments of the American economy in this period. In the last generation we have approximately doubled per capita real income, and this increase has been quite widely distributed. The real wages of the employed have almost doubled; the proportion of national income going to labor has actually shown some increase; and the record of the twenty years after the Second World War is unquestionably much superior to the record of the twenty years after the First World War, which was a tragic failure.

The costs of power

At least of equal importance with fiscal conservatism in explaining the sluggish performance of the American economy is the absorption of the whole American society in international political and military competition, its neurotic determination to be the only great power, and the consequent absorption of a large proportion of our total effort in the war industry, or what might be called the space-military complex. The rise of the war industry has been far and away the greatest internal change in American society in the last generation. In the 1930's it was barely 1 percent, of the gross national product; today it is between 9 and 10 percent, and, if the Vietnam war continues to escalate, will almost certainly go higher. This change exceeds by whole orders of magnitude any other change in the system. The only other proportional change in the last generation which anywhere approaches it is the decline in agriculture. Furthermore, from the point of view of growth and development, the 10 percent of the gross national product which is absorbed by the war industry greatly

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understates its impact. Seymour Melman has estimated that some 60 percent of the total research and development effort is channeled into the space-military operation. Melman's claim that the technological development of the civilian sector of the economy has been severely and adversely affected by this absorption of what might be called "the growth resource" in the space-military complex is to be taken very seriously. It is one of the astonishing facts of our times that there has been no comprehensive economic study of the distribution and impact of technological change in detail over the economy as a whole. The many instances which Melman cites, for example, of depletion and at least relative technological stagnation in our society, in, for instance, railroad, shipbuilding, and machine tools, in civilian electronics, in education and health, in construction – the list is frighteningly large – are of course instances, and they can be offset to some extent by reports of spectacular technical change due to automation, for example, in selected cases. Nevertheless, the evidence for widespread technological malaise in the American economy is not to be dismissed, and the most obvious explanation is the absorption of such an enormous proportion of our intellectual, research, engineering, and growth resources in the relatively sterile activities of the space-military complex.

It may be argued, of course, that these activities are not as sterile as I have accused them of being, and that there are, in fact, considerable spillovers from the space-military industry into the civilian economy. In the early days this may have had some truth to it. Certainly, for instance, we would not have had the civilian jets as early as we did if it had not been for the enormous research resource devoted to military aviation. It is becoming increasingly apparent, however, that these spillovers are declining, mainly because the space-military complex is now at least a whole technological generation ahead of the civilian economy as a result of the enormous resources which have been put into it. There are very great difficulties involved in the transfer of technology between two societies, or even between two parts of the same society, where one is more than a technological generation ahead of the other. (We see this problem in its extreme form in the difficulty of translating Western agricultural techniques into forms which have any use whatever for the poor countries of Asia and Africa.) The two technologies speak such totally different languages that they cannot communicate at all. So while there may be long-run technological payoffs on earth for all this investment in space and rocketry, miniaturization, and so on, the payoffs do not seem to be for this generation.

The "space ship earth"

The evolutionary process, throughout its whole vast span of time, has been characterized by short periods of very rapid change followed

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by rather long periods of slow change, and one sees this also in human history. We have already gone through two transition periods of very rapid change, one from the paleolithic to the neolithic, the other from neolithic to civilization, and the present period is entirely comparable to these, and of even greater magnitude. If we are interested in development, therefore, it is quite legitimate to ask: what does the developed society look like? – even though we are not going to be able to spell it out in detail, and even though the developed society itself will undergo a continuous change and transformation, though one suspects at a somewhat slower rate than we are having now.

The present transition is characterized by, and indeed largely caused by, a mutation in the process of growth of human knowledge which we call science. We are still very much in the middle of this process; indeed it is doubtful whether we have yet reached the middle, and it seems probable that the next fifty years will see a rate of change at least equal to what we have seen in the last century, perhaps even greater. Certainly the impact of the biological sciences on the condition of man and the nature of his social system is going to be as spectacular as the impact of physics and chemistry, and we have hardly seen the beginning of this. Some people tend to view the transition as opening a prospect of absolutely unlimited expansion. This tends to be the Communist view, with the deification of man and what seems to me a naive faith in his absolutely unlimited powers. I take a somewhat more restricted and pessimistic view myself. To me, the real significance of this transition is that it represents a change from an "open society" – with an "input" of material from mines and ores and fossil fuels, and with pollutable reservoirs as recipients of "outputs" – to a closed society in the material sense, in which there are no longer any mines or pollutable reservoirs, and in which, therefore, all materials have to be recycled. This is what I have called the "space ship earth." In a space ship, clearly there are no mines and no sewers. Everything has to be recycled; and man has to find a place in the middle of this cycle. The "space ship earth" simply repeats this on a larger scale – though when we look at the earth from space, we realize very clearly what a small, closed, crowded space ship it is.

In economics, this represents a transition from what I have called the "cowboy economy" of exploitation and pollution to the "space man economy," which is characterized by extreme conservation. Whether the desperate necessity of conservation will produce conservatism is an interesting problem. It is certainly not beyond the bounds of possibility that one of the things we will need to conserve is change itself, and the ability to change. In the space ship economy, consumption is no longer a virtue but a vice; and a mounting GNP is to be regarded with horror. Human welfare will clearly be seen to

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depend, not on the through-put of the society – that is, not on the amount it can produce and consume – but on the richness and variety of its capital stock, including, of course, the human capital. Consequently, anything which will conserve consumption and enable us to maintain a larger and more elaborate capital stock with smaller production would be regarded as desirable. Great stress would have to be placed on durability, both of things and of people. We may find indeed that the space ship economy is not feasible without a substantial extension of human life, as George Bernard Shaw suggested in *Back to Methuselah.* I have discussed elsewhere[1] the appalling short-run consequences of cracking the aging barrier and extending human life beyond the Biblical allotted span. Nevertheless, if the space ship earth is to be tolerable at all, it may well be that the consumption of human knowledge which takes place by the frightful toll of aging and death at the average age of 70 will be more than the resources of a depleted planet can cope with.

A space ship society does not preclude, I think, a certain affluence, in the sense that man will be able to maintain a physical state and environment which will involve good health, creative activity, beautiful surroundings, love and joy, art, the pursuit of the life of the spirit, and so on. This affluence, however, will have to be combined with a curious parsimony. Far from scarcity disappearing, it will be the most dominant aspect of the society. Every grain of sand will have to be treasured, and the waste and profligacy of our own day will seem so horrible that our descendants will hardly be able to bear to think about us, for we will appear as monsters in their eyes.

Toward the modest society

How far does the Great Society assist in making this transition? It is hard to avoid giving it some rather bad marks. Greatness is a totally inappropriate moral attitude for a space ship society, which has to be above all things modest. Greatness is all right on the great plains; it is wholly inappropriate to a tiny, fragile sphere. A space ship cannot afford cowboys; it probably cannot even afford horses, and it certainly cannot afford men on horseback. It looks like a tea ceremony, not a parade ground. The slightest touch of grandiosity could ruin it. It involves conservation, coexistence, extreme care in conflict resolution, and above all, no rocking of the boat.

It seems to me that what we need today is less rhetoric about the great society and more thought about the dynamics of the transition to the "modest" society. Revolution is out, as this just creates and

1. K. E. Boulding, "The Menace of Methuselah: Possible Consequences of Increased Life Expectancy," *Journal of Washington Academy of Sciences,* 55:7 (Oct. 1965), 171-179.

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reinforces greatness, pomposity, corruption of taste, and is likely to establish tyrannies. If revolution is out, however, we need to have an image of a dynamic by which legitimacy is gradually withdrawn from the old system and is acquired by the new, to the point where eventually the old system becomes merely a shadow and cannot cause any trouble. I am convinced that the dynamics of legitimacy is the key to this whole problem; the trouble is I don't know anything about the dynamics of legitimacy. I take heart, however, in the fact that the collapse of empire in our time, and the doubling of the number of nations in the last twenty years, is a symptom of something very important – the realization that national greatness is too expensive and that the people of a modest nation have a much better time, or at least a better chance in the long run of a better time.

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Project Camelot: an autopsy

ROBERT A. NISBET

Project Camelot may well have been the worst single scientific project since King Canute dealt with the tides: the worst conceived, worst advised, worst designed, and worst executed. But this much has to be said for it. Never has one project in the social sciences aroused interest so broad, so diverse, and in such high places of the national government. More important, never has one project produced, or at least stimulated, results so momentous (and possibly beneficial) in the long run to government policy with respect to the social sciences.

What was Project Camelot, and why the fuss?* Reading through the multitude of reactions and comments aroused by Project Camelot one is reminded irresistibly of the ancient tale of the three blind men and their individual descriptions of an elephant. For the *Washington Evening Star*, whose political reporter, Walter Pincus, first broke the

*The bare details of Project Camelot are as follows: the Project was conceived in late 1963 by some officers in the Army's Office of Research and Development. Detailed planning was turned over to American University's Special Operations Research Office (SORO), an organization that had been established a number of years before under Army funding for the express purpose of conducting social science research for the Army. The objectives of Camelot were declared to be (1) the systematic identification of the symptoms of the breakdown of a society and (2) the identification of actions that might forestall breakdown. The major national areas of Camelot research interest were chosen from countries in Latin America, the *(cont.)*

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story, Camelot was another episode in the unending conflict between the Departments of Defense and State. For the United States Army, under whose auspices Camelot had been conceived, it was a research project concerned with conditions of social unrest, riots, and insurrection, that would, in the words of General Dick, "help us to predict potential use of the American Army in any number of cases where the situation might break out." For more than a few Chileans, in whose country Camelot first came to international light, it was a flagrant and odious intervention in the domestic affairs of a country with which the United States was at peace. Secretary Rusk saw Camelot as a less than brilliant intrusion by the Army into the always delicate sphere of Latin American foreign relations. Most members of the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements saw Project Camelot as a sad consequence of the dispersed, unfocused, and inadequate role of the behavioral sciences in the Federal government. This last view, as we shall see, comes perhaps the closest to revealing the whole elephant.

For many social scientists, the most conspicuous feature of Camelot was its summary cancellation by the Army, an act widely held to unfold yet another chapter in the government's discrimination against the behavioral sciences. (This view, as we shall also see, was perhaps the most self-serving, the least founded in reality.) For some university administrators across the country, and also a few behavioral-science project tycoons, the reaction to Camelot was, or might have been: "There but for the grace of God. . . ." For American social scientists at work in the field abroad, especially in those political areas where national patriotisms tend normally to be on trigger, Camelot was dynamite that might easily spell disaster for future foreign area research. And so it went.

The Outsiders move in

There was one other reaction to Project Camelot that we must mark for the sake of the record: the reaction of many liberals and non-Establishment social scientists. What they learned from Camelot, others have learned elsewhere: the wages of sin is death. One of the most ironic – let us say, Camelotian – aspects of the Project was the utter absence from its operational staff of those social scientists who

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Middle East, the Far East, Western Europe, and Africa. Project Camelot was activated in late 1964 by SORO with a special group of social scientists under the direction of the late Rex Hopper, a sociologist with Latin American interests. Advising the Project, with varying degrees of directness and continuity, were some thirty-three consultants, many of them among the most distinguished behavioral scientists in the United States. Project Camelot was terminated in July, 1965, by order of Defense Secretary McNamara, following a chain of events described briefly in this article.

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are most commonly the targets today of the Outsiders: those for whom the sesquipedalian "Establishment" has come to replace all four-letter words in the lexicon of Outsider profanity. Think of it! Here was a huge behavioral science project sponsored and financed by that most establishmentarian and hoary of all Establishment agencies, the Army; a project created – to cite the words of the high chief of Camelotians, Dr. Theodore Vallance, Director of American University's Special Operations Research Office (SORO)– as "an outgrowth of continuing interest in the Government in fostering orderly growth and development in the newer countries in the world," an Establishment objective if there ever was one. Add to all this the fact that Project Camelot was probably the most richly endowed (up to $6,000,000 had been allocated) single project in the history of the behavioral sciences. And, *Gloria in Excelsis Deo,* it was a project at long last in which Outsiders were Insiders – most of the social scientists involved were, to one degree or another, on the liberal-left of the political spectrum, and it is not likely there was a single supporter of the Viet Nam war among them. Across the River Styx, the shades of Plato and all his descendants down to C. Wright Mills must have danced in joy at the sight of this final ascent of the pure in heart to the very citadel of modern power.

What were the incentives that attracted and the motives that inspired such social scientists to a project, the official nature of which was a kind of unclassified intelligence enterprise to permit the U. S. Army easier tactical footing? Irving Louis Horowitz, who had no part in Camelot but whose article is the most informed and the most clarifying of all that have appeared, tells us that a glittering range of motives was to be found among Camelot's participants. The following is drawn in paraphrase from Professor Horowitz's "collective self-portrait of Camelot as the social scientists who directed it perceived it."

First, there was the joy of being able to do something Big in social science, something to wipe out memory of the picayune, to obliterate the remembered tedium of what C. Wright Mills had once called "abstracted empiricism." Second was the intoxicating sense of freedom that came with a position at the pinnacle of power; this in contrast to the unfreedom of ordinary academic existence where peers could examine one's work for merit and substance. Third, there was the Platonic prospect of educating an elite, of moulding the minds of that most ancient and reactionary of ruling groups, the generals, and of perhaps endowing the Army, for the first time in history, with peaceful and constructive aims. Fourth was the hope of accelerating man's ascent to perfectibility through the humanization, if not immediate capture, of military power: a dream that had heretofore been confined to utopians in history but was now part and parcel of

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the newest men of power, the behavioral scientists. Fifth was the intoxicating sense of living dangerously while other poor behavioral scientists remained within university cocoons.

These are a few of the motives that Professor Horowitz was able to uncover in his investigation of Camelot. From them it is easy to conclude that a sense of millennial excitement must have seized the minds of Camelotians during the stirring days of 1964-65; a sense of excitement generated by the realization that minds incorruptible and imperishably humanitarian were in the halls of power, at the ramparts indeed, able to look down upon those lesser social scientists, the Establishmentarians, who had sold their souls too early and too cheaply.

Then all hell broke loose. After months of Camelotian respose, of contemplation, of thought and planning, of endless cost-plus consultation with the favored, months in which dreams were dreamed and then coded and punched, the whole thing (oh, cursed spite!) had to end. End not with a bang but a whimper. It happened this way.

Disaster in Chile

One of the Camelot consultants, an assistant professor of anthropology, of Chilean birth but American citizenship, who was on his way to Chile for the summer on personal business, offered – for a fee, of course – to sound out Chilean social scientists on their possible enthusiasm for a project in which the United States Army, working through behavioral scientists, would undertake – in a strictly basic science sort of way, naturally, and with only the highest of motives – to investigate the conditions of social unrest, of insurgency, and means of counterinsurgency, in foreign countries; not necessarily in Chile, understand, but in other Latin American and foreign countries. This seemed like a dandy idea to the Chief Camelotians in Washington, and off went the, if not very first, the very last of Camelot's Intrepids.

The rest is history. Chilean social scientists, for some reason, did not take kindly to the thought of their country or any other being investigated by behavioral scientists who, however pure in heart and in methodological design, and however many echelons removed from tanks and flamethrowers, were nevertheless inescapably acting as agents of the United States Army on foreign ground. We are informed in the Chilean Select Committee Report to the Chamber of Deputies that the initial slight interest of a few Chilean social scientists in the project came from their having been assured in writing that such study as Camelot envisaged was sponsored by private or civil agencies and that it was not until they began reflecting on the implications of the use of a code name and, even more revealing, had received a full and documentary account of what Project Camelot was in fact from another of its consultants – a man of pacifist inclination unable to

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bear longer the weight of guilt – that they were able to respond in ways appropriate to the occasion.

One of the ways was to turn the whole thing over to a left-wing newspaper which, after months of the usual dreary leftist copy, had, for a change, something of Stop Press significance. It is not difficult to imagine the theme: American diplomacy, after a century of working through banana royalists had now turned to behavioral science royalists, that is, from industrial to academic tycoons, etc. etc. In any event, the news of Camelot was out – in Chile at least. Domestic uproar was predictably immediate and substantial, reaching the Chamber of Deputies which, as I have indicated, saw fit to receive a report on the whole matter from a special committee. All things considered, the Chilean report is remarkable for its temperateness, but it spares few details of Camelot, its operating structure, personnel, contacts with Chileans, and so on. In these respects it is a more useful document than the report on Camelot of our own House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements which protects the identity of Camelot scientists and the nature of all the details of the project – in a way that would probably not have been allowed had Camelot involved business or government figures rather than academics.

But if the Chilean Select Committee report was relatively moderate in temper, public and governmental opinion was not. The backlash produced by Camelot caught at least one American social scientist that I know of, leading to his summary eviction from Chile, with months of important research left dangling. He was indeed a victim, hardly qualifying as a bystander, for he was not only unconnected in any way with Camelot but totally ignorant of its existence. His protests were unavailing. The odium of Camelot was inclusive so far as American social scientists were concerned.

It was not, however, Chilean but Washington reaction to Camelot that proved decisive and of great long run significance to the behavioral sciences. Our Ambassador to Chile, Ralph Dungan, stung by his ignorance of something that (given U. S. Army sponsorship) understandably seemed part of his proper business, sent a sharp cable to Rusk after reading the details of Camelot in Chilean newspapers. Rusk went to LBJ, LBJ went to McNamara, McNamara went down gracefully (and gratefully, no doubt), and out of it – in one of the fastest actions ever recorded in official Washington – came a Presidential directive prohibiting Government-sponsored foreign area research that in the opinion of the Secretary of State would adversely affect United States foreign relations. Without the loss of measurable instant, Defense put Camelot to rest; or, to stay within the lovely imagery of it all, sentenced its inhabitants to return to the world of reality.

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And the saddest of all the sad little ironies in the whole story is that, as one of the principals was to say, almost plaintively, Chile had not even been marked for Camelot study, had not been brainstormed, programmed, coded or punched! Of such, alas, is the city of man.

II

But Camelot's memory lingers on. Its real importance in the history of the social sciences begins indeed with its death. As nothing in the life of Charles I of England was said to have become him as did his manner of ending it, so nothing in Camelot's life was as fertile to the social sciences, as pregnant with issue, as its corpse; the corpse that was ordered exhumed for Congressional autopsy almost before its last breath. From the hearing conducted on Camelot by the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements came a report, and I can think of nothing more edifying for social scientists than a reading of this two-hundred page document; edifying and flattering. If any further medicine is needed to wash away the minority-group syndrome that still characterizes the self-evaluation of so many of us in the social sciences, that still leads us to feel despised, discriminated against, and disliked by society and government, it is to be found, free, in this report. Let it be trumpeted far and wide: the Federal government, starting with the Subcommittee whose job it was to look into Camelot's coffin, and going all the way across town to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, loves the behavioral sciences.

In fact, one discovers, as he reads through the text of the Report, that the behavioral sciences are miraculously found free of sin. The Military's *use* of the behavioral sciences is not free of sin, but that, as we shall see, is a different story. Twice only could I find, in comments of individual members of the Subcommittee on the behavioral sciences, undercurrents of the ironic, but these were prompted by testimony on the behavioral sciences that has to be read to be believed. Let me cite the two instances. At one point, the Director of SORO (the administrative structure within which Camelot was hatched) was explaining to Subcommittee members the importance of American behavioral science "know-how" being exported to the underdeveloped nations; his illustration is the account given him by a friend who, while traveling in Africa, had once seen an automobile on an African highway stopped because of a flat tire, with its occupants standing about helplessly, as it seemed. To this one of the Subcommittee members could only gently recommend that the Director drive down any American highway. The second example was offered by a representative of the Military. He pointed, when pressed by the Subcommittee, to behavioral science's "discovery" that the Viet Cong frequently travel in village groups, with women and children along,

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and that they eat their meals at fixed times of the day. This intelligence, he noted, has made possible easier exterminatory actions by the American forces. One of the Subcommittee members, patience by now somewhat tried, wondered why batteries of behavioral scientists were required to discover what presumably would be within the powers of any scouting detail, something that Julius Caesar had found out through simple legionaries in his Germanic campaigns.

But these, I emphasize, are the only such examples I can find in the Subcommittee Report, and their real butt was not the behavioral sciences but, rather, the Military and its use of them. Reading the Report one finds himself, as a social scientist, almost literally holding his breath as he progresses through the testimony, for if ever a single behavioral science project lay exposed – in professional judgment, in design, in execution, quite apart from heavy expenditure of money (several hundred thousands of dollars had already gone into it) – to the possibility of merciless caricature by a Congressional committee, it was Project Camelot. But, far from caricature or hostility, there is only respect, courtesy, and seriousness of interest in the contributions of the behavioral sciences and in their proper status in the Federal government. After all, where else in a Congressional document (or professional document, for that matter) can one find the behavioral sciences characterized as "one of the vital tools in the arsenal of the free societies," with concluding recommendation made that funds for their subvention be greatly increased and their official status honored by inclusion in the Executive Office of the President as well as in a national foundation?

III

Not once in the Subcommittee hearing was the matter of professional ethics raised with respect to the behavioral scientist participants of Project Camelot. It was, however, in Chile, where apparently a different standard of conduct is expected of academic scholars. Reading the Chilean Select Committee report and some of the expressions of opinion in Chilean newspapers, one finds little if any of the censure of the American military that our own Subcommittee confined itself to, for in Chile, as in Latin America generally, nothing but the worst is usually expected from the military. What bothered, and still bothers, Chilean social scientists is, first, the fact that American academics could have allowed themselves to become involved in something like Camelot and, second, that no acts of censure toward Camelot social scientists have been taken, or even voiced, by American social science organizations. From a Chilean perspective it seemed incredible that social scientists could have given themselves, in the first instance, to a project under the auspices of the United States Army involving research into "the most intimate

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details" of Latin American institutions and personal lives; equally incredible that in their earliest communication with Chilean social scientists, American social scientists had camouflaged Army sponsorship by referring vaguely to private foundation and National Science Foundation support. To this day there are Chilean and other Latin American social scientists who believe it the responsibility of American academic professional organizations to render apology in some form; even to register censure for the conduct of the Americans. But anyone who knows the reluctance of American professions, medical, legal, or academic, to voice censure of their own kind knows that the Chileans will wait a long time.

The ethical aspects of Camelot have received some attention by American social scientists, but it has been chiefly in the form of letters to the editor of one or another journal, and these seem, on the whole, superficial and tangential, frequently self-serving, with the Military and State Departments made the scapegoats, and are largely concerned with the question whether or not the behavioral sciences have any business working for the Military. The last seems to me a baseless question, except on grounds of personal ideology. I happen to believe that there was a major ethical responsibility that Camelot's technicians flouted by acceptance in the first place of *the nature of this assignment*. But that has nothing to do with what would appear to me to be the unquestionable, the almost axiomatic, propriety of the behavioral sciences entering into *certain kinds* of professional engagements with the Military.

If the behavioral sciences are what their prime representatives say they are – non-ideological, objective bodies of hypothesis and conclusion drawn from dispassionate and controlled study of human behavior – then there is nothing intrinsically wrong with their conclusions being used by, or given to, the Army. Why should not the behavioral sciences contribute to military and foreign policy as they contribute to community organization, urban renewal, race-relations, and other areas of society? Whether behavioral scientists make this contribution to the military directly – as employees on a military-designed project – or through quasi-autonomous foundations or universities is, as I shall emphasize below, a matter of profound operational and organizational significance. But it is hardly an ethical matter.

The right of the individual, whether he be a sociologist, chemist or engineer, to hold back from the Military, to the best of his abilities, the efforts and contributions he has made as a scientist is, I should suppose, incontestable, however vain and illusory it might be. But the grounds for this have nothing to do with the nature of the sciences and everything to do with personal moral values. I do not see how we can argue on the one hand that the behavioral sciences are

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sciences – that is, bodies of knowledge which reach beyond individual caprice and moral preference to the level of empirically validated conclusions – but that on the other hand their principles should not be given to the military or some other established, recognized part of American society and government.

Theirs not to reason why

Where the issue of professional ethics entered most significantly in Project Camelot, it seems to me, was in the initial acceptance of the mission of the project by social scientists *acting in their role as social scientists.* Let us, for sake of emphasis of this one point, dismiss the feelings of the Chilean social scientists and others who felt put upon by the Americans; it is always difficult to prove who said what, when. Let us, for the same reason, dismiss the ethical matter of the motives Professor Horowitz's interviews uncovered among principals of Camelot – motives which, I have to confess, shock in me what I had thought was an unshockable sense of propriety; for, motives, after all, are elusive, tenuous, and probably irrelevant. But what cannot be overlooked is the fact that a group of American social scientists, acting as social scientists, allowed the American military to believe there was nothing *scientifically* wrong in an American social science project, under American Army sponsorship, entering the historically sensitive areas of Latin America for the express purpose of discovering, through every possible penetration of culture and mind, the conditions of social unrest, conflict, and insurgency.

Here is a cross-cultural consideration that one might justifiably assume to be understood by every sophomore in an introductory sociology or anthropology course, one that might occur to any lay American who has been reading the news over the past decade or two. Was there no one in the administrative organization of SORO, no one among the social scientists who were appointed as *professional* men, not as simple technicians, to say in effect to Lt. General William Dick, Chief of Research and Development, Army: "Your objective is your business and no doubt admirable from the point of view of the Army; as behavioral scientists we desire to be of such help as we can; *but everything we know as behavioral scientists suggests the monumental, possibly catastrophic, unwisdom of such a project.*"

Not five minutes would have been required to acquaint the good general with the most elementary aspects of Latin American ethnocentrism, especially when the American military is involved. Was not the raising of such a question necessary and fundamental? I do not mean "ideologically" fundamental, but *professionally, scientifically,* fundamental. Is not the physician *as physician* professionally bound to refuse the order of a patient to prepare a compound that medical

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knowledge tells the physician is injurious? Does any sociologist believe that the physician can properly take refuge in the implicit statement: I am a behavioral scientist and if my sponsor orders it, it is not mine to reason why?

To say that the social scientists have no right, as scientists, to question a mission, even to refuse (still as scientists) cooperation, is not only to miss the nature of professional ethics but also to be blind to the view that has come to prevail in the larger scientific community today, where the scientist's duty to pronounce on matters of research policy, to pronounce as a scientist on the feasibility, economy, and wisdom of research policy, is not only unquestioned but, as Don K. Price has documented in admirable detail in his *The Scientific Estate,* is a matter on which Congressional and Executive opinion has come to depend.

But this, from all I have been able to read, was not a consideration in the minds of the behavioral scientists of Camelot or their consultants. Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do or die — an epitaph more fitting, however, for cavalrymen than for professional scientists from whom judgment of feasibility is a recognized part of any contract.

IV

But if the behavioral scientists and the Military never saw the underlying, constitutive question, the members of the House Subcommittee assuredly did. Over and over during the hearing, the question was raised by one or another member as to the wisdom of the Military undertaking the kind of research contained in Camelot's objective. No one asked the question more tersely and pointedly than Representative Roybal: "Wouldn't the mere fact that the Army was heading the Project itself create a problem in many countries?" That is indeed the question: How does the military get into this act? To which General Dick replied that, when American soldiers go into a foreign area, it is useful for them to know about the mores, customs, and also possible internal conflicts of that area; hence the Army's long standing custom of issuing handbooks to its entering troops. But this was hardly an answer to the real question which pertained, not to handbooks issued soldiers in areas in which the United States maintained troops, but to the multi-million dollar "basic science" project that was Camelot. Representative Fraser conceded the necessity of handbooks in Viet Nam or Korea. "But," he went on, "when you try to create a model of a developing society for purposes of predicting what is going to happen in that society, for purposes of trying to figure out what kinds of things can be done to affect decision making, and the social processes, I do not see the Army in the game."

Nor would a good many other persons, but so far as one can infer

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from a reading of the transcript, neither Dr. Vallance, representing Camelot's behavioral scientists, nor General Dick and Mr. Seymour Deitchman, representing the Army, ever got it into his head that some gross stupidity or – looking at the matter "methodology-wise" – some scientific anomaly lay in the U. S. Army having commissioned behavioral scientists to go into Latin American countries like Chile. It was not a behavioral scientist connected with Camelot but, once again, Congressman Fraser who uttered the following words – this time following some rather pious testimony from Dr. Vallance:

"[T]here is throughout your whole presentation a kind of – an implicit attitude or relationship that this country bears to the rest of the world which, if I were not an American, I would find perhaps most highly offensive, but it suggests somehow we are the ones to find out the dynamisms that are at work in these countries for the benefit of our Military Establishment. If I were a Latin American, I wouldn't find this a particularly happy arrangement."

With Camelot to spur them, Subcommittee members could have entered into the record that just as war has long been held too important a matter to be left in the hands of the generals, the behavioral sciences are too important to be left in the hands of project titans. But the Subcommittee didn't. With the kind of luck that, as Arthur Guiterman described it many years ago in his famous jingle, God grants to children, fools, drunkards, and citizens of the United States of America, the behavioral sciences emerged from this potentially devastating hearing with their luster untarnished, their prestige, if anything, higher, having been treated to the always joyous spectacle of the military being spanked, and the clear prospect ahead of Federal organization and funding of the social sciences beyond anything that might realistically have been dreamed of once the Pandora's box of Camelot had been opened.

State Department vs. the academics

Nor was this all! We are treated also in the Subcommittee report to something that social scientists can rejoice in almost to the degree of their pleasure in seeing the military made the scapegoat. This is the spectacle of the State Department being told by the Subcommittee to commence making more use of the behavioral sciences in the formulation of foreign policy. In some ways, this is the most Camelotian byproduct of the whole weird enterprise, for if ever there was a time for the State Department to shore-up its traditional dislike of the behavioral sciences, this was it.

It is an old story that between State Department policy sections and the American academic community there is, and for long has been, distrust founded upon the State Department's lack of con-

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fidence in the concrete results of social science research and the academic community's belief – best expressed by Professor Gabriel Almond to a reporter for *Science* – that the State Department is a "conservative institution dominated by a foreign service which is trained largely in the law, in history, in the humanistic disciplines. They believe in making policy through some kind of intuitive and antenna-like process." According to official estimates gained by *Science*, of the $25.3 million spent by government agencies on social science research abroad during fiscal 1966, the State Department spent only $200,000. The Defense Department spent $12.5 millions or half the total.

Despite his generally candid and impressive testimony before the Subcommittee, Secretary Rusk did not appear eager to go into reasons for this disproportion. When pressed by Representative Frelinghuysen as to why, given the large amount of money that Defense got from Congress for behavioral science research, State received, and asked for, only pennies, and, more to the point, why such research as that represented by Camelot was not in State's hands rather than the military's, Rusk indicated only that he preferred not to get into the "question of criteria by which one or another Department might accept responsibility for certain types of research." To be sure, Secretary Rusk did, at this juncture, make the important point that such research "might be better left even to private agencies." I shall return to this in the final section of my article, for it is probably vital to the future of foreign area research by American scholars.

But if Secretary Rusk did not choose to explain the gulf between the State Department and the academic community, others with equal experience in both the foreign service and the universities have. Louis J. Halle, writing in *The Virginia Quarterly Review* (Winter, 1964), has put the matter illuminatingly. "There was a period after the [Second World] War when various departments of the Government tried to marry themselves to the universities. This worked in the case of the Pentagon and the faculties of science and technology, a wartime precedent having already been established at Oak Ridge and Los Alamos. In the case of the State Department it did not work. Professors of diplomatic history, professors of Latin American history, professors of economics and of sociology were brought to Washington for meetings at which the men in the State Department tried to explain their troubles. But the gulf could not be bridged. The professors tended to confine themselves to the general nature of the problems that the officials hopefully set before them, often speaking about the need to maintain the traditional idealism of our international conduct. When confronted by the direct question, 'What shall we *do*?', they fell silent. They could answer every question up to that last, but that last was the one question for which the

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men in the State Department had to have an answer. The experiment, abandoned at last, left the State Department men in a mood of disenchantment tinged with bitterness, such as often follows a frustrated courtship or a broken engagement."

One guesses, however, that in the future the State Department, under the prodding of the Subcommittee (formal prodding, contained in its official recommendations), will engage more actively in research partnered with social scientists. Not the kind that is expected to produce an answer to each *ad hoc* question that crosses a desk during a State Department day, but a kind that, when carried on long enough, and, hopefully, with a degree of discrimination lacking in Camelot, could be the context or seedbed of decisions of policy.

V

We cannot conclude discussion of Camelot's impact on the State Department without reference to one development that for awhile led to considerable agitation in the social science world. This was the memorandum from President Johnson, hard on the heels of Camelot's exposure in Chile, directing the Secretary of State henceforth to screen all Government-sponsored foreign area research for its possible adverse effects upon United States foreign relations. Heaven knows, given the blunders of Camelot, there was every good reason for such a directive. But the first response of social scientists, including those who had been involved in Camelot, was to cry "censorship." By what right, it was asked, did one department of government take to itself the function of scrutinizing research projects sponsored by other Government departments in which American social scientists were participating?

The answer could have been stated simply: by the same right under which today, though still imperfectly, the State Department screens "projects" of American industry that involve entry into Latin American countries. The once odious spectacle of American businessmen entering the banana republics of Central America and then calling for the Marines when the going got difficult should not be repeated, it would appear obvious, when it is large scale social science projects that are involved. Despite the myth of Immaculate Conception that obtains among American behavioral scientists — under which the most aggressively intimate forays into human privacy are held miraculously pure — the rape of national dignity by American academic enterprise is as repugnant to foreign feeling as rape by American business or government. The Chilean Select Committee Report makes this very plain indeed! On a hot day one can chill himself by reflecting on what might have happened in Chile — or any of the countries marked by Camelot for invasion — had the project had "good" luck; had it been "successful"; had unforeseen

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exposure not led to premature death. Several regiments of Marines would have been necessary to salvage American research capital and protect American researchers' lives.

The blessed wonder is, given all the considerations of national dignity involved, considerations that, as the Select Committee Report specifically emphasized, could not be waived "under the pretext of the scientific character of Camelot", that the President's directive did not include *all* foreign-area research. For what can be more important than preservation of good feeling in Latin America, good feeling that for years was jeopardized by American commercial arrogance and that American academic arrogance jeopardized in 1965? But the President's memorandum did not make this mistake. It properly confined itself to *Government-sponsored research.* It excludes altogether from its scope private research – of universities, foundations, and of individuals. Secretary Rusk made this emphatic in his testimony before the Subcommittee. Almost equally important, the Foreign Affairs Research Council that was established by the State Department to give effect to the President's memorandum, has, in practice, excluded also from its jurisdiction domestic grants of the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the National Defense Education Act, and the Fulbright program. The Council's range thus is restricted to Federal departments – Defense, Commerce, Treasury, etc. – in the more customary sense. Finally, in the year's experience with the new procedure, it would appear that nothing of legitimate concern to the social sciences has arisen in the Council's actual administration of its responsibility. It is difficult to understand what the executive officer of the American Psychological Association had in mind when, according to *Science* (8 July), he declared that the new risk review procedures "have eroded confidence in the government's understanding of how science goes about its business. . . . You would prefer that your peers look at your work. This is the way science is advanced, by having your critical colleagues look over your shoulder."

Such words are as irrelevant as they are pious. Returning to Camelot, it may be assumed that dozens of scientific consultants looked over the shoulders of dozens of Camelot principals. But if there is any record of their having looked critically enough to get at the core of this monumental blunder, I have been unable to find it. To talk serenely about the holy ground of science in the aftermath of Camelot, a project that, above anything that has ever happened, has weakened the confidence of Latin American intellectuals *in the American academic and scholarly community,* is a little like talking about the rights of free private enterprise in the predatory contexts of dollar diplomacy.

As I indicated above, the members of the Chilean Select Com-

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mittee were unmoved by the "scientific" objectives of Camelot. It is useful to quote the words of the Committee report: "We wish to say that this foreign intervention in our internal affairs may not be defended on the pretext that the social investigation which was proposed has a scientific character." I shall have more to say below of the mounting implications to American foreign policy of large scale, corporate research in search of foreign areas. Here it suffices to emphasize only that when a major Federal department – be it Defense, State, or Commerce – sponsors a scientific project, even one composed of dues-paying psychologists and sociologists, it is elementary that not even the elixir of scientific method is sufficient to wipe away the fact of sponsorship.

VI

We come now to what are surely the most far-reaching episodes in the aftermath of Camelot: the Congressional hearings and bills which, if approved, will result in a National Social Sciences Foundation and an Office of the Behavioral Sciences in the Executive Office of the President – not to mention a White House Conference on the Behavioral Sciences.

I do not mean to imply that Camelot was the sole cause of these momentous events. After all, proposals along their line have been in the minds of social scientists for years. There was, moreover, the effect on academic and government consciousness of disclosure that Michigan State University had had for some years a project, under Federal financing, for the training of police in South Viet Nam, a project in which individuals were employed "who had background in intelligence work for the United States," according to President John Hannah. It was charged that CIA under-cover agents were among these individuals, and although President Hannah declared that none "was known by the University or its representatives to have affiliations with the Central Intelligence Agency," such a statement, with all respect to its maker, is a little hard to assess. In the nature of things the University *wouldn't* have known, wouldn't have been permitted to know, officially at least, if some of those "with background in intelligence work" were agents of the CIA.

But the Michigan State affair was only a tempest – with rather limited consequences, a few being cancellation of some potentially sensitive university projects around the country with CIA and other agencies of the American military apparatus. Camelot, on the other hand – in terms not only of ensuing governmental action but also of ethical, intellectual, and academic issues – was, by comparison, an earthquake, one whose repercussions will continue for a long time. Let us examine a few of these.

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Social science and public policy

There is, in the first place, the vital matter of Federal policy with respect to the social and behavioral sciences. As I noted above, the House subcommittee, in its autopsy of Camelot, made strongly evident its dislike of military sponsorship of foreign area research. This is explicit in the Subcommittee's official recommendations. And while there was an inclination among Subcommittee members to see such research under the State Department, the most significant recommendation (with but one member dissenting) was toward the establishment of a separate agency in the Federal government for sponsorship of the social sciences. The official recommendation of the Subcommittee did not go beyond an Office of Behavioral Science Advisor in the White House. Subsequently, however (in June, 1966), the Chairman of the Subcommittee, Dante B. Fascell of Florida, introduced bills in the House to give formal effect, not only to this recommendation, but also to the establishment of a White House Conference on the Behavioral Sciences and, most important, to the establishment of a National Social Sciences Foundation. At the present time (August, 1966), the Senate Government Research Subcommittee under Senator Fred R. Harris of Oklahoma, is holding hearings on these and related matters. The preponderance (though by no means all) of academic testimony has been in favor of such a foundation, and we are told that Senator Harris' own sentiments in the matter are favorable. Still another hearing on the social sciences and their use by the Government is currently being held by the House Research and Technical Programs Subcommittee (of the House Committee on Government Operations), under the chairmanship of Representative Henry S. Reuss of Wisconsin. Again, of Camelot, one can only say reverently, never have so few so unintentionally earned the gratitude of so many!

Whether a National Social Sciences Foundation, not to mention an Office of Behavioral Sciences Advisor in the White House, is desirable at this juncture in the history of the social sciences is a difficult question even for those of us whose immediate interest is the welfare and prosperity of the social sciences. There is no doubt much to be said for both agencies. Some embarrassments and difficulties might be obviated. But there are others that, far from being obviated, might easily be created by such agencies. I am surely not alone in my belief that formal and heralded establishment of these agencies could well lead to a burden of expectation by government and public opinion that the social sciences are ill-prepared to shoulder. I say this not from belief that nothing or little of scientific character exists in the social sciences. Far from it. There are areas in the social sciences today where work of more genuinely scientific nature (using the word in its strict and hard-core meaning) exists than in certain areas

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of the biological and, for all I know, the physical sciences. This is not in question. The major difficulty would come, I believe, from the heavy likelihood that the Federal government – which already tends to be largely and increasingly "mission-oriented" in its conception of science – would place upon such a Federally-sanctioned office responsibility for massive *policy* questions and problems that the social sciences neither can, nor should, be expected to answer.

Over the past generation, the social sciences have made contributions of considerable value to society and to social policy. This is incontestable. That, given current tendencies, they will make even greater contributions in the future is almost certain. But this is not the essence of the problem. The essence is whether, given the monumental policy *expectations* of the social sciences that would be created by establishment of such agencies as those envisioned in Representative Fascell's bills, the social sciences (or, for that matter, *any* sciences) could meet them in a way not leaving a gulf between expectation and reality so wide as to promote disillusionment in government and society. Stating the matter briefly, one can say the danger consists in the ever present temptation of government to see the social scientists as *physicians* – called upon to answer *ad hoc* questions today, yesterday if possible – when they are, at their best, *physiologists*, still concerned with vital matters of the nature of human behavior.

Bureaucratic shadows

There is another disturbing aspect. The social sciences contain today a great diversity of not merely *kind* of work done, but, equally important, of conceptions of kind of work that *should* be done. Beneath the crust of apparent unity in the phrase "the social sciences" lie fissures of extraordinary depth in self-conceptions by social scientists. Orientations here vary much more greatly than among natural scientists. The almost inevitable effect, it would seem, of the establishment of a social sciences foundation would be to create an all too visible hand in the eventual resolution of their conflicts. A national foundation means a powerful director, not to mention vast funds. Everything we know as social scientists about bureaucracy and about the informal but potent pressures on bureaucracy, from inside and out, suggests the prospect of an external shaping of the development of the social sciences that one cannot contemplate with equanimity.

There is, finally, and from the strict point of view of social science research the most important of all considerations, the inevitably fragmenting, not to say segregating, effect that such a foundation would have upon the science of human behavior. The root is still man, and one of the most fascinating and encouraging of all tendencies today

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in the behavioral sciences is the synthesizing of strains of social, psychological, and physiological (and, who knows, physical in the next generation) research in the study of man. If there is anything that makes the elusive term "behavioral science" different from the "social sciences," it is the closer concentration, it would seem, upon *human behavior,* as the rigorous point of departure, in contrast to the plethora of problems, issues, values, and ideologies that the long history of moral philosophy and the social sciences have bequeathed to us. There are vital problems that are neither social nor biological in character but both – problems on which important research is now being conducted. To seek, in effect, through separate funding and design of problems, to disengage the social from the biological would be to reverse present healthy trends.

It seems to me that it would be far better to widen, through appropriate legislation, the present social science area of the National Sciences Foundation. (A bill now before Congress proposes exactly this.) Experience of recent years with this agency has certainly been encouraging from the viewpoint of the social sciences. Having for years protested, as many of us have, the arbitrary distinction the public makes between "science" and "social science," why, now, seek to institutionalize this distinction, risk perpetuating it forever, through establishment of a separate foundation?

VII

Important as it is, the matter of a new foundation may be of less vital relevance than still another question – one also dramatized by Camelot – and that is the continued usefulness of the whole "project system" that has been in vogue in the Federal government's relation to the sciences ever since the years just following the Second World War, when a group of outstanding scientists in Washington were able to give it the wise guidance and control that the project system so plainly needs. But such wisdom cannot be taken for granted. The opportunities, on the one hand, for bureaucratic direction and misdirection of scientific research and, on the other, for political (I mean intra-scientific politics as much as other) considerations to govern, are all too rife. There is much to be said for the abandonment, or at least sharp cutback, of a system which not only permits, but encourages scientists to go to Washington as individuals or in small groups and receive grants for projects with scrutiny too hurried and too much governed by pecking-order considerations. The system, moreover, promotes disaffection within the universities.

Dr. Frederick Seitz, President of the National Academy of Science, has uttered some recent, important words to this effect. "I think that the whole process of supporting academic research with federal funds would be improved substantially if a larger fraction of the

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money granted by the government came to universities in the form of institutional grants that were handled on the basis of decisions made jointly by university administration and faculty."

Dr. Seitz makes clear that one of the primary reasons for his recommendation of this change in policy is that of restoring strength to the inner governments of universities – to department chairmen, to deans, but also to constituted faculty committees and councils; strength they have lost under a project system in which they are either bypassed altogether or reduced to mere clerical or clearing-house status by individual scientists whose own power and mobility are guaranteed by the independence of their project from the university in which their primary identity (and tenure, and high salary, and perquisities) are rooted. As Dr. Seitz emphasizes, such independence helps explain the kind of disintegration of academic community on a campus that Berkeley experienced two years ago.

The second reason Dr. Seitz gives for his recommendation is the fatal affinity that seems to lie between the project system and the *size* of projects that take residence on university campuses. No bureaucracy likes to administer funds for an infinity of small, individual projects. It is so much easier to grant one distinguished man large sums of money in a single project. Knowing this, scientists make application accordingly. Add to this the fact that Congress can most easily be pleased, on the occasions of its examination of how funds for science have been spent, by projects that are "mission-oriented," that have a high degree of applied flavor. The result of this is to encourage proliferation of types of scientific project of a practical or applied nature that could as easily be handled by non-university bodies – Federal, state, or private – and a subtle but puissant downgrading of appeal of those smaller, more open-ended, even amorphous "projects" that fall in the basic or theoretical areas of science.

The problem of sponsorship

There would be, it is clear, still another gain, and that is to the steadily enlarging field of American foreign-area research. If Project Camelot teaches anything, it is the crucial importance of *sponsorship* when a team of American social scientists goes abroad to conduct inquiries into social structure, culture, and values which, by their very nature, run the risk of offending foreign sensibilities. There is, among many foreign scholars – quite apart from government officials and citizens – a certain suspicion of, not only the United States government and its agencies, but of government agencies in general: a suspicion founded upon frequent conflicts between their own governments and the intellectual communities in these countries – especially in the new and underdevolped areas. Research projects which go abroad from the United States under the aegis of a govern-

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mental department, even departments as generally "clean" as AID or NSF or NIH, will increasingly encounter suspicion of, or will at least be subject to partisan political charges of, clandestine military penetration.

Universities, on the other hand, would appear much less susceptible to such suspicion or charges, especially when their research enterprises abroad are based, from the start, upon full cooperation with universities in the areas to be studied. In almost all countries of the world, the university is, and is most likely of all institutions to remain, trusted. One need think only of the large numbers of scholars, scientists, and public servants in the Latin American, Asian, and African countries whose higher educations have been gained in whole or part in American universities – quite apart from a generally distinguished record of American university scholars in these foreign areas.

It can be said, of course, that Camelot is evidence of the contrary. After all, this project was conceived within SORO which is itself administratively connected with American University. But from all one can gather, SORO has virtually independent status; it would appear to be only nominally a part of the University, in it but not really of it; its ties with the Army come closer to being those of RAND's to the Air Force. It is, in fact, a research center of the Army that, for various reasons which must once have seemed good to officials of American University, is housed there instead of in the Pentagon.

This is surely a very different thing from university-sponsorship as we generally and rightly understand it. And if Latin American scholars were, unhappily for us all, justified in placing some of the odium on a university in the United States, sober analysis nevertheless requires the differentiation I am making. But there is a hard lesson, nevetheless, in Camelot. If the system of block-grants to universities should be adopted by Government foundations, in preference to the present project system, then much is properly owing these Government foundations by the universities in the way of *guaranteed administrative machinery* within the universities through which all such block-grants will be handled. Federal foundations should insist upon, at a minimum, proper academic-administrative bodies of review within the universities, composed of faculty members, as well as of administrators, which would have something of the same overall responsibility for research conducted under these block-grants that faculty-administrative councils and committees have immemorially had over curriculum, courses, and over internally-financed research in the universities.

Let us make no mistake. Such a system, replacing the twenty-year old project system in this country, will have its bitter enemies

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among scientists themselves; among those, at least, by now well accustomed to the free-wheeling possibilities, the independence, the sense of titanship, that go with the project system. Nevertheless, both for the reasons given by Dr. Seitz and for reasons inherent in the special nature of the social sciences – especially inherent in the nature of foreign-area research – I think the block-grant system, making the universities rather than Federal agencies acting through *ad hoc* projects the true principals, will work to the long run enhancement of research. There will be, I should think, far less probability of a Project Camelot again occurring. But this will be true only if a *bona fide* university "infrastructure" for the allocation and handling of these funds within the university exists. To turn such vital matters over to an agency like SORO, where university ties are only nominal and those between it and the Army (or any other Federal department) are decisive, could be ruinous.

VIII

But no matter what the "infrastructure" of American foreign-area research, it would be naive to suppose that the future can be made free of the threat of impact upon foreign relations that Camelot represented in so egregious a way. Even if Camelot had never happened, there would still be what Camelot assuredly intensified: the problem of retaining (not to mention increasing) the hospitality of foreign nations toward American research in the behavioral sciences. Granted that Chileans, Nigerians, Ceylonese, English, French, and Germans would be more hospitable to a project of Camelot's general type emanating from Harvard University than from the Department of Defense, the question remains: how favorable? For we are dealing with research orientations in today's behavioral sciences in the United States of a mass, and of a type, that increasingly pose problems of potential conflict with foreign sensibility.

It is well to be reminded that some of the animus toward Camelot found in the Chilean Select Committee Report has to do with the basic type of problem that was buried beneath the Project's more manifestly absurd pretensions. From the Chilean point of view, there was gross impropriety in the fact that, irrespective of Army sponsorship, Project Camelot proposed (I am quoting almost verbatim here) to investigate not only isolated and innocuous aspects of Chilean life, but to make an X-ray of the nation, including the most intimate aspects of human beings: what they think, feel, believe, or hope. And all of this without the consent of or authorization of either the Chilean government or the Chilean universities.

It is a fact worth stressing that personal and institutional privacy is still taken more seriously in Latin American and many other countries in the world than it is in the United States, where Gallup and

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Roper Polls, Kinsey reports, behavioral science and/or FBI bugging of juries, class rooms, offices and conference halls, not to mention the oceans of questionnaires that go forth daily from social science centers, industrial personnel offices, and civil service agencies, inquiring into every intimate and sensitive aspect of one's political, sexual, financial, and dream life have, over a period of a quarter of a century, made Americans the most nakedly exposed – and in this vital sense, perhaps, unfree – people in history. Even under the military dictatorships of Latin America, a freedom of individuality and of personal privacy is known and cherished that we in the United States may be beginning to forget.

Breaches of confidence

There is a further reason for possible distrust among intellectuals and social scientists abroad of American foreign-area projects. That is the slightly uneven record of preservation of research confidence by individual American social scientists. There have been instances, as is well known, in which full entry into a community, a sect, a club or gang, or a file of documents was granted a social science project *only* under the guarantee of absolute confidentiality and anonymity of respondents: confidentiality and anonymity which were ruthlessly violated by one or more individuals of the self-same projects acting, despite the best efforts of the principals to restrain such violation, under the cloak of individual academic freedom to publish the truth, however gained. The recent cancellation, by the U. S. Air Force, of a project funded by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, but administered at the University of Wisconsin, is possibly a case in point. Although the Air Force gave no official excuse for cancellation, there is reason to believe that when some of the detailed and intimate questions that were to be asked of selected Air Force officers were examined, the conclusion was reached that such a questionnaire would be inimical to service morale, given the ever-present possibility of future leaks of community-, group-, or individual-identity.

Here again, as with so many of the issues raised by Camelot, the immediate, instinctive reaction of the academic-research community is a curious one, to say the least. We find one professor declaring that the prime lesson to be learned from the Air Force cancellation is that we, the social scientists, must educate the public into understanding that the same kind of personal intimacy of question is to be expected and accepted from social scientists as has long been accepted from physicians and lawyers. But at least two aspects of the matter render this comparison decidedly suspect. In the first place, the physician's "intimacy" stems solely from diagnosis designed to cure. Intimacy of the social scientist stems from research designed for publication. There is, second, the matter of responsibility and sanctions. A phy-

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sician found guilty of broadcasting or leaking the identity of a patient with, say, a venereal disease or an advanced case of alcoholism or nymphomania would be broken professionally. There are no such sanctions in the academic profession. It is possible, indeed, to be promoted and to draw excellent royalties in the behavioral sciences for actions that would lead to suspension from the legal or medical professions.

This may seem a tangential matter. I am suggesting, however, that what is an increasingly complex and uneasy matter for American conscience is bound to be, given the less than perfect record that the behavioral sciences have for preservation of confidentiality, a matter of considerable moment when the subjects are Chilean or French instead of American. As I noted above, one of the responses of the Latin American academic and intellectual community to Camelot has been precisely that of asking what acts of censure have been taken by American social science associations toward the individuals involved in Camelot.

The imperialist phase of survey research

More important, however, to the future of American foreign-area research than type of research project and question is its potential volume. Here we have something that can, not inexactly, be put in Malthusian terms. The number of foreign research areas will increase (through dropping of barriers) *arithmetically*, but the population of American behavioral scientists with questions to ask of foreign areas will increase *geometrically*. Where once American foreign-area research was confined to a tiny handful of anthropologists and geographers who learned, the hard way, the exceeding importance of tact, trust, honesty, and limits to questions when dealing with foreign peoples, and who went in as individuals, not as members of formidable projects, such research now, as we know, engulfs all the behavioral sciences. Given its rising popularity among social scientists who once could not have found their way to a passport office; given the shrinking (in the sense of yielding diminishing returns) domestic supply of political attitudes, religious beliefs, social aspirations, dreams, orgasms, etc., against the voracious requests of domestic behavioral science titans for ever enlarging masses of subjects; and given, finally, the hordes of graduate students writing dissertations, junior professors on the make, senior professors in struggle for project titanship, not to mention the tens, the hundreds of millions of dollars for such research that will inevitably come from formalized Federal assistance – given all this, it could hardly be a matter for wonder if more and more foreign governments (and also foreign academic communities) began to take the hostile stance toward American social scientists that was once reserved for American busi-

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nessmen. The bland and righteous belief among American academics that any degree of invasion of privacy, any degree of public exposure of the human psyche, is justified so long as it is in the name of science rather than, say, the TV industry, is no more likely to win popularity in the long run than did the medieval Inquisition when it defended *its* invasions in the name of piety and protection of the faithful. To assume that all will be well if only investigation of natives abroad is done by an American NSSF or a university is, I fear, naive. There will be, all too certainly, other considerations – of foreign relations, national policy and so on – when the American knowledge industry really gets tooled up for foreign markets, and its production rolling.

Does such language offend? We had better get used to it. The relevant model of behavioral science research is fast ceasing to be the scholar – he of "furrowed brow in bookish corner" – and fast becoming the brisk executive, at home, equally, in institute, business, and government. We still use the beguiling image of the scholar and his natural right to freedom of inquiry. It is to today's large-scale, corporate research what the image of the small individual businessman and his natural right to profit is to corporate industry: a compound of honest nostalgia, guilty conscience, and camouflage. The structure, the incentives, and even the language of contemporary large scale research have more in common with business than with the academy. And it matters little, substantively, whether we have reference here to "academic" or "nonacademic" research.

It is possible, I think, to apply to today's knowledge industry what Berle and Means wrote thirty years ago of the modern corporation. "Just what motives are effective today, in so far as control is concerned, must be a matter of conjecture. But it is probable that more could be learned regarding them by studying the motives of an Alexander the Great, seeking new worlds to conquer, than by considering the motives of a petty tradesman of the days of Adam Smith." Substitute "petty scholar" for "petty tradesman" in the foregoing words, and the relevance is immediate.

Foreign-area research is bound to become massive and, potentially, invasionary. If one were a Marxist-Leninist he could say that the American research industry is just beginning to enter its imperialist phase. Diminishing returns, a falling rate of profit, are encountered in the American market. Smalltown, Midcity, Big City have been entered too often; the middle, upper, and lower classes are beginning to be sucked dry. New worlds are needed for conquest if the already frenzied competition for returns within the United States is not to result in civil war. (A sometime business executive, now financial vice-president of a great university, said recently: "Nothing I saw in fifteen years of business compares with the gut competition, the dog eat dog, that I see in the university. God help the natives

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abroad when the academics get at them in full force.") There must be, at this moment, literally tens of thousands of American behavioral scientists – Ph.D. aspirants in search of dissertations, professors of all ranks, not to mention the hordes of nonacademic researchers in business and government – poised, computers oiled and at the ready for the Big Leap across all oceans, once long-dreamed-of capital is available.

L'Envoi

The time is 1984. Dispatches from the Latin American country, Bralivia, have just been received, reporting thundering headlines and editorials in Bralivian newspapers, riots in the streets, and the government in mortal danger of collapse. The American Embassy and consul offices are being stoned. A vast Project Shangri-La in Bralivia has just been discovered; funded by the United States Foundation for the Behavioral Sciences and led by eminent American behavioral scientists in secret cooperation with Bralivian scientists under American salary. Confidential permission of access had earlier been given by the Bralivian government in return for an 87 percent administrative override, payable in dollars, the going rate in American universities for projects Federally funded. Project Shangri-La, according to Bralivian newspapers, had been organized years earlier – immediately after the mistakes of Project Camelot had been counted and assessed – for the objective of Saturation Inquiry of an unsuspecting (and, hence, research-pure) foreign population. With the permission of the Bralivian government and the aid of Bralivian scientists, Bralivian confessional boxes, juries, schoolrooms, household kitchens, and brothels had been bugged. Through recently discovered computer techniques of Simultaneous-Total Assault, all Bralivian institutions – church, family, political party, local community, trade union, school, mental asylums, infant nurseries, business enterprise, and bureaucracy – had been engaged. Depth interviews of new intimacy had been made possible through psychodelic techniques that destroyed all possibility of suspicion on the part of the Bralivian subject. Project Shangri-La, it is learned, has been in existence in Bralivia for more than three years. Although no American behavioral scientist could be found who professed knowledge of Project Shangri-La, a member of the Project administrative staff made the following statement: "Shangri-La was only a feasibility study; we were not really interested in Bralivia at all; it was not among the 24 countries marked for intensive study. The tragedy is that we were just on the verge of the greatest methodological breakthrough in the history of science. Now it is all for nothing." It is understood that exposure of Project Shangri-La came from a leak by one of the American consultants when he learned that the results of Shangri-La would be made available to the Department of Commerce.

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Liberalism and the national idea

SAMUEL H. BEER

A few years ago, while preparing a talk on liberalism, I thought I would look back before the 1930's in order to see what leading figures in our past had taken the term to mean. To my surprise, I found that they almost never used it. I turned, for instance, to Herbert Croly, who, as author of *The Promise of American Life* and founder of *The New Republic,* could surely be regarded as one of the principal voices of liberalism in this century. Only very occasionally in that book, which was written between 1905 and 1909, did he use the term "liberal" or "liberalism." No more frequently he spoke of conservatism, and then only as one of two extremes, of which the other was radicalism.

Similarly, in political controversies before Croly's time, generic terms – such as "progressive" and "democratic" – were used in addition to party labels to designate important viewpoints. But "liberal" was not among them. Nor did contemporaries in these contests use the liberal-vs.-conservative formula to describe their confrontations. This is not to say that the terms are never found in American political discourse. Among the educated, who were in touch with politics abroad, "liberal" and "liberalism" were sometimes used. In this way one can account for occasional uses, as when Orestes Brownson for a few years called himself a liberal. This does not change the main point: that "liberal" and "liberalism" were used hardly at all in American political debate in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early

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twentieth centuries. Then, suddenly, in the first years of the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, they were widely adopted by editorial writers, politicians and the articulate public in general to identify a major position in American politics, namely the outlook of the New Deal.

In politics words are cheap and this striking innovation in political terminology could have been merely verbal. In fact, the New Deal brought into existence not only a new alignment of social forces and a new balance between the parties, but also a new outlook on public policy. Between that outlook and elements of our political past, there are, of course, many continuities, stretching back through movements of progressive and democratic reform even to Jefferson and his "cherishment of the people." The novelty in the New Deal that needs emphasis is precisely the union of this tradition of democratic reform with what I shall call the national idea.

My central point is not merely the familiar observation that the party of Jefferson took over the old Hamiltonian advocacy of strong central government. The national idea is not only a view of American federalism, but also a principle of public policy. As a principle of public policy, it is a doctrine of what today is commonly called "nation-building." Its imperative is to use the power of the nation as a whole not only to promote social improvement and individual excellence, but also to make the nation more solidary, more cohesive, more interdependent in its growing diversity: in short, to make the nation more of a nation. Thus, American liberalism descends from and builds upon old traditions of democratic reformism, but also joins to them a powerful thrust toward national integration.

This view of the origin and two-fold nature of American liberalism derives mainly from Croly's interpretation of our political history in his *Promise of American Life*. Following his suggestive account, I should like first to review the role of the national idea in American party politics and then, in some rather more speculative pages, develop the meaning of the national idea and relate it to the new era of public policy which we have entered with the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. Throughout I shall confine myself to attitudes toward domestic affairs in order to avoid undue complexity.

I

Croly's *Promise* was written at a time when "the social problem" was making its first hard impact on our politics and in much that he said there he laid out the path that liberalism was to take a generation later. At the same time, he could look back over a field of vision that had not yet been obscured by the liberal-conservative realignment of ideas, social forces, and political parties. What he saw was an enduring tension between "the principle of nationality" and "the principle of democracy." Originating in the clash of ideas between Hamilton and

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Jefferson, this opposition, he believed, had lasted into his own day. His effort was to find a conception that reconciled the two ideas, suitably reinterpreted to fit the facts of the twentieth century.

If we look at the past from the perspective of the democratic idea (in his usage), we may indeed find confrontations similar to one important aspect of the present liberal-conservative conflict. Charles A. Beard, for instance, gave us a reading along these lines. In his view, our politics in the earliest days of the Republic revolved around the clash of economic interest groups: broadly, a coalition of owners of large property against a coalition of owners of small or no property. A rough, very rough, parallel with the liberal-conservative alignment of recent years can be granted and thus Jefferson made the ultimate author of the New Deal and Hamilton of its opposition.

But when we look at these early contests from the perspective of the national idea, the lineage is reversed. The modern liberal, as a champion of strong and active central government in the service of nation-wide purposes, becomes the heir of Hamilton, while the modern conservative, as the opponent of centralization and friend of states rights and localism, represents the Jeffersonian tradition. In short, even if we grant a certain continuity between modern liberalism and Jeffersonian democracy, the total configuration is strikingly different: the powerful strain of Hamiltonian nationalism in the liberal tendency separates it fundamentally from the Jeffersonians.

For the sake of clarity, I will state the point with some exaggeration. For the greater part of our history and well into the present century, the main division of political forces consisted of the following: 1) on the one hand, a national party, tending toward elitism, *viz.*, the Federalists, the Whigs, and then the Republicans; 2) on the other hand, an anti-national or "provincial" party* tending to be "democratic," *viz.*, the Jeffersonian Republican and then the Democratic Party. Granting the continuity between the elitist-democratic division and one aspect of our present conservative-liberal split, my object here is to emphasize that during our first century and more the issue of overwhelming importance was the national question. The conflict of classes was, and always has been, mild in comparison with such conflicts in other countries of the Western world. The national question, however, precipitated the one instance of large-scale armed subversion in our history.

The national idea vs. states sovereignty

As an issue of political conflict, this question had two main aspects, relating, first, to a theory of the Constitution, and, second, to

*I take the adjective from Albert Beveridge who, in his biography of John Marshall, described how in the 1790's the political parties arose, "one standing for the National and the other for the Provincial idea."

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a view of public policy. As a theory of the Constitution, the national idea was opposed by the compact or state sovereignty theory. According to the latter, the Union was established by agreement among the thirteen states, which had previously been independent, sovereign political entities. In the Constitution, rather as in a treaty among separate nations, they agreed to give up certain powers to the Federal government. Federal power thus was derivative from state power and one might well feel that the states were, and continued to be, the fundamental political communities. From this theory, it also was plausibly inferred that the states had the right to interpret the compact and, if necessary, to nullify an unconstitutional act, to interpose their power to prevent its execution and in the final resort to secede from the Union.

According to the national theory, on the other hand, the Union was brought into existence not by independent states, but by the people as a whole; "we, the people," as it says in the Preamble, formed the Union. As a community of individuals, not a combination of states, we constitute the nation. From this national community the authority of the states, as of the Federal government, is derivative. Nor is it simply the state governments, but the people of any state themselves who derive their authority from the nation. This national community is our essential form of political existence and to it we owe our primary allegiance. "The Union," said Lincoln, "and not themselves [*i.e.*, the states] separately, produced their independence and their liberty. . . . The Union gave each of them whatever of independence or liberty it has. The Union is older than any of the States, and, in fact, it created them as States." According to this view, of course, no state could secede or nullify or interpose, since it had been given no such authority by the nation.

On balance, the national theory is the better account of the state of mind and will of the American people at the time of the foundation of the Republic. Yet, unfortunately, the compact theory was also supported by considerable evidence, including interpretations rendered by leading men among the Fathers themselves. Nor did the words of the Constitution itself clear up the ambiguity. From the start, in other words, there existed in our conception of nationhood a deep and tragic flaw. As a result, the United States for many generations struggled with a severe problem of national identity. One can, of course, find instances when both theories of the Union were used as mere rationalizations for economic or social interest. This should not, however, obscure the real motivational force of the underlying values that were at issue. The Civil War sprang not only from a conflict of economic and social interests, but also, as Hans Kohn has said, from a conflict of American nationalism with "another nascent true nationalism."

Given this ambiguity in American political culture, it was natural

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that our early party divisions should center on the national question. The purpose of the national party was, in the first place, to defend in word and deed the national ideal of the Union. But the national party did not simply defend a view of the Constitution and American federalism. It also made the national idea into a view of public policy. This was the view not only that the American people were one nation, but also that they ought over time to become more of a nation. In its various incarnations, the national party was, to use Croly's awkward phrase, the "nationalizing" party. In Hamilton's opinion, according to Croly, the central government was to be used "not merely to maintain the Constitution, but to promote the national interest and to consolidate the national organization," a policy which implied "an active interference with the national course of American economic and political business and its regulation and guidance in the national direction." In spite of many setbacks and the great crisis of the 1860's, this purpose was more and more fulfilled. "The organic growth [of the United States]," said Elihu Root, in 1913, "which must ultimately determine the form of institutions, has been away from a mere union of states towards the union of individuals in the relation of national citizenship."

In opposition to Hamiltonian nationalism and elitism, Croly set Jeffersonian democracy. In it he found not only the political doctrine of "trust the people," but also an economic doctrine of "extreme individualism." "The people" were the best safeguard against authoritarianism in government and at the same time entirely capable of taking care of themselves individually. These beliefs led to the Jeffersonian conclusion that "good government, particularly on the part of Federal officials, consisted, apart from routine business, in letting things alone." This "old fatal policy of drift" meant that in our history one result of Jeffersonian democracy was to promote "a system of unrestricted individual aggrandizement and collective irresponsibility."

From Jefferson to F.D.R.

In what way does the national-provincial distinction relate to the liberal-conservative division and the positions of the two major parties in recent decades? Clearly, in the present-day meanings of the terms, Jefferson was no more a liberal than Hamilton a conservative. This is not to say, however, that the national question became irrelevent when the rise of the "social problem" brought forward the issues that ultimately produced the New Deal. For not the least remarkable aspect of that turning point was the exchange of policies, indeed of long-held principles, on this vital question by the Democratic and Republican parties. The Democratic party — more precisely, its liberal section — became the bearer of the national idea, while the

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conservative wing of the Republicans became the champions of the provincial idea.

We are now so accustomed to thinking of the Democrats as the "nationalizing" party that we may well forget how radically contrary this tendency is to what that party stood for through most of its history. Again Croly's reading in *The Promise of American Life* is instructive. Reviewing Democratic advocacy of the "old fatal policy of drift" in general, and of such heresies in particular as "nullification, squatter sovereignty, secession, free silver and occasional projects of repudiation," he found that in all our history no "measure of legislation expressive of a progressive national idea can be attributed to the Democratic party." That party, he concluded, "cannot become the party of national responsibility without being faithless to its own creed." It was, of course, to the Republicans, as restored to their "historic position and purpose" by Theodore Roosevelt, that he looked for "vigorous national action" to deal with the social problem.

This was not an idle hope. It was surely a shorter step to the New Deal from the New Nationalism than from Wilson's New Freedom – at any rate, before the New Freedom in office had absorbed the main substance of the first Roosevelt's program. Perhaps after the era of Harding and Coolidge it was too late for the Republicans again to return to their "historic position and purpose." Still, one is tempted to speculate what would have happened if Al Smith had won in 1928 and Hoover had taken office in 1932 free of the obligation to defend the policies that had led to collapse.

Perhaps it was an historical accident. In any event it fell to the second Roosevelt, no small student and admirer of his cousin, to restore the national idea. His measures had definite "class" overtones that give them a distant, but discernible affinity with the Jeffersonian "cherishment of the people." Yet we miss a major dimension of the New Deal and of the liberalism it propagated if we confine our attention to its bearing on the economic interests of various social strata.

In dealing with economic concentration and deprivation, the New Deal and its successors created a new balance of power and a new level of security. By these measures, beneficiary groups, such as industrial labor and recent immigrants, also won a degree of acceptance in the national consciousness and in every-day social and economic intercourse that they had never previously enjoyed. American liberalism acted as a "nationalizing" force not only in the sense that it centralized governmental power, using the authority of the national government to deal with problems that had previously been left to state or local government, or had not been dealt with at all. It was also "nationalizing" in the sense that it integrated into the national community groups which had previously been marginal or excluded. Through the new doctrine and force of liberalism, the national idea

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worked to integrate the pluralism of the twentieth century as it had once countered the territorial sectionalism of the nineteenth.

Of this liberal achievement the Democratic Party became the principal instrument. The result was an imbalance in our party system which persists to this day. For most of our history, each of the two main parties has had a mixed character, its outlook combining a major strength, moral and electoral, with a major weakness. A national party suffering from elitism has faced a democratic party put at a disadvantage by its provincialism. Not surprisingly in this country, the democratic party has shown greater longevity, so that the political party founded by Jefferson today may claim to be the oldest in the world.

Still, an opposition has been able to survive for long periods, even when burdened with a more or less ill-disguised distrust of the people. The essential electoral condition of its survival, however, has been an adherence to the national idea. When the Federalists weakned in this faith, they lost their coherence and their following and deservedly sank into nullity. Likewise, when the Whigs, for all their talk of Union, burked the problem of slavery as a national problem, they rightly went into decline. Similarly, when in the past generation the Republicans joined to their elitism the old provincial causes of the Democrats, they too lost support and fell into the position of the minority party. More recently, in the 1964 presidential campaign, pursuing this fatal course in the name of conservatism, they reduced themselves to such a position of impotence as to raise fears for the future of our two-party system. For at the same time, the Democrats, among whom the liberals were stronger than ever, retained in modern form important elements of their Jeffersonian heritage and also continued their adherence to the national idea. Croly's hope for a party that was at once national and democratic had been fulfilled, although hardly in the way that he had expected.

II

Today the national idea is in no danger from the grosser forms of menace that threatened it a hundred years ago. Yet as a theory of American federalism which provides an approach to constitutional interpretation and, even more important, sustains a state of mind, it still needs emphasis. When Southern Senators, or Barry Goldwater, explicitly advocate the compact theory, we need not be greatly disturbed. But was it only a lapse when President Eisenhower in 1952, having declared that the "Federal Government did not create the States," went on to claim that "the States created the Federal Government?"

Today the national idea is, first of all, a perspective for viewing and judging the relations of the Federal and the state governments. People sometimes slip into the habit of speaking as if there were

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something inherently preferable about state or local government in contrast with Federal. And indeed if the states were the primary political communities, that would be true. But since the nation is our essential form of political existence, such preference as flows from the structure of authority favors the activity of what Daniel Webster called the "general government" as against the provincial governments. The point is relevant to the assertion that state and local governments are "closer" to the people. If, as the national theory teaches, one means by "the people" the basic political community, the nation as a whole, then certainly the "general government" is "closer" to this community than are the lesser governments whose contacts with it are partial and separated.

Similarly, from the perpective of the national theory, one will not necessarily be alarmed if the state governments decline in power and scope of activity in relation to the general government. From the viewpoint of the national theory, it is legitimate and logical that as the process of integration of the national community goes forward, the content of the common good, with whose promotion the central government is charged, should likewise develop. This is not to say that the national theory must imply the ultimate demise of the states. On the contrary, there are excellent practical reasons why they should flourish, especially in the context of cooperative federalism and new forms of regional cooperation. The merit of the national theory is to help us see that the considerations sustaining and defining a role for the states are almost entirely practical in character, not constitutional. In essence, this was also the view of Hamilton, Marshall and the men "who 'put across' the Constitution and who set the national government going." For in their opinion, according to E. S. Corwin, "the national government. . . . is under no constitutional compulsion, either in the selection of means whereby to make its powers effective or in the selection of objects to be attained by their exercise, to take account of the coexistence of the states or to concern itself to preserve any particular relationship of power between itself and the states."

Croly and the national purpose

But the national idea is more than a theory of constitutional interpretation. It also sustains a dynamic perspective on public policy and national development. In the first place, it favors the process of *governmental unification* which has been a principal theme of our political history. By governmental unification I mean what is often called "centralization," "consolidation" or, in Croly's terms, the "nationalization" of governmental functions. The national idea, however, does not legitimate governmental unification simply for its own sake. There is some end or purpose to which it is instrumental and in the

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light of which one may judge in what specific ways and at what pace unification should proceed. In one phase of his thought, Croly clearly drew this distinction by making democracy itself this purpose.

To Croly, as to many other political theorists, the term "democracy" is less a concept of analysis than a stimulus to speculation. One need not agree with all his uses of the word to find his speculation interesting. Certainly, he did not confine the meaning of democracy to a conception of authority, a definition of how power ought to be distributed in the polity. To him it meant not only popular sovereignty, but also the end for which power was to be exerted. Yet he was not content with the Jeffersonian ideal of "equal rights for all and special privileges for none" as a definition of this end. For in this ideal he found that "extreme individualism" which, in the course of economic development, had produced the "social problem." Indeed, in rejecting this doctrine Croly asserts that the national government must "discriminate" constructively "among the various prevailing ways of exercising individual rights" for the sake of certain results. These results consisted in the first place in "social improvement," meaning action to promote "a constantly higher standard of living" and, more positively, "to guarantee to every male adult a certain minimum of economic power and responsibility." In this branch of Croly's approach to the "social problem," it is fair to see his anticipation of the main theme of New Deal liberalism, its use of national power for economic balance and security.

Even more interesting to us today, however, is Croly's conception of the other element in the democratic purpose in the twentieth century. This was to use the powers of the nation to promote "the increase of American individuality." Indeed, to this problem of raising the standards and stimulating the pursuit of "individual distinction," Croly gives far more attention than he does to the material problems of the economy. He thunders at the American's faith in mere good intentions and his lack of moral and intellectual discipline. "In all civilized communities," he wrote, "the great individualizing force is the resolute, efficient, and intense pursuit of special ideals, standards, and occupations." In this emphasis one finds vivid anticipation of that "pursuit of excellence" which, beginning with the Kennedy Administration, has increasingly formed the theme of some of the more original programs of the national government.

For Croly, then, the national purpose, as he saw it in his time, was to use "the democratic organization for the joint benefit of individual distinction and social improvement." This dual purpose was to legitimate and guide the process of governmental unification and the exercise of power by the national government. Similarly, if we look at the development of Federal programs in very recent years, it is possible and instructive to discern in them this same twofold

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purpose. Plainly enough, there is in the Kennedy-Johnson effort a massive stratum of New Deal liberalism. I am thinking not only of the development of basic statutes, such as the wage-hour and social security laws, but also new programs using familiar means, such as the Appalachia program. Contrasting with this old stratum of public policy is a new layer. Typical and most important is the series of programs involving education. Looking at the problems that confronted President Kennedy just after his inauguration, Theodore H. White put first "the unbelievable problems of education and knowledge." Going over the main Kennedy programs a while back I counted fully a third that made education in some form a central element. And, it hardly need be said, the priority given education has only increased under President Johnson, who indeed is reported to have said that "the answer for all our national problems comes down to one single word: education."

The use of labels is of no great moment. But it is worth seeing where there is continuity and discontinuity between these new departures in public policy and the pattern of New Deal liberalism. There is continuity in the vigorous use of the powers of the national government. These measures are a further step in governmental unification. In particular, the growing programs of Federal aid to education mark a large advance in the process of unification which the New Deal itself greatly forwarded. In other respects, however, there are contrasts. Above all, where New Deal liberalism sought to achieve its effects by alterations in structure, especially economic structure, the new programs operate rather through improvements in the intellectual capacities of individuals—and not only intellectual, but also moral capacities, insofar as education develops powers of discipline, self-reliance, and independent choice. This difference in the tactics of reform implies also a difference in analysis. In place of that tinge of economic determinism which colored New Deal liberalism, this new liberalism, while as strongly national as the old, puts much greater emphasis on cultural factors.

Public policy, it hardly needs to be said, cannot be neatly and exclusively sorted out into a few simple categories. The erratic pressures, *ad hoc* responses, bureaucratic snarls, legislative compromises, and all the vast complexity of our society and its government mean that no descriptive scheme can do more than indicate general tendencies. Granting this obvious qualification, one can still outline the broad meaning that these tendencies have, given the national idea today. This is: that the process of governmental unification goes forward guided by a national purpose that can still be accurately stated in Croly's words: "the joint benefit of individual distinction and social improvement." Yet there is, I believe, a major dimension of the national idea of which this discussion has not yet taken account.

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Toward national integration

Throughout *The Promise of American Life* Croly presents "the principle of nationality" as on a par with "the principle of democracy." To say, however, that the national idea means merely that unification should be used to promote democratization is to make the national subordinate to the democratic idea. One cannot feel that this is fair to Croly's meaning. The "principle of nationality" clearly means more than that a strong central government is acting to promote "the joint benefit of individual distinction and social improvement." It means further that a process of national integration is being carried on in which the community is being made more of a community.

National government and national community, like the processes of unification and integration from which they emerge, are interdependent. At the moment, however, I wish to direct attention to the national community as something distinguishable from government. For this community and the process of integration by which it develops are surely much harder to observe and analyze than the national government and its growth. Yet it hardly need be said that all that furious activity and mighty agglomeration of power at the center has little point apart from the quality of life it promotes in the nation.

No national community, especially if it is a free nation, will embrace the whole of an individual's life. Outside these national bonds will remain not only the activities of many groups, but also the ultimate privacy of the individual. Yet community in the form of nationality can be a principal means of moral fulfillment.

By community I mean, to begin with, an emotional fact: a massive background feeling of "belongingness" and identification. This emotional aspect of American nationality is not usually in the front of our consciousness. But from time to time, in moments of ritual or crisis or reflection – or perhaps simply when we travel around the country or return home from abroad – it comes sharply forward, showing its power. We perceive then a force that continually, although imperceptibly, conditions our attitudes and behavior. We recognize that, apart from the *private* emotions which we share with family, friends and other limited groups, we are joined with a vast national community by a distinctive kind of emotional tie: by *public* joy, grief, pride, anger, envy, fear, hope and so on. Few Americans who watched the funeral of President Kennedy will doubt this fact. His family and personal friends had their private grief. Throughout the world people could respond to certain universal human themes, such as the tragedy of a gallant and youthful leader struck down senselessly at the height of his powers and promise. But for Americans there was a special experience: emotions of grief, anger, fear and loss that only members of this national community could feel.

People who constitute a community in some basic sense share a

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common life. This common life consists, in one respect, of certain resemblances, certain conformities. In this sense, one may speak of an American consensus – a pattern of values and beliefs generally pervading the nation – or pernaps even of an American national character. These shared cultural objects, constituting resemblances among the members of the community, are a source of solidarity.

It is usually these resemblances that are analyzed by students of nations and their development. Exclusively to emphasize resemblance, however, is misleading, for there is another equally important aspect of community, *viz.*, the fact that relations among members are complementary. Croly suggested this aspect when he spoke of the national community as "a socially constructive drama." Durkheim referred to the "division of labor" and in a memorable passage described the mutual identification that results from its complementary diversities. "The image of the one who completes us," he wrote, "becomes inseparable from ours, not only because it is frequently associated with ours, but particularly because it is the natural complement of it. It thus becomes an integral and permanent part of our conscience, to such a point that we can no longer separate ourselves from it and seek to increase its force."

Here Durkheim is speaking of face-to-face communities in which the members are directly and visibly in contact with one another. His insight, however, directs attention to similar complementary relations in a large-scale community, such as a nation, in which a widely shared image of interlocking roles or types likewise enhances solidarity. This is, I think, our commonsense perception of the matter. If we reflect on the object of our national loyalty, one aspect is no doubt certain general ideas. With its political and non-political elements, this consensus, although rough and ready and far from lucidly systematic, is vitally important to the maintenance of the governmental and social systems. Yet the object toward which our national feelings are directed obviously includes far more. It is more concrete and richly varied, more historical and less ideological. It is a common life, consisting not only of similarities, but also diversities. In other words, our attachment to the nation does not proceed simply from our resemblances – the American consensus or "way of life." The social context with which we identify as members of the nation also includes a pattern of complex, varied and highly differentiated attitudes and behavior.

Along with the more familiar factor of *consensual cohesion,* this *functional cohesion* is a major source of the stability of American institutions. Consensus is, of course, important and students of American government and society are right to be much occupied with identifying a body of values and beliefs that members of the national community generally share. Yet this consensus on generalities may

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sometimes be a thin and insufficient foundation for toleration and support between persons or groups. In such situations, it is helpful to see that a further force for stability may be provided by the more particularistic bonds of functional cohesion.

National integration in this twofold meaning is a principal purpose of governmental unification. To say, however, that the thrust of the national idea is in this sense "to make the nation more of a nation" is to attribute to it no new significance. From the start this was one of its goals and effects. If, for instance, the Whig policy of internal improvements had been realized, our common life as a nation could not have failed to be enriched and strengthened. To stress this old significance here is important in order to make clear that the national idea means something more than mere centralization of power. As the principle of community, it provides, along with the democratic idea, one of the standards by which governmental unification can be justified and by which it should be controlled and guided.

The national idea and civil rights

The national idea has persisted throughout our history. It has always confronted opposition, and this tension has constituted one of the major axes of our political life. Its friends have not always cherished "the people" or professed sensitivity to the grievances of the poor. At different times they have called themselves Federalists, Whigs, and Republicans. Beginning in the 1930's, the Democrats, or more precisely the liberal Democrats, became the principal bearers of the national idea. The liberalism brought into existence by the New Deal consisted of a combination of the national idea and the democratic idea which was unique in our history, although in broad outline it had been anticipated by Herbert Croly. Looked at from the democratic perspective (in Croly's meaning), it aims at the "joint benefit" of social improvement and individual distinction. Yet these same programs also serve the national idea by providing means and enhancing capacities for extending and deepening community.

At present, the civil rights programs are without doubt the most important example of this old effort to make the nation more of a nation. According to some historic conceptions of liberalism, it is a proper and decent solution for a minority if it is given the opportunity to live unto itself in such a way that it may enjoy and develop its own way of life — a status comparable, for instance, to that of the French-speaking people of Canada. American liberalism, however, rejects such solutions along with the doctrine of "separate but equal" and, as a force influencing both Negroes and whites, compels us toward integration. This new stage in American nation-building is surely one of the most ambitious, difficult and characteristic undertakings into which the national idea has led us.

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The case for a lottery

ELI GINZBERG

The problem of the draft has surfaced. The President, Congress, and the public now know that the process by which we procure our military manpower is defective. The mounting casualties in Vietnam have unquestionably helped focus attention on this issue: the fact that a high school graduate is 50 percent more likely than a college man to serve in the Army may be glossed over in times of peace, but will not go unnoticed once the number of wounded and dead begins to mount. The Act under which young men are drafted is entitled the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, as amended. Today, this concept of "universality" is defined by the fact that only 46 percent of all men reaching 26 have served in the military.

The coincidence of military escalation in Vietnam and the jump in the number of young men reaching eighteen – reflecting the rise in the birth rate after World War II – have precipitated the debate that successive Administrations and Congresses have assiduously sought to avoid. Since, under existing arrangements, the Pentagon obtains without difficulty the number and quality of manpower it needs, and since the colleges are assured of the student flow which they need to operate optimally, it is understandable that policymakers have avoided disturbing the status quo. But they can avoid doing so no longer.

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It is relatively easy to identify what is wrong with the draft as it presently operates. It favors those who have the financial and intellectual resources required for college attendance; until recently, it encouraged young men to marry in order to be deferred; until the recent expansion of the Armed Services from 2.7 million to 3 million, older men were more likely to be drafted than young men – a double disadvantage since men's lives are more likely to be disrupted at an older age and the military prefer younger men. A less obvious but still clear debit has been the influence of the draft in encouraging many students to enroll in college or graduate school for no reason other than to avoid the draft. Above all, it violates the concept of universality and has helped to make a mockery out of the democratic principle that the responsibility to bear arms rests equitably upon all males.

This list of shortcomings can be enlarged by noting that many presumably eligible men are rejected from military service: the accident of where a man is registered plays an important part in whether or not, and when, he is called up; and there has been no uniformity in the criteria which local boards follow in granting deferments.

The merits of selective service

Nevertheless, there are strengths in this system which help explain why the American people were willing to accept it for more than a decade.

First of all, the draft has been a highly flexible instrument. During the year when the Korean buildup reached its height, 587,000 men were drafted; a decade later, the annual intake had dropped to 60,000; during a recent twelve months (July 1, 1965 – June 30, 1966) 335,000 men were drafted.

Secondly, the draft has contributed markedly to enabling the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps to rely overwhelmingly on enlistees. Many men "volunteer" for these services because they know that otherwise they will be drafted. According to a special study of the Department of Defense, 38 percent of the regular enlistees "volunteered" for this reason, as did 41 percent of the officers and 71 percent of Reserve and National Guard enlistees. To the extent that the Armed Services gain from having their requirements met by enlistees – they serve longer and they are likely to have better morale than draftees – to that extent much of the credit belongs to the draft.

Finally, the draft has been operated so as to inhibit an inflow of large numbers of men who could not be readily absorbed into a military organization, whether because of lack of aptitude or because of other shortcomings. Not all of the selectivity in "selective service" has been unreasonable.

General Hershey would call attention to some additional benefits. He believes in citizen responsibility for the operations of the

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Selective Service System. He sees great merit in a system whereby call-ups and deferments are made by informed persons who live in the same communities as the registrants. The inventory of draft eligibles, maintained by the Selective Service System, is a major support of our mobilization base. In addition, General Hershey would note the remarkable freedom from bribery and other forms of chicanery which characterizes the Selective Service System.

There can be no doubt, then, that the draft has many assets as well as some liabilities. Since no system is perfect, why should we not leave it alone? Besides, there have been recent improvements. Since August, 1965, marriage has not been a ground for deferment, though it still often works out that way; the Armed Services have revised their criteria for selection and now accept certain men whom they formerly would have rejected; Congress has recently passed a new GI bill which is at least one step towards greater equity; and the Armed Services' requirements are such that they now induct men shortly after their twentieth birthday. What more can one system do?

The demographic imperative

If the demographic picture were to remain unchanged; *if* the strength of the Armed Services were to remain at the present ceiling of 3 million; *if* the Department of Defense were to cease its efforts to substitute civilian for military personnel — then there would indeed be a strong case for preserving selective service. However, we face a certain and continuing rise in the number of eighteen-year-olds to a level of over 2.1 million in 1974, which will represent more than a doubling of the number available during the early 1950's and a 40 percent increase over 1964. At pre-Vietnam force levels this would mean that, in 1974, only 1 out of every 3 young men reaching twenty-six would have served in the military; and even at the current force level the number would be only slightly more than 2 in 5. And such a surplus of eligible manpower would again threaten to force up the age of induction: our selective service system, operating to catch men before they reach the escape age of twenty-six, takes older men first. The Armed Forces would receive the wrong type of manpower; therefore, before long the present system will have to be changed because the Department of Defense itself will demand a change.

Before discussing desirable changes in the draft, we should explore the alternatives to the draft. Possibly we can get on without it; possibly not. A small number of people, including General Hershey, continue to favor the institution of universal military training, which was the proposal of the War Department at the end of World War II, but which was ceremoniously buried despite strong support from the Compton Commission and the advocacy of General Marshall. Such a proposal would mean that every young man capable of mili-

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tary service at the age of eighteen would undergo four to six months of military training, and from this total group the Armed Services would obtain – by enlistment or some form of compulsion – the numbers required to meet their needs. But UMT would meet only part of the equity problem – it is unlikely that there would be enough enlistments to obviate the need for a selective draft; it would be inefficient – the short training would not be of much value; and it would be very costly – perhaps as much as $2 to $3 billion every year.

Another proposal aimed at better matching the large numbers available for service and the limited needs of the Armed Services is to reduce the required length of service for draftees to below the present two-year minimum. However, even with two years of service for draftees the Army gets limited use out of many men, since so much time must be devoted to processing, training, and traveling. The small gains which would be made in equity by drafting larger numbers for a shorter period of time would be more than counterbalanced by large losses in efficiency and economy.

Can we eliminate the draft completely and have the Armed Services rely solely on volunteers? The Department of Defense has recently estimated that even after taking into account the larger pool of eighteen-year-olds who will be available in the early 1970's, the maximum all-volunteer force that could be maintained would be 2 million at the present 4 percent level of unemployment, and 2.2 million if a 5.5 unemployment rate were postulated. This would leave a significant deficit even if force levels returned to their pre-Vietnam figures. An even more serious problem would be how the Armed Services could attract the specialists who play an even larger role in the successful operation of modern military organizations. For example, how could the Armed Services induce 3,000 physicians to volunteer for active duty?

Despite the contentions of some economists, such as Milton Friedman, it is doubtful that the American people would approve of an additional annual expenditure of between $4 and $17 billion dollars for our Armed Forces; this is the sum which the Department of Defense calculates would be necessary to recruit and support an all-volunteer force at the pre-Vietnam level. These sizable additional expenditures have taken into account offsetting savings in training costs and in reduced turnover that a career force would make possible.

A further objection to an all-volunteer force is that it would be exceedingly difficult to man the active reserves. Moreover, the costs of responding to a sudden increase in requirements, such as during the buildup in Vietnam, could be horrendous if we had to rely on monetary incentives to attract quickly several hundred thousand additional men.

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A third approach would be to develop, under universal "military" training, a system of civilian assignments which would be considered the equivalent of a term of duty in the Armed Services. Currently, two years in the Peace Corps is treated in this way by most draft boards. Can we designate a large number of such positions – teaching or social work in depressed rural and urban areas, scientific or technical work in specified fields, civilian jobs in U. S. overseas operations other than the Peace Corps? The list of high priority useful jobs can be readily enlarged.

However, there are many objections to this proposal, too. Among the most important are the clear advantages that this would give to young people from middle and upper income homes who attend or graduate from college. In addition, the problem which would result from paying these young people at the prevailing rate of civilian wages would be enormous – as would be the problem which would result from paying them less! Furthermore, the availability of alternatives to military duty might have a serious effect on the inflow of trained manpower into the Armed Services; any other assumption would not be realistic. Finally, our liberal-democratic traditions view with strong distaste the kind of large scale and permanent governmental direction of civilian labor that such a program would entail.

These arguments against the suspension or abolition of the draft hold for now and for the proximate future. If the fighting in Vietnam were to come to a halt; if no other front were to become active; if the size of the Armed Forces could be reduced from the present three million to closer to two million; if energetic efforts were made to replace several hundred thousand men in uniform (in clerical positions, in base maintenance, in hospitals) with civilians; if the reserve structure could be further reduced – then in fact it might be worthwhile to see whether the conditions of military service could be improved to a point where the Armed Services might obtain the military manpower they need solely through enlistments. But this is clearly something for the distant future, not for tomorrow.

The lottery as a workable alternative

The real challenge is to design an alternative that will result in a more universal sharing of the risk of service while providing the Armed Services, at a reasonable cost, with the numbers and quality of manpower they require. In my opinion, a lottery can substantially meet the test for equity. If all young men are not needed by the Armed Services, a lottery is the fairest method of determining on whom the obligation should fall. However, even a lottery should not mandate the induction of all those selected at one specific age, such as nineteen. It is clearly advantageous for the Armed Services if certain young men complete college or even go further in their edu-

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cation before they are called upon to serve. Those who receive a deferment to continue their education, however, must take their chances when they complete their schooling. They would enter the lottery at that point. A rough estimate suggests that since more than 70 percent of all young men complete high school, and since half go on to junior or four-year college, approximately one-third would enter the lottery at an age older than nineteen.

The key element of a national lottery for military service is an annual list of all young men liable for military service. The requirements of the Armed Services would determine the proportion of the group to be called. Those not called in any one year could make their plans reasonably assured that they would not be called at all, except in an emergency. Such a system could be put in effect just as soon as the international situation begins to stabilize. Unless the Vietnam war accelerates far beyond our worst fears, the number of young men available for service will grow steadily larger than the number required.

General Hershey is fundamentally opposed to the lottery. He argues that it has not worked satisfactorily in the past and that it would be unsatisfactory again. He states that the American people would object if such fundamental decisions as who should serve and who should be deferred were to hang on the turn of a wheel. He believes that reliance on the decisions of local citizens is much to be preferred.

Now, it is quite true that no system can be perfect and that the most carefully constructed lottery will have its faults. Thus, if the requirements of the Armed Services fluctuate, the risk for men entering the lottery in one year instead of another will not be the same. This kind of multiple chanciness can be nerve-wracking for those who are involved. But the fact remains that the present system cannot be continued and will not be continued once the Congress and the Presidential Commission highlight its gross inequities. Given that fact, a lottery would appear to be the most sensible and least problematic of all alternatives to selective service.

A lottery can be reinforced with "fringe benefits" to make the incidence of luck less brutal. Since there would still be gross differences in sacrifices between those who serve and those who do not, the gap could be reduced by raising the level of military pay and by providing educational and training benefits for the inductee and enlistee. For instance, it would be desirable if the armed services were to provide educational and training benefits, prior to their entering upon a term of active duty, for young men who join the enlisted reserve. Such a system would prove both efficient and economic, since it would reduce the amount of time and resources that the Armed Services have to devote to training their own specialists.

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The G.I. bill, which was recently passed, also makes a contribution to greater equity. I would further favor providing transitional education and training benefits for career men who, at the end of twenty years service, must fit themselves into the civilian economy.

One other point: present standards for military service lead to the rejection of large numbers of young men of limited aptitude and education – roughly one third of the age class. The manpower pool is sufficiently large that the Armed Services do not have to induct the hard-to-train and hard-to-discipline. From the vantage point of the Armed Services, such a policy is easy to appreciate. But if the frame of reference is broadened from the military to the national scene, this policy is not the only possible – or the only correct – one. Under recent federal legislation, we have been spending over two billion dollars annually in training and retraining young people without jobs; and we shall probably soon spend much more. In World War II, the Armed Services, particularly the Army, did an outstanding job in providing special training opportunities for a half million illiterates.

The establishment of the Job Corps, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, and other training and training-related efforts under civilian auspices appears to have decided the issue in favor of the civilian sector.

Yet the recent statement of the Secretary of Defense that the Armed Services will induct annually about 100,000 men with low aptitude scores suggests that some policy ambivalence exists about the preferred manner of dealing with disadvantaged youth.

This move by the Department of Defense may provide the opportunity for a good experimental study of the relative effectiveness of military versus civilian efforts at socialization of, and skill acquisition by, disadvantaged youth. It is by no means clear that private corporations, nonprofit organizations, or civilian governmental departments will be able to do as good a job as the Armed Services.

This much is clear: military manpower policy can never be effectively separated from national manpower policy. And national manpower policy must always be the concern of the entire citizenry.

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The case for a national service system

MORRIS JANOWITZ

In the spring of 1966, public discussion of the draft became widespread and intense for the first time since 1940, when the legislation was initially passed. One of the most critical groups consists of college students who, opposed to the war in South Vietnam, believe that they have found in the draft an acceptable and popular issue for agitation. But by now public debate about the draft has come to involve the widest segments of American society. And the appointment of a Presidential Commission on the problem means that it is no longer a question of whether the policies of the Selective Service System *should* be modified, but along what lines they *will* be altered.

Recommendations for change usually rest on an admixture of arguments based on moral justification, economic costs, and military efficiency, as well as on broad conceptions of national interest both domestic and foreign. Three basic positions have emerged which express different conceptions of "who shall serve" in the armed forces of a political democracy.

1) First, there is the position that the armed forces should be a completely voluntary establishment based on a competitive pay scale, regardless of the costs. Immediate and temporary shortages in personnel should be made up by some form of a lottery system. Selective service itself, of whatever kind, would be employed merely as a

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device to meet particular emergencies, and should be abandoned as soon as possible.

2) There are those who seek to reform the present Selective Service System. This approach assumes that the current system is inefficient as well as morally unjust because of the reliance placed on educational deferments. In this view, to rely exclusively on a voluntary "mercenary" army is politically risky and is probably not economically feasible. At present, and for the foreseeable future, some form of selective service is required to produce the type of manpower the military establishment requires. But to make use of educational deferments is to rely upon an unfair criterion which is biased against the lower classes, and which assumes that the educated should not serve their country. Moreover, it is disruptive of the normal functioning of universities since it encourages many people to seek a refuge in higher education. The present system, it is argued, also introduces excessive amounts of uncertainty into making career decisions. This position seeks to reform current practice mainly by a lottery to augment those who elect to serve on a volunteer basis.

3) Lastly, there is the viewpoint that leads to some form of national service. In this perspective, the question of selective service cannot be detached from the broader problems of American education and of American policy in international relations. Effective education, as well as the pressures for social and political change, underlie the desirability of a broad involvement of young people, for a period of one or two years, in various types of national service, both domestic and international. Selective service is required, but it must operate in a moral and political setting which makes it legitimate. National Service is based on the widest degree of voluntary choice; but to insure military needs, selective service would have priority and would rely on a lottery. Those who do not serve in the military either as volunteers or selectees would be expected (or, alternatively, required) to perform national service. The variety of forms of national service would be numerous and would involve many non-governmental programs.

All three positions give a role to a lottery system if only as a temporary or stand-by device. Civilians who urge this change must recognize that the idea of a lottery system scratches a sensitive nerve among the professional career officers, especially in the ground forces. The professional soldier often believes that he is perceived by civilians as one who has somehow failed in the occupational competition of civilian life; and many officers hold the view that a lottery for the selection of enlisted men would serve to strengthen and substantiate this stereotype of the military as members of a luckless legion. Moreover, the military fear that it would be difficult to incorporate men selected by chance with those whose service is based on

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choice. They believe that the motivation of the soldier selected by a lottery might "contaminate" the attitudes of regular personnel.

There is also a deeper moral issue here for the professional officer. Military service always involves a chance of death in combat, or even in training. The professional soldier views this as no mere "occupational risk": it is for him, quite genuinely, a selfless and supreme sacrifice. Some professional officers are concerned lest a lottery system cause their men to define potential casualties as losers in a chance situation. And what will be the attitudes of society toward a "sacrifice" resulting from nothing more than being a two-time loser? Will it view the loss as simply another contingency and thus fail to support the men who fight?

Despite all these misgivings, however, most career officers would certainly accept a lottery if it were made the law – especially if it were part of a national service system, which to them is a positive concept. They are aware of the difficulties of the present procedure; and they are also aware that a lottery would produce a more diversified source of skilled manpower for their services.

The case for national service

The purpose of this article is to set forth some of the demographic and organizational issues involved in a type of national service system which I believe to be a desirable long-term objective, even though it clearly could not be launched overnight. In my opinion, such a national service system supplies a sound basis for coping with the deficiencies of *any* draft system, including one that must rely on a lottery. (In other words, I believe that some form of national service would make the lottery more acceptable and more equitable to all involved. For example, a national service program including a lottery supplies a powerful mechanism for preventing the creation of an over-concentration of Negroes in the enlisted ranks of the ground forces, a situation which would be most offensive to American democratic sensibility.) In addition, a national service system is consistent with the moral obligations of democratic citizenship, and is itself a device for contributing to the essential consensus on which democratic political institutions must rest.

The case for national service would have validity even if selective service were not required. The argument for national service does not rest on the struggle between national benefits versus individual benefits, for it sees the two as converging. To participate in national service is to make a contribution to performing many essential and needed tasks which are not being adequately filled under present arrangements, from teaching in the inner city, to health services, to natural conservation work. In turn, for the individual the benefits are not merely "a second chance" for the deprived, but represent valuable

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personal and social experience in preparation for adult responsibilities.

The notion of national service has been thought of in terms of two years, or roughly two years. My analysis proceeds on such a basis, but it does not preclude the real possibility that some aspects of national service might, at least initially, or for parts of the system, involve one year of service, and therefore be more manageable during the initial period.

The heritage of selective service

Demands for reorganizing selective service are rooted, in part, in the strong public presumption that the system has worked with a definite class bias. When selective service was reinstituted during the Korean conflict, it was for a partial mobilization, in contrast to the nearly total mobilization of World War II. There was a military need for only part of the age group from nineteen through twenty-six. There was also a strong emphasis on the necessity of not disturbing the flow of personnel into professional and scientific training. Selective service further sought to remove from itself the responsibility of determining who should go on to higher education.

As a result, occupational and educational criteria were used as the basis for deferment. In the public view, this meant that the burden of military service was placed on those who did not go to college, namely, on the lower socio-economic groups. A set of demographic factors actually contributed to the validity of this perception. From the time of the Korean conflict until the South Vietnam build-up, the size of the available manpower pool of age groups eligible for selective service increased, while the number who had to be drafted decreased. The result was an increasingly greater reliance on occupational and educational deferments. Therefore, there is an important element of truth in the assertion that selective service has a bias against the lower socio-economic groups. But it is also true that this assertion is so oversimplified as to be an inadequate and even dangerous basis for a public discussion of selective service.

Unfortunately, social scientists have avoided serious and systematic analysis of selective service as a social and political institution. In fact, there is not one single major study of the subject. Nevertheless, on the basis of the work of a handful of specialists, plus inferences that can be drawn from official statistics and special governmental surveys, it is possible to piece together a fairly accurate picture of the social consequences of selective service.

It is of prime importance to make a distinction between the recruitment patterns of selective service and the allocation of manpower within the armed services. Research has shown that, for the period of the Korean hostilities, the burdens of war – and especially

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the incidence of casualties – fell disproportionately on lower socio-economic groups. This was also the case during World War II, although for this period adequate documentation does not exist. But it should be emphasized that the social basis of casualties was as much the result of the way in which manpower had to be utilized by the ground forces as it was the consequence of the bias of selective service. (At the officer level, casualties cannot be said to be distributed unequally as to social class; if anything, because of the emphasis on college graduation as a requirement for officers, there was a bias in the reverse direction.) The division of labor in the military establishment meant that young men with better education (which correlates with higher socio-economic position) were sent to advanced training and into specialized units where the casualty rates were lower. Infantry units, those units which in the language of the military require "soft skills," were staffed with men of limited educational background. The result was that combat infantry units were predominantly from the lower socio-economic classes.

After the Korean conflict, selective service, for all its inherent biases, operated with a relative fairness, especially since there were no combat operations. The very few casualties occurred mainly in the Air Force, among units engaged in routine aerial operations. (These were officers of better-than-average socio-economic background, and reflected the exposure to risks that a professional officers corps has to take.) The basic manpower requirements of the armed forces were met by two sources. Limited quotas of young men were drafted and were assigned to the Army. But the bulk of the requirements was met through volunteers, who were responding in part to the pressure of the Selective Service System. This pressure generated not only contributions to the enlisted ranks, but also men who joined the various short-term officer programs. The Air Force and the Navy, because of their more attractive conditions of work and the specialized training they offered, and the Marine Corps, because of its traditional appeal, all could rely on volunteers exclusively. In fact, after the Korean conflict, standards of recruitment were raised, and young men from low income groups, and Negroes especially, were actually kept out of the armed services to a disproportionate extent.

On the basis of available materials, it is now possible to describe the educational and social background of those who actually served in the armed forces during the period before the expansion of the war in South Vietnam. At this point we are interested in the incidence of all types of military service, whether a man volunteered or was drafted, whether he was an officer or an enlisted man, for all these types of military service are themselves influenced by the operation of the Selective Service System. A good indicator is the military experience of men who were twenty-seven to thirty-four years of age in

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1965; these men had already passed through the period of their eligibility for selective service. Of this group, those whose education ranged from having completed nine years of school to having completed college had had roughly the same proportion (about seventy percent) in military service. At the lower end of the educational continuum, the incidence of military service declines sharply; only one-third of those with less than a grammar school education served in the military. At the upper end of the educational continuum, consisting of those who entered graduate and professional school, only one-quarter entered active service. Obviously those with less than eight years of education were deferred on the basis of "unfitness," according to standards then in use. Graduate and professional study, on the other hand, produced exemption by virtue of educational deferment, often supplemented by marital deferment.

We know that education in the United States is unequally distributed, having a clear and positive correlation with both race and socio-economic background. In the recent past, the Negro was underrepresented in the armed services because he had less and inferior education and was rejected more frequently by selective service. Among men with less than eighth grade education, Negroes served to a lesser degree than whites. The same held true among those with nine to eleven grades of education. But among high school graduates, Negroes and whites served in similar proportions.

Since 1962, the overall participation of Negroes in the armed forces has risen from 8.2% to 9.0% today and is most likely to continue to rise. This rise needs to be related both to the procurement rate of new Negro personnel and, more pointedly, to the reenlistment rates of Negroes.

During the period of 1962 to 1965, Negroes – both volunteers and inductees – were entering the armed services in about the same proportion as they are represented in the civilian society. (Given the traditional strong attractiveness of a military career to low income groups, this percentage clearly still reflects the lack of educational preparation of Negroes.) On the other hand, when – in the latter part of 1965 – there was an increase in selective service quotas because of South Vietnam, the procurement of Negroes by induction fell from 15.2% during the month of July, 1965, to 10.8% in December, 1965. It is obvious that a representative draft – a lottery, in other words – without college deferments would, in the long run, contribute to the elimination of any "over-representation" in the recruitment of Negro enlisted personnel.

However, more important in accounting for the representation of Negroes in the armed forces is the markedly higher reenlistment rate for Negro enlisted personnel. In 1965, the first term reenlistments of white personnel was 17.1%, while for Negroes it was 45.1%. Given

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their educational backgrounds and previous level of skills, Negroes have tended to concentrate in the combat arms of the Army where the opportunities are greatest for rapid advancement into non-commissioned officer positions. In some units, such as airborne paratroop formations, the percentage of Negroes is near forty. Overall participation of Negroes in South Vietnam has been reported for the last part of 1965; the Army had the highest proportion of Negroes with 15.8%; the Air Force had 8.3%; the Marines 8.9%; and the Navy 5.1 percent. From 1961 to 1965, Negro fatalities were 237 out of 1,620, or 14.6%.

The armed services are aware of the dangers of creating units in which Negroes are concentrated. It is, of course, basic to their operations not to use racial quotas; on the contrary, they look with pride on the success of integrating the Negro into combat units, for experience in combat units is the basis of military prestige. Nevertheless, the armed services do have a variety of personnel practices designed to distribute Negroes more equally throughout the services. These, however, are only slowly being implemented. Given the high rates of reenlistments among Negroes, the possibility of predominantly Negro units is a real one, unless corrective steps are taken.

Thus, in summary, it is clear that there have been distortions of the Selective Service System, mainly in the past, through the exclusion of low educational groups, especially Negroes, and contrariwise through exclusion of persons pursuing a post-college education. To some degree, exclusion at the lower levels will be modified as the educational standards of the country rise and as criteria for selection are altered by the urgent need for manpower. Efforts on the part of the armed services to deal with this question by having special remedial battalions have not received Congressional support; but special civilian or military programs are certain to emerge in the years ahead, not only because of the needs of the military, but because of a broader social policy to give core-city youths a "second chance." An important step in this direction was the announcement by Secretary McNamara, in August, 1966, that 40,000 "rejectees" would be inducted annually and given special remedial assistance especially to overcome educational deficiencies. On the other hand, distortions in the operation of selective service as a consequence of post-college education seem to be growing, as the emphasis on such education increases in the United States. And in the current situation we are dealing not only with the facts of such distortion, but with the growing public sentiment that educational deferments *per se* are morally undesirable.

Assessment of the past performance of the Selective Service System must encompass more than the social characteristics of those who entered military service. The system operated in the past with a considerable degree of administrative effectiveness in meeting immediate

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and short-term requirements. In fact, its concern with month-to-month procurement in part prevented the development of a longer-range perspective.

The organization represents an effective balance between highly centralized policy-making and decentralized implementation. The Selective Service System has worked with an amazing absence of personal corruption. To select young men for military service is a painful task, and the use of local community personnel has reduced hostility to rules and regulations. Moreover, there is a general feeling that local boards have been fair in applying national directives to the local situation. Decentralized operating procedure reduces local friction – but it also produces considerable variation in practice from state to state. These differences in local administration have become a new source of criticism. Selective service and its local boards do not proceed on the basis of a national manpower pool, taking into consideration wide discrepancies in population characteristics among communities. Moreover, there have come to be wide variations in quotas on a month-to-month basis. In effect, selective service has emerged more and more as a procurement agency for the Department of Defense without adequately representing the interests of the registrants.

However, it must be said that the Selective Service System, as it operated after the Korean War, was well adapted to the realities of the American political system and to American strategic commitments during a period of international tension without actual military operations.

First and most basically, it was seen as a temporary system. The resistance to a permanent Selective Service System has remained remarkably pervasive in the United States.

Second, the Selective Service System operated with a minimum of disruption of civilian society and at the same time it produced the required manpower for the type of armed forces the Executive wished to create. The new instruments of mass destruction require a force with a cadre of long-term and highly trained professionals; but at the lower ranks, both officers and enlisted personnel, the majority are still short-term personnel. During much of this period the size of the ground forces was limited, and a limited selective service was able to meet these requirements. Even during the period of gradual expansion of the military establishment after 1960, the selective service operated without great social strain or disruption. In good part this was due to the career opportunities the military establishment offered to the socially disadvantaged.

Thirdly, a temporary Selective Service System coupled with an extensive reserve component helped keep alive the citizen-soldier concept which has strong roots in American history. Reservist units

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with local attachments find strong support in the various states. Important political leaders have also had powerful reservations about a military establishment that does not have a citizen-soldier component and a constant flow of citizens, in and out. More tacitly than explicitly, the Selective Service System is seen – and in fact does operate – as a force for "civilianizing" the armed services and overcoming the sharp segregation of the military from civilian society that characterized the armed forces before World War II.

The temporary nature of selective service operated to inhibit both long-range planning and public discussion of its operations, since there was a vague feeling that at some future date it would no longer be needed. In fact, as recently as 1964 President Johnson authorized a study to probe the possibility of its ultimate elimination. Instead, events in South Vietnam have demonstrated the rigidities and inequalities of present procedure, once hostilities started. During this period of actual military operations, the Selective Service System has operated ineffectively and has produced considerable social and political strain. The standards of procurement have been judged too rigid and too arbitrary. It is true that the Selective Service System, in order to develop criteria for utilizing college students on a partial basis, turned to the American Council on Education. In retrospect, it is incredible that the American Council on Education did not engage in wider consultation with its constituency, but merely endorsed the repetition of a system that was used during the Korean hostilities.

In any case, it is now a fact that public opinion feels the Selective Service System is in need of a change. What kind of change? I should say that Secretary Robert McNamara's proposal for a system of national service has created the conditions for a careful scrutiny of both immediate military requirements and long-range national objectives.

The organization of a national service program

To anticipate military manpower requirements for even a year or two in advance has indeed been hazardous in the past. However, to describe the elements of a national service system, some assumptions must be made, not only for the next two or three years, but, at a minimum, for a ten to twenty year period. While the military manpower aspects of a national service system could be introduced very rapidly, other elements of a national service system would have to be developed over a five year period; but even after a five year period, probably no more than an eighty percent participation in the voluntary service programs could be expected.

In Table One, the actual number of new personnel procured by the armed forces in 1965 is shown to be over 570,000. This includes the small number in the special federal programs of the Coast Guard,

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Table 1

New Military Manpower Actually Procured in 1965*

National Military Establishment			
Enlisted:	First Enlistments	318,209	
	Inductions	102,555	
	Reserves – Active Duty Training	94,374	
	TOTAL		515,138
Officers:	Commissioned	46,535	
Officer Candidates			
	Academy Cadets (Entering Class)	2,449	
	Aviation Cadets and OCS	2,856	51,840
	TOTAL		566,978
Coast Guard			
Officers		385	
Enlisted:	Regular Terms	4,912	
	Active Duty Training	3,038	
	TOTAL		8,335
U. S. Public Health Service			665
Merchant Marine Academy			200
TOTAL NEW PERSONNEL			576,178

*Includes special federal programs (Coast Guard, U. S. Public Health Service, and Merchant Marine Academy).

U. S. Public Health Service, and the Merchant Marine Academy. In 1966, with the South Vietnam build-up, this is certain to go well over 800,000. As a point of departure for planning a national service program, it is assumed that in the less immediate future the required level of manpower will be equal to that before the current build-up. This implies an eventual reduction of international tensions, and, in particular, some degree of stabilization in Southeast Asia. For the purposes of this analysis, 550,000 to 600,000 officers and enlisted men is projected as the need for the next ten years, with this need slowly decreasing during the ten years following that.

Each year in the United States, approximately 1,800,000 young men reach the age of eighteen, and this figure can be expected to increase slowly in the years ahead before it declines. To many manpower specialists, this presents a real dilemma. (See Table Two.) We have too many young men for a selective service system; and, on

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the other hand, military manpower requirements are too large to rely upon a voluntary system. A national service system is designed precisely to deal with this dilemma, among other issues.

Table 2

Number of Males Attaining Age 18
for Selected Years, July 1st

1966	1,791,000
1967	1,787,000
1968	1,775,000
1969	1,823,000
1970	1,871,000
1971	1,938,000
1972	1,974,000
1973	2,028,000

Source: *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 321, November 30, 1965, Table 4, page 23.

National service is based upon a dual concept. Military manpower must be met by a fair and flexible selective service system based on a lottery and recognizing that there will be hardships and imperfections in any system. At the same time, all young men should engage in some type of national service. Volunteers and a lottery must be used for military service, for in general, civilian service cannot be defined as a *substitute* for military service; it is an *alternative* for those who are not selected into the military. For those young men who do not enter military service, either as volunteers or under a reformed system of selective service, national service would, at the outset, be voluntary. There must be a maximum amount of free choice in the type of national service, and a heavy emphasis on the role of private and voluntary groups in developing opportunities to do national service. In short, our goal is to fuse together a reasonable selective service system with a broad concept of national service. The basic features and principles are strikingly simple.

First, each new group of eighteen-year-old men would be required to participate in a national registration at which each young man would make known his personal preference. He would have the opportunity to indicate his choice of three basic alternatives:

a.) *Intention to volunteer.* He could make known that he intended to volunteer for military service and indicate his interest in the various specialized procurement programs, including enlistment in a reserve program with active duty training.

b.) *Declare himself subject to selective service* and indicate

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what type of alternative volunteer national service he prefers in the event he is not selected by lottery for military service.

c.) *Apply for exemption* on the basis of being a conscientious objector by virtue of religious conviction or other criteria set forth in the decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court. There would be no marital exemptions; and while there would be some family hardship and financial hardship exemptions, a federal allotment system would be used wherever required to eliminate gross inequities. Deferments on the basis of critical skill (as defined by the Department of Labor) would be kept to an absolute minimum or eliminated. But there are a limited number of types of national service activities which are either so burdensome or so important to have done they could be specially designated as exempting an individual from the selective service lottery system. This type of service could be called substitute service and would include, as is presently the case, the U. S. Public Health Service, the Coast Guard Academy, etc., as well as new programs such as a Police Cadet Corps.

Second, entrance into the military service would take place during the next year when the young man was nineteen, or in an orderly fashion on a basis of completing a given school year. Those who wished to volunteer for the armed service would be directly incorporated on the basis of their preference and qualifications. Volunteers, of course, would have to be matched against the available openings. Remaining deficiencies in military manpower requirements would be met by the Selective Service System operating on the basis of a lottery. A national quota would be established and the lottery would be administered on a state by state basis, so as to eliminate inequities due to differences in population characteristics. Normally, a young man would be subject to the selective service lottery only once during this period of initial registration when he was eighteen years of age. In the event of a major national emergency, cohorts between the ages of nineteen and twenty-six would, on a systematic basis, be liable for subsequent exposure to the selective service procurement system. Likewise, it would be expected that young men who did not enter the armed forces would have completed their alternative volunteer national service by the time they reached twenty-six years of age.

Third, although the lottery establishes the priority of selective service, it is clearly recognized that there would be differential incentives and rewards. Those who served in the armed forces would receive benefits under a GI Bill, while alternative national service would not have such features or would have very limited ones. The length of time in national service would be variable. The Peace Corps, for example, now requires twenty-seven months in contrast to twenty-four months of military service, reflecting an appropriate differential

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in obligation and requirements. The type of alternative national service would depend on the skill and qualifications of the man involved, as well as his preference. The time at which the person would complete his national service would be determined by his convenience and at which time he is best prepared for performing his national service.

This system does not imply that the armed forces will become the manager of large numbers of young men. On the contrary, the administration of selective service would rest on the present structure, but selection of local board members needs to be made on a more representative basis. Once military manpower needs were met, the armed forces would have no involvement with the rest of the age group. For example, the Peace Corps would continue to operate as a volunteer organization. There would be no compulsion for any individual to enter the Peace Corps and young men could enter the Peace Corps after they had been exposed to the lottery system. The same is true for all forms of alternative service described in detail below.

The logistics of national service

The sheer number of young men who become eighteen years of age each year defines the scope of a national service program. A selective service system based upon a lottery could be instituted immediately, while it would seem to require at least three years, and perhaps five years, to develop the full range of opportunities for alternative voluntary service. These programs would have to be phased in year by year.

The initial step in examining the logistics of national service is to recognize that the existing standards of eligibility for selective service – both medical and educational – are not relevant. In the past, of those young men who were subject to examination by selective service, 15 percent were rejected on medical grounds. If one adds those rejected for inadequate education and on administrative grounds (moral and criminal records), the percentage of rejection in particular years rose to over 45 percent, with the bulk of those being rejected for educational reasons. Men who sought to volunteer for military service had, of course, a much lower rate of rejection. Thus, a more realistic rejection rate on the basis of past military standards for the eighteen-year-old youth population would be approximately 30 percent. Under arrangements operating in the first half of 1966, the 1,800,000 young men of a given eighteen-year-old group would be allocated as follows: 600,000 enter military service; 600,000 rejected; and 600,000 surplus through various forms of exemptions and deferments.

But a basic objective of national service would be to eliminate

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arbitrary educational standards either through remedial efforts by the armed forces, or by substitute service in a National Job Training Corps. Thereby, these young men would have a second chance to enter the mainstream of American life. Some greater flexibility in medical and psychiatric standards is clearly possible, both for military service and alternative forms of national service. However, it would be unrealistic to assume that all young men would be eligible by educational and medical and administrative standards to participate in some aspect of national service. There are those with severe medical problems, gross bodily deformities, incapacitating psychiatric maladjustments, mental retardation, or asocial personalities. There are, in addition, those young men who suffer from limited defects, especially medical ones, who would be better off not participating in any national service. In all, we are here dealing with approximately 15 percent of the eighteen-year-old group, some 270,000 persons, leaving a total manpower pool of roughly 1,530,000. In Table Three, allocations of manpower to the various proposed national service programs are set forth on the basis of this figure.

Armed forces

If force levels can be reduced to their size before the South Vietnam build-up, the armed forces will require approximately 575,000 new men each year. Some 500,000 will be needed for the normal intake of enlisted personnel, both volunteer and selected by a lottery system. Because of the impact of the operation of a lottery, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps will be able, as in the past, to meet their military manpower requirements through volunteer enlistments. The Army will have to rely on a mixture of volunteers and those procured by the lottery system for a period of two year service.

But in addition to meeting national security requirements, the manpower system of the armed services serves as a vast training system for basic technical skills as well as for a variety of more advanced occupations. In essence, the armed services are the main source of vocational education in the United States, and there is every reason to believe this will have to continue during the next decade.

The majority of those who serve a term as enlisted men, including volunteers, do not re-enlist. In 1964, only 25 percent of all armed services regulars, for example, re-enlisted. The pay of the armed services still tends to lag behind civilian pay, especially for trained technicians. Some improvement in re-enlistment rates might be expected – more in the case of second and subsequent re-enlistments rather than for first term re-enlistments – by improving the conditions of work, etc. But a high rate of personnel turnover at the enlisted level is to be expected. If the situation were otherwise, it might be dangerous, indicating that the armed forces were being burdened with per-

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sonnel who could not find comparable positions in civilian life. Moreover, it should be recognized that the men who do not re-enlist bring back into the civilian sector crucial skills required for economic growth and social mobility. The training that creates these skills proceeds with a high degree of effectiveness because of the organizational environment of the military. Perhaps one of the most important changes would be to reduce the first term of volunteers' enlistment in the ground forces to two years so it would be comparable to those procured under the draft. Specialized training would come wherever possible after the first period of two years of service.

Table 3

Manpower Allocations Under Projected National Service Program (Distribution for 19 year old age Cohort)

Total age group (19 year old)		1,800,000
Not eligible for National Service (15 percent medical and administrative)		270,000
Eligible annual manpower		1,530,000
Projected Annual Allocations:		
National Military Establishment		
Enlisted Personnel	500,000	
Officer Personnel*	75,000	575,000
Proposed Military Remedial Programs		40,000
Special Federal Programs (Substitute Service)		
U. S. Public Health Service, Coast Guard, Merchant Marine Academy		10,000
Police Cadet Corps (Substitute Service)		100,000
National Teacher Corps		150,000
National Health Corps		50,000
Vista Workers and similar Public Programs		70,000
Private Domestic Programs		30,000
Peace Corps		50,000
Private Peace Corps Programs		20,000
National Public Service Corps (including Job Training Corps)		400,000
Conscientious Objectors		10,000
Not allocated		25,000
		1,530,000

*Does not include the 90,000 enrolled in high school R.O.T.C. programs.

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An additional 40,000 young men would be taken on a volunteer basis into the proposed army's specialized training and educational program designed to supply remedial education and health services. This would be only approximately 10 percent of those eligible for such training, while the bulk of 400,000 would be allocated to the National Job Training Corps.

To meet officer manpower needs, 75,000 men would have to enter the various procurement programs. This would include new entrants into the military academies and into the various college R.O.T.C. programs. This does not include the 90,000 students in the high school R.O.T.C., since the bulk of these high school R.O.T.C. cadets would enter the services as volunteers and become non-commissioned officers or, in a minority of cases, participate in an officer training program.

Special Federal programs

In the United States there are various national programs which serve as substitutes for service in the armed forces. These include the United States Coast Guard, the United States Merchant Marine Academy, the United States Public Health Service. As has already been said, entrance into these programs has been and should be considered substitute service for involvement in selective service. In all, approximately 10,000 men each year are involved.

Police Cadet Corps

One hundred thousand young men could be given a substitute service in some form of police work. Increasing the number and quality of police officers is a pressing issue in the United States, and problems of police recruitment resemble those of military manpower. Police departments today require a broader base from which to recruit personnel, and professionalization would be enhanced if there were an increase in the flow of personnel in and out of the police at the lower ranks. The opportunity for promotion of career police personnel would be increased if there existed a category equivalent to short-term military service.

A number of arrangements could be worked out to implement this aspect of national service. Youngsters could be taken at the age of sixteen or seventeen to serve four or five years as cadet tours of duty. This kind of a program would emphasize recruitment into the police service at the end of the cadet's duty. An alternative approach would be to take young men at the age of twenty-one to serve three years as police officers. In all cases, personnel would volunteer for police duty and have to meet the qualifications of the police departments involved. These programs would be administered by local police departments or by the states. Such service would exempt the person from selective service.

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National Teachers Corps

One hundred fifty thousand teachers could be recruited annually for work in our cities. Present policies and resources make it impossible for the central city to have an adequate supply of teachers and teaching personnel. The whole trend in teaching is to make use of more personnel with general liberal arts background and special summer training. The Teachers Corps concept would also make use of semi-professionals with two years of college, and of Teachers Aides with a high school background. The inclusion of Teachers Aides in the National Teaching Corps would increase its social heterogeneity – service as a Teachers Aide would, hopefully, stimulate many to further academic and professional training.

Service in the National Teaching Corps would be an alternative to national service and would *not* exempt an individual from being subject to the lottery system. It would be organized by the federal government along the lines of the Peace Corps and would involve about twenty-seven months of service.

National Health Corps

Similar to the National Teachers Corps, 50,000 young men could be utilized in the health service field. Educational requirements should not be used as a barrier and the National Health Corps would serve for many as a work training experience which might lead to a more permanent career in the health field.

Peace Corps

The present Peace Corps could be expanded to include 50,000 young men each year. The organizational procedures are well worked out and involve twenty-seven months of service. Because of the small number involved, Peace Corps service could be either substitute service that exempts individuals from the lottery or merely alternative volunteer service which the individual would perform if he was not selected by the lottery system. In addition, opportunities could be created for 20,000 men annually in private equivalents of the Peace Corps operations abroad.

Domestic Vista Programs

Domestic equivalents of the Peace Corps under government sponsorship could employ 70,000. Private voluntary national service, under the auspices of church groups, voluntary associations and the like, would involve another 30,000 young men in the United States.

Conscientious Objectors

Conscientious objectors constitute a very small proportion of the population, even if present Supreme Court definitions, which include

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both political and religious opposition, are used. At a maximum, 10,000 men per year would be involved under the broadest definitions. Following present practices, they would be assigned to non-combatant posts if they were prepared to accept such posts, or to one of the various types of alternative service.

National Job Training Corps

Of special importance in a national service program is a National Job Training Corps along the lines of the Civilian Conservation Corps which would annually accommodate up to 400,000 young men. The United States is witnessing a crisis in the ability of its educational institutions to meet the needs of low income groups. The entire thrust of federal aid to education has been thus far designed mainly for those entering college and those already prepared for various forms of specialized training.

We are faced by a problem of overwhelming magnitude. The public education system has been unresponsive to the needs of the most culturally depressed in the center of our largest cities. During the last three years we have witnessed the increase in social tension in the inner city to the point of outright explosion. It is unlikely that the schools can handle these problems. Initial halting steps have been taken by the Neighborhood Youth Corps and in some of the Job Training Centers. But the ideology of the professional educators and social welfare workers does not make possible the fundamental planning required to meet the needs of the inner city youths. We are particularly thinking of the years between dropping out (or being forced out) of school and being available for employment. A National Job Training Corps under civilian jurisdiction, but with clear paramilitary elements, would supply an opportunity for fundamental education and satisfactory personal experience of achievement during this difficult period. In the past, the armed forces performed some of this job. But this becomes impossible as war becomes more automated and as the weapons of the military become more destructive. Every year we must cope with approximately 440,000 youths who have been failed by our society; forty-thousand would have opportunities in the previously mentioned remedial battalions of the armed services; the remaining 400,000 would be eligible for a National Job Training Corps.

Service in a National Job Training Corps would be a substitute for military service. After successful completion of his service, the young man would be in a position to volunteer for the armed forces. One part of the National Job Training Corps would be called the National Public Service Corps. It would undertake conservation tasks, control of pollution, traffic control, recreational programs, and would be available for service in natural disasters.

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Long-term implications

For the next five to ten year period, the national service concept must be evaluated against a purely voluntary armed force based upon competitive economic compensation. From an economic point of view, an armed force based on "competitive" salaries is not a real possibility. Each official inquiry into this matter produces higher and higher cost estimates.

But the argument against a purely volunteer force is not merely economic. It is also political and professional. The armed forces in a political democracy cannot operate without a variety of social links to civilian society and must have a broad base of recruitment. A wide degree of representativeness of its personnel contributes to a willingness to accept the controls of the outer society. A long-term and highly professionalized force, especially at the enlisted man's level, is likely to be less representative and to have weaker civilian ties.

The case for national service, however, is not to be based on a refutation of the volunteer force concept. The arguments for national service involve positive ideas of institution building and the facilitating of social change, although it fundamentally must deal with the task of selecting men for the armed forces.

National service is an attempt of a democratic society to find an equitable approach to sharing the risks of military service without disrupting the management of our universities. The present system cannot be defended on the grounds that it maintains a supply of trained professionals. The supply of professionals depends on many basic factors such as graduate study subsidies, available training opportunities, and the like. Moreover, to interrupt training either before college or between college and professional school would not radically alter the long-term supply of trained professionals.

National service is an experiment in education. Clearly, the military establishment has, in the past and now in the contemporary period, performed educational functions. As mentioned above, it operates the largest system of vocational education, and it supplies an avenue of social mobility for lower class youth. However, national service does not involve an extensive expansion of this function in the military establishment.

It should be emphasized that national service is more than an effort at rehabilitation and a second chance for those youngsters who come from the most deprived segments of our society. It is designed to make a contribution to all social strata of contemporary society. The present structure of American education is unable to supply to many those group experiences required for the socialization of successive generations. The search for personal development and individual identity in a social setting which has a narrow emphasis on

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individual classroom performance leads all too often to various forms of rebellion and withdrawal.

In a democratic society, it is particularly dangerous to make school and academic performance the exclusive route to mobility into adult society. The results of this danger are already clearly manifested by the existing levels of hostility, negativism, and apathy toward "school." National service will deliberately interrupt, at appropriate points, classroom experience so as to give a young man an alternative educational experience. These experiences are designed to develop intense and close group solidarity.

It is particularly important to have these alternative life chances to overcome the constriction, and even boredom, that comes from continuous exposure to classroom instruction. Young people need exposure to a wide range of types of adults and types of teachers beyond subject-matter specialists. This broadening of the range of experience is crucial since, at the university level today, there has been a rapid expansion of the faculty, a large proportion of the new men having achieved their teaching positions without any significant non-academic experience and therefore being restricted in their capacity as effective teachers and role models.

National service is an innovation in the allocation of human resources. In dealing with the problem of the inner city, and with selected aspects of overseas development, labor-intensive techniques have an important and crucial role to play. The terms volunteer, semi-professional, and para-professional are prestigeful words to describe the fact that there are limits to the number and effectiveness of highly trained professionals. We are dealing not only with the results of the restrictive policies in the education and training of professionals, but with the inescapable fact that many operational tasks are better performed by persons who do not have trained incapacities. One way of organizing these work situations is to have persons perform them for short periods of time, but without having to confront the issue of a career in that particular vocation. The national service concept is designed particularly to meet this need, recognizing that there are limitations on the allocation of labor through economic incentives.

At the same time, national service is a contribution to the reallocation of the most highly-trained professional skills. In recent years, the gap between the old nations and the new nations has not been closed rapidly. In fact, there has been a drastic drain-off of professionals from the new nations, especially doctors and scientists. The national service program is a device for making service abroad part of the education and responsibility of each generation of highly trained professionals. In the last analysis, national service is a form of enlightened self-interest on a world-wide scale.

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COMMUNICATION

Against a Negative Income Tax

ALVIN L. SCHORR

ONE can only agree with the basic assumption of Professor Tobin's article (in *The Public Interest*, No. 4). That is, the nation requires two complementary strategies to deal with poverty. One would educate and train our citizenry to earn as much income as they can. The other would assure income, by some system of government payments, to those who have not succeeded or cannot succeed in securing adequate income through work. Beyond that assumption, Professor Tobin's presentation of the negative income tax is thoughtful and enlightened. It therefore offers an unusual opportunity – without necessity for detour into minutiae or underlying ideology – to identify serious limitations in the only type of plan for assuring income that has drawn public attention since the declaration of a war against poverty.

The incentive scale

Professor Tobin himself identifies one of the serious limitations of the negative income tax. There are, he says, "inexorable conflicts" among three objectives of such a program: providing a substantial

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Ed. Note: – *The issue of a guaranteed annual minimum income – and, in particular, the negative income tax as a way of achieving this goal – will certainly play a significant role in American politics, over the coming years. But it is not likely to be a simple role. Just as not all proponents of the negative income tax are "liberal," so not all of its critics are "conservative." There are professional as well as political divisions. It is the economists who tend to look benignly on the negative income tax; it is those involved in the social welfare and social work fields who tend to be critical. Having published James Tobin's "The Case for an Income Guarantee" in issue No. 4, we asked Alvin L. Schorr for this critical reaction. Mr. Schorr is Deputy Director of Research for the Office of Economic Opportunity, and is the author of a book,* Poor Kids, *just published. A rejoinder by Professor Tobin follows Mr. Schorr's Communication.*

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payment to families that earn little; building in a strong incentive to earn more; and limiting the cost of the program by avoiding payments to those who do not need them. Until recently, for example, public assistance theoretically provided exactly the difference between a family's income and total needs. If their income rises, their payment falls – a painful balance that can only discourage voluntary effort. The negative income tax incorporates a response to this problem: the family retains a percentage (two-thirds, in Professor Tobin's proposal) of any income they earn. Unfortunately, such an incentive scale gets caught between opposing pressures. Either the rate at which payments are made pushes downward and many people receive inadequate income, or it moves upward and people with comparatively decent incomes receive assistance.

The illustration that Professor Tobin uses of his proposed scheme – a married couple with three children – makes the opposing pressures clear. Under the scheme, such a family would receive an income allowance until its own income reached $6,000. That figure is very nearly the median family income in the United States, which is to say that nearly half of all couples with three children would receive some payment. At the same time, families with less than $2,500 of their own income would receive a government payment too small to bring them above the poverty line. As it happens, almost half of poor married couples with three children have less than $2,500 in income and, though perceptibly helped by the income allowance, would remain poor. Because for obvious reasons their earnings are less, families without a husband or father would fare even worse. Four out of five of those with three children would remain poor while receiving an income allowance under the plan.

One could do better for families at the bottom by pushing the whole scale upwards, but then families with even higher than median incomes would receive payments. One could avoid payments to families with average income, but then families at the bottom would receive even less. The difficulty is not an accident of Professor Tobin's particular plan or example; as he says, the conflict is intrinsic in the general concept. The nature of the anxiety that this conflict arouses should be made explicit. Payments that would push too far into the higher income brackets cost a good deal; they also undermine the credibility of a program said to be designed for poor people. Therefore, such a plan is not likely to be enacted. But payments that are too low at the bottom of the scale fail to assure income in terms appropriate to the third decade of affluence.

A single program

Simplicity and widespread coverage are among the chief attractions of the negative income tax; unfortunately, they constitute a second limitation. The notion of providing a decent income to men who might work calls forth passions in Americans that are never fully explained on rational grounds. One might think that we suffer from a buried desire not to work at all, so bitterly do we regard people

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who we think are bringing it off. We have avoided this problem in the past by assuring income to identifiable groups that do not provoke us – old people, children without fathers, the blind. As for the others, we have invoked a variety of unwieldy devices more or less obnoxious to beneficiaries and reassuring to the citizenry. We have conducted medical examinations on applicants and required them to report for job referrals or rehabilitation. We have scrutinized their affairs and cut them off, willy nilly, after thirteen weeks or twenty-six.

The negative income tax promises, in a brilliant stroke, to pare away these unworthy practises. With an incentive scale, the individual could be trusted to work when he should and be spared the restraints of policy and investigation. In applying it to all, however, we give up for old people, children, and the disabled (who together constitute at least two-thirds of the poor population) the protection of separate treatment from the suspect employables. Separate status is an expensive nuisance if employable people are to be decently treated. But it is vital if – a possibility that must at least be entertained – the pressures on an incentive scale produce a desperately inadequate payment for those with the lowest earned incomes. Under the negative income tax proposal, for example, an old man who is not covered by social security and has no earnings would receive total income of $400 a year. The average payment to an old person under public assistance is more than twice that.

In short, a danger – not to say, irony – of the negative income tax is this: carefully engineered to the requirements of people who should work, the penalty of the lowest total incomes (including income allowances) will be suffered by families included, as it were, by courtesy – families without earners. Conceivably, the income of such families could be supplemented through public assistance. We should wind up then with a large public assistance program, raising the question whether the new departure had achieved anything of significance.

Income testing

The third limitation of the negative income tax is that it is a conservative and even retrogressive movement in the development of income assurance. The case that is made *for* the negative income tax is, in some measure, simply the case *against* public assistance; yet the two programs are as much alike as different. Public assistance has been characterized by two offensive qualities. One is a detailed investigation of applicants' affairs; it is proposed that the negative income tax do away with this. The other is the provision of a government payment based on a demonstration, however simple, that income is lacking. Income testing, as we shall call this quality, is also fundamental to the negative income tax. Although the principle may seem the commonest of common sense, Americans have been plotting to do away with it for years. When we succeed, the plea will be justifiable homicide.

When a third of the nation was poor, by standards even more stringent than we use today, experts cast about for ways to provide

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income as a matter of right. As it has turned out, many rights would do – a history of work, contributions to a fund, payment of a government tax, old age, veteran status, and so forth. Social security was, in this sense, a product of widespread revulsion against income testing. We sought for a way to provide income in old age (and, later, in case of death of a husband or father, and in case of disability) that would not require a demonstration of need, and the way was found. Much more recently, medicare represented a struggle on the same issue. The American Medical Association and others argued that medical care should be provided on the simplest demonstration of need. But old people did not want an income test, the Administration did not want it, and Congress was persuaded.

Need or want is the only quality that we have not by itself converted into a right or, on the receiving end, been able to feel as a right. It is not, in truth, for lack of trying. Our most embattled income assurance program was conceived in the 1930's in a deliberate attempt to protect children from the humiliation and inadequacy of general relief. If mothers' aid or children's aid could be singled out, experts reasoned, assistance would be rendered as a matter of right to those who could demonstrate need. The history of Aid to Families with Dependent Children provides a bitter rebuttal to that fond hope.

The reaction so far – or lack of reaction – of potential beneficiaries of the negative income tax is itself a bit of evidence about the meaning of income tests. The writer's impression is that poor people would, if they were consulted, reject the negative income tax. Civil rights leaders have shown less than spontaneous enthusiasm for the notion. It was conspicuously absent from the recommendations laid before the White House Conference "To Fulfill These Rights" last summer, although they dealt with guaranteeing income. Poor people would probably say that they want to make good as others have. They will be glad to take the fringe benefits that go with making good – including exemptions, pensions, benefits, allowances, and insurance payments – but are willing to be spared a new set of payments based on a demonstration that they are poor (read: are supplicants).

In strictly economic terms, the distinction between one type of government payment and another may be trivial. The medicare payment to a hospital for an old person not covered by social security is a transfer payment quite like his Old Age Assistance. Yet, obviously, such distinctions affect how people feel in receiving the payment; they also affect whether programs are administered with decent respect for them. In these terms, the negative income tax would continue and even extend the domain of the income test. If we try it, we may be tutored once again in a lesson we seem regularly to forget. We are brutal in the giving of money we define as relief; we are sweetly charitable only when we have succeeded in defining a payment as something else – a right based on age, on paid-up status, on some event (military service, death of a husband). It is rather the latter types of program we should seek to extend.

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At least the first two limitations of the negative income tax – the difficulty of providing a *decent* payment to those who need it, without paying to many who do not, and the risk to those who cannot work of sharing the payment levels of those who can work – may ultimately be appraised against the actual payment levels that are proposed to Congress. The debate on these two points need not be carried on solely in the abstract. We have noted that Professor Tobin's illustrative plan provides inadequate income for many families. If payment levels should be enacted no lower than he proposes, and even indeed higher, it might be hoped that these two limitations were not serious after all. On the other hand, a plan with payment levels that are any lower cannot be regarded as a first step towards a program that will eventually become adequate. The effect of these two limitations is precisely that a small, inadequate program is likely to be attractive, while a plan with decent payment levels raises conflicts that cannot be resolved. The third limitation – that the negative income tax travels the income-test route rather than the income-by-right route – is an issue upon which citizens ought to reflect and be heard.

An alternative course

Presumably, a communication should not be longer than the article to which it responds. In the space that decently remains, an alternative course to take in assuring income will at least be indicated. In brief, we might accelerate the course we have been following since 1935, strengthening a series of programs based on established rights and devising programs to fill the gaps that will remain.

The social security system is our most successful mechanism for assuring income, and it can readily be strengthened. For example, almost two out of five people who receive retirement benefits are poor. The minimum benefit for an aged person is now $44.00; doubling the figure would be a long step towards wiping out poverty among old people. Benefits for those with higher than minimum earnings would also be raised, of course, but not as quickly at first. Such a strategy would provide an interesting international reversal. Great Britain and Sweden began their systems with a flat payment that was essentially an antipoverty device and held little attraction for those accustomed to good incomes. Recently, the two countries have added a benefit related to wages on top of the minimum. In effect, in establishing an antipoverty minimum, we should be moving toward a similar two-decker system from the opposite direction.

Apart from the question of payment, something over one million aged people are now quite uncovered by social security or similar public systems. They may be provided status under social security, following the precedent of the 1965 amendment that "blanketed" people over 72 into social security. (Professor Tobin may agree with these proposals regarding the aged, as he writes that social security might handle all the income problems of the aged. However, he does not mention blanketting-in and seems to imply lower levels of social

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security.) Provision for other social security beneficiaries might also be strengthened. A widow with three or four children may receive as little as $66.00 a month under social security. Obviously, minimum payment levels in such cases require improvement. Appraised in terms of assuring a minimum income, the social security definition of who is gravely disabled probably needs to be liberalized. Nor should we be limited to perfecting existing provisions. For example, the man in his mid-fifties who is laid off from work may be a natural candidate for a new extension of retirement insurance; one day, we shall no doubt seriously consider such proposals.

It is probably not necessary to review in detail all the other income assurance programs that require strengthening—unemployment compensation, workman's compensation, medical care for the poor who are younger than 65. (Some other part of the task, of course, lies with assuring that decently paid jobs and the education or training necessary to perform them are made available.) The point may be clear: if we perfect and expand social security programs and others like them, we can assure proper income to a great many people who are now poor. The Commissioner of Social Security has estimated that in this manner a third to a half of poverty in the United States could be avoided.

A program for children

When we have visualized what might be achieved by improving existing mechanisms, we shall doubtless be struck by one major omission in the general plan. In so child-centered a nation as ours, it is a curious fact that the major omission is a program to assure income for children. Particularly at risk are children whose parents have separated or divorced – *socially* orphaned children – and children in large families. A single statistic may dramatize this point. Three out of four youths who are poor can make one or both of these statements: "I did not live with my father or even a man I could call father;" and "my family has five or more children." Even full-time work may not exorcise poverty for a woman raising children alone (she earns little; she pays for day care) or a couple with five children or more (poverty level, $4,600 or more). Whether children face one problem or the other, their difficulty is not confronted by any income assurance program short of public assistance.

Probably the foremost nominee as a method of providing income to children by right would be a program of children's allowances. As an illustration, a program of children's allowances designed to cost about $12 billion* might work like this:

* Professor Tobin estimates that his illustrative scheme would cost $12 to $15 billion. It might be argued that the cost of the alternative being outlined here would be $12 billion for children's allowances *plus* the costs of improving social security. On the other hand, it might be argued that social security levels of payment and coverage are quite regularly improved – every two years or so. The social security improvements outlined here merely affect the allocation of funds that are going to be committed to income assurance in some fashion or other.

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A benefit of $50 a month would be payable for each child under 6 years of age and $10 a month for each older child. Present income tax exemptions for all children would be eliminated, and the benefit itself would be taxable. The cost would be borne out of general revenue.

A family with *taxable* income between $4,000 and $8,000 that has only school-age children would about break even in comparison with our present taxing arrangement. (They would receive $120 per child in exchange for the tax benefit to them of a $600 exemption.) Families with only school-age children and higher taxable incomes would register a net loss – from only a few dollars a year to as much as a couple of hundred dollars in the highest brackets. All families with pre-school children and all low- and middle-income families would register a net gain. Over a period of several years, the program would probably be regarded with gratitude by families that started out with modest means and achieved a good income later on – a not uncommon pattern. In effect, some income would be moved forward for them from the years when they would have most to the years when they most need it.

The program would be quite as simple to operate as to describe. Everyone having care or custody of a child would receive a monthly check after he once provided a simple statement of the child's age and relationship.

As all Western industrialized nations have a program of children's allowances, their experience answers the questions that come to one's mind. Would the money really be spent on children? Yes. Would it lead to an increase in birth rates? Despite conventional wisdom on the subject, it would not. (One may look, for example, at neighboring Canada and at France, which makes the largest allowance payments in the world. The striking quality of birth rates in both countries in the last twenty years is that they closely resemble trends in the United States.) Would allowances tend to keep children in school? Probably, if enrollment was a condition for the payment. Would payments interfere with incentive to work? Not at all, for – contrary to the negative income tax – the allowance payment does not alter, whether income is little or very large indeed. The allowance payment is a right of childhood, a birthright, one might say.

The particular arrangement of benefits offered here – $50 and $10 – is unusual. It is designed as nearly as possible to wipe out poverty among families in the first few years of marriage or, to shift perspective, to wipe out poverty for pre-school children. These years are irrecoverably important to young parents. Considerable evidence suggests that they may falter in efforts at self-improvement (fail to take a better job in another city, drop out of school or a training program) because their income does not provide enough flexibility to gamble on their future. These years, which are also crucial to children's development, are the very years when we can barely reach them except through their parents. Finally, in these years the mother

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– not to say the children – is least able to supplement what a husband can earn. All these factors fade in significance or urgency when children enter school; therefore, in this particular proposal, the largest share of money is funnelled to pre-school children.

Conclusion

Major differences between the possible courses for assuring income might be put as follows. Professor Tobin proposes a general program that would become the core of income assurance. Other programs would not expand greatly and might even diminish. The core program would be income-tested. An incentive plan would be built into the program in order to assure that incentive to work was not eroded. The result would be a comparatively simple, rational system with every poor person getting something, but many families failing to escape above the currently defined poverty line.

The alternative that has been indicated here would improve and expand existing programs to create a pattern that assured income for virtually everyone. For such groups as needed it, new programs would be devised. Programs would be based on a variety of rights and income-testing would be used as little as possible. Because programs based on right do not in general reduce payments when there is other income, incentive plans would not be required. In systematic planning for a pattern that assures income, a more orderly plan should emerge than now exists. Nevertheless, the result would be less tidy than with Professor Tobin's proposal.

Although the issues may be clear, they are readily clouded with technical detail; the issue of income-testing versus income-by-right rests very much on how people feel; a part of the judgment that must be made requires some degree of prescience. Two considerations weigh heavily for the writer against the negative income tax and for an alternative course.

First, less than enough is not enough. Income assurance means that no one shall be poor. Professor Tobin's proposal does not achieve that. Moreover, there is reason to suspect that it *could not develop* into a program that would achieve that objective.

Second, almost as important as not *being* poor is not *feeling* poor. Only income-by-right achieves that.

A Rejoinder/ JAMES TOBIN

THE primary point of my article was the urgent necessity of a major reform of government income assistance. The objectives of such reform should be a system which is (a) more complete in its coverage of need, (b) more uniform across the nation, and (c) more desirable in its incentive effects. Alvin Schorr agrees that reform oriented to these objectives is necessary. This agreement is much more

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important right now than the details of different schemes, and certainly much more important than the names of different schemes. I hope no one will think that there are deep conflicts among "income guarantees," "negative income taxes," and "family allowances."

I am not wedded to the details of the illustrative proposal in my article, and I welcome into the discussion alternative proposals such as Mr. Schorr's plan for children's allowances. His proposal to pay *taxable* allowances to all families with children has the great merits of simplicity and universality. But in this field no advantages are secured without cost. Here one cost is the payment of sizable allowances, net of taxes, to families who do not need them. Even a father in the highest tax bracket (70% marginal rate) would retain $180 of the $600 annual allowance Mr. Schorr would pay him for a young child.

It is true that Mr. Schorr would also abolish the current $600 exemptions for children, and this would take away the $180 from the affluent father just mentioned and $240 more besides. Still, any father of a young child would gain from Mr. Schorr's proposal so long as his marginal tax rate was less than 50%. (With a 50% tax rate, he loses $300 by the abolition of the exemption and receives a $600 allowance on which he pays tax of $300.) On the other hand, every father with a marginal tax rate 17% or higher (taxable income above $4000) would lose on children over 6 years old. (Allowance $120, as against tax on allowance of $20.40 or more and loss of exemption worth $102 or more.)

The merits of this sort of redistribution are doubtful, and its political acceptability even more so. In framing my own proposal, I imposed the political constraint that no one's tax liabilities be increased. Without this constraint I could, of course, remedy some of the inadequacies Mr. Schorr finds in my proposal. For example, if I could, following Mr. Schorr, abolish children's exemptions for high income taxpayers, I could increase the basic *per capita* allowance in my proposal by $100 a year.

Mr. Schorr's children's allowances do not, as he recognizes, begin to meet the income needs of the poor. As indicated in my article, I very much agree with him in wishing to abolish poverty among the aged and disabled by expanding and improving the social security system. But Mr. Schorr also proposes to expand and proliferate other private rights to receive income from government, rights based on every plausible and implausible criterion *except* low income itself. This is what we have been doing these many years, with the perverse consequences which both Mr. Schorr and I deplore. This approach is bound to waste dollars on people who do not need them, but have the "right" to receive them. Indeed, it is bound to spend more dollars, per dollar that relieves real poverty, than schemes involving an income test, a fact that is surely relevant in appraising the political acceptability of the two approaches.

Mr. Schorr seems to be under the illusion that it is only "negative income tax" systems that face the necessity to compromise among the

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three considerations of adequacy, economy, and incentive. Every system, or lack of system, involves tension among these objectives. It is because the compromise we now have is so bad that alternatives, like Mr. Schorr's and my own, are being proposed. His proposal does not, as the discussion above shows, escape the necessity to trade off one objective against the others. He just strikes a different balance from the proposals he criticizes.

I think that Mr. Schorr overdoes the distinction between income-by-right and income-testing, and overstates the American public's revulsion against the latter. Many programs that provide income-by-right also involve income tests; even social security payments to aged beneficiaries under 72 are geared to their other earnings. My illustrative proposal gives income by right of national citizenship. Haven't we already, although imperfectly, acknowledged this residual right to assistance when the individual cannot muster any other claim upon us? In my proposal, the amount of income assistance to which this right leads is subject to an income test, in the same way an income test is now used to determine who pays income taxes and how much.

Mr. Schorr and I are really on the same side. I wish he would not stress our differences and instead help me explain to the public that the right to receive assistance in amounts geared to income is not a radical departure, but a logical development of existing American institutions and values.

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Irving Kristol, Editor

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CURRENT READING

The Minimum Wage

One tends to be put off by a pamphlet called "The Minimum Wage: Who Pays?", published by the Free Society Association, Barry Goldwater, Honorary Chairman. It doesn't help to discover that the pamphlet takes the form of an "interview" with Professors Yale Brozen and Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago, who can hardly be described as uncommitted inquiring spirits. Their thesis is that the statutory minimum wage hurts precisely the people it is intended to help. At any moment there must be many marginal workers – unskilled, uneducated, badly located – who are just barely worth hiring at the going minimum wage; raise that minimum and sooner or later some of them will become unemployed. To the extent that marginal workers are predominantly Negroes, or young people, or old people, to that extent a high minimum wage concentrates unemployment on those groups.

The reader who rebels at this conclusion will be pleased to find that the authors use some shoddy arguments. Friedman claims that the widening of the gap between non-white and white teenage unemployment rates in 1957-8 was a direct consequence of the 1956 increase in the minimum wage from 75 cents to a dollar an hour. He does not bother to explain why the gap first began to appear in 1954, or why it did not tend to narrow during the period of more than five years that the minimum wage remained at a dollar. Brozen argues that the 1950 increase in the minimum wage must have been the cause of the subsequent decrease in the number of textile firms owned by individuals and partners, and of the rise in the number of textile corporations (presumably mainly in the North), as if nothing else could possibly have been happening in those years to influence the structure and location of the industry. Friedman is capable of quoting a study that finds that the states with the highest minimum wage rates and the broadest coverage also had the highest unemployment rates, as if the composition of a state's industry and agriculture and a dozen other factors were not far more important.

Nevertheless, when all is said and done, the basic thesis is probably right. Most economists – liberals included – believe that high minimum wages do more harm than good in the battle against poverty. What is not clear is whether minimum wage laws have much effect at all. When a new step in the minimum is enacted, there is certainly some immediate tendency for unskilled labor to become more expensive relative to skilled labor, especially in low-wage industries and areas. But much of this effect may be transitory, if above-minimum wages rise to restore traditional differentials. In that case

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the net effect of the higher minimum may well be trivial; it will do neither good nor harm. If the higher minimum does achieve a permanent narrowing of wage differentials, then one important effect will be to squeeze some marginal workers out of employment; their jobs will be mechanized or their industries will contract. The extent to which this happens is simply not known, but it is bound to happen.

Statutory minimum wages probably have no effect at all on the total amount of unemployment; that depends primarily on the total volume of spending, which is not very sensitive to minor changes in wage structure. What the minimum wage may do is to make the unskilled, inexperienced, uneducated workers more vulnerable to unemployment by making it more difficult for them to compete with skilled, experienced, educated workers, and with the machinery that such workers typically build.

Forty hours of work a week at sub-minimum wages does not provide a decent living for a family. Quite right; such low incomes ought to be supplemented. It is fruitless to try to compel employers to provide the supplement; they have the option of not hiring, and that does no good at all for the worker and his family. But there is no reason why a supplement can not be provided through public assistance payments, minimum income allowances, or negative income taxes, various schemes for which have recently been suggested. The political leverage that has spent itself in successive increases in the minimum wage would probably have done more for the poor had it been used to build some kind of explicit floor under incomes.

Where Does the Money Go?

Once our international commitments and domestic economy permit, it seems likely that the Johnson administration will do more for the poor – whether it be by stepping up the war on poverty, adopting some form of guaranteed family income policy, or revising traditional welfare programs. The question naturally arises: how much money are the poor already getting? And equally important (especially if you are poor), how much money is actually being *taken* from the poor and given to those better off?

Some answers to these questions are provided by Robert Lampman, Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin, in an article entitled, "How Much Does the American System of Transfers Benefit the Poor?" (in *Economic Progress and Social Welfare,* edited by Leonard H. Goodman, Columbia University Press). Lampman, of course, was one of the earliest and most influential analysts of the poverty problem in America. His 1959 report to the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress was a milestone in the slow emergence, during the early 1960's, of poverty as a domestic political issue for the first time since the Great Depression.

Lampman takes as the poor those with incomes less than $1500 a year for one person, $2000 a year for two persons, $3000 a year for four persons, and so forth. He calculates how much money they receive and how large a proportion of the population they are, "pre-

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transfer" – that is, before they get any money from government transfer payments, such as public assistance, social insurance, and various publicly-supplied services such as education and health care. The amount of such transfer money is enormous – Lampman estimates that it totals close to $100 billion – and it clearly works to the advantage of the poor. Before transfers, 28 percent of the population lived below the poverty line in 1964; after transfers, only 18 percent lived in that condition. Or if you prefer the gloomier perspective, even after the transfer of nearly $100 billion, 18 percent of the people still lived below the poverty line.

How can so much money change hands and still leave so many people poorly off? The answer, obviously, is that the poor do not get all the transfer payments (to be exact, they get only 39 percent of them) and that, in addition, they pay – through taxes – part of the cost of such payments (about 8 percent). They are net gainers (the non-poor, though they get 61 percent of the transfer money, pay 91 percent of the costs); but the amount of that gain to the poor, after they have paid their share of the costs, is only about $30 billion a year.

Not all the poor benefit equally from these transfers. The money taken from the better-off tends to help small poor families more than large poor families, and not-so-poor families more than really-poor families. Indeed, the big families – those with six or more members – *were scarcely helped at all:* 34 percent were poor before transfers, 29 percent were poor after transfers. (By contrast, the percentage of two-member families who were poor fell from 28 before transfers to 15 after.)

A major reason for the inefficacy of transfer payments with respect to large families is that such a large fraction of the transfer money comes in the form of Social Security payments to elderly people who, naturally, rarely have small children.

This fact has the most profound implications. If social problems increase with family size (there is some evidence that they do), then transfer payments are not reaching the most troublesome families. *Much of the money we transfer is not in fact transferred to deal with poverty at all; it is to deal with aging.* Thus, simply increasing the amount of money spent on present welfare programs will not do much to reduce poverty any further. *In fact, half – maybe two-thirds – of all children living in impoverished families are in families that now receive few or no benefits.*

Changing this is not, in principle, difficult. Lampman shows what can happen just by *not* taxing the poor. This alone would bring 600,000 families above the poverty line. And if the poor were given a tax credit equal to 30 percent of their money income, then nearly three million more families would be brought above that line. Lampman recognizes, but does not answer, the rejoinder that such a credit might seriously reduce the incentive to work. But the theme of the article is nonetheless intact: our present system of welfare and transfer payments is hardly a model of efficiency in dealing with poverty in America.

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Dogpatch — U.S.A.

The social and economic map of the United States has changed enormously in the last sixty, and particularly the last twenty-five years. The patchwork system of local political governments – counties, townships, unincorporated townships, school districts, etc. – has not. Inefficient, costly, often riddled with petty corruption, most of local government is a mess. In its report *Modernizing Local Government,* the Committee for Economic Development has taken a hard but asceptic look at Dogpatch U.S.A. There is no discussion of political machines, crime, bookies, interlocking systems of protection and deals. It is all put out, neat and clean, like an accountant's report, in dollars-and-cents terms. And yet, there are some fascinating findings and, within the purview of school administration theory, some intelligent recommendations.

Some findings:

¶Of the 80,000 local governments in the United States, few are large enough, in population, area or taxable resources, to apply modern methods in solving local problems. Less than half contain as many as 1,000 people; less than 10% have more than 10,000 inhabitants.

¶Overlapping layers of local government – municipalities and townships within counties and independent school districts and special districts within them – form a crazy quilt pattern of jurisdiction. These layers, in some cases numbering ten or more local units with power to tax the same parcel of land, compete in a struggle for revenue sources. The city of Fridley, Minnesota, for example, holds elections (apart for federal and state offices) for nine separate superimposed governments: fourteen independent school districts; a North Suburban sanitary sewer district; the greater Minneapolis-St. Paul sanitary district; the North Suburban hospital district; a Soil Conservation district; Anoka County officials; the greater Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Commission; and the Metropolitan Mosquito Control District (the largest administrative unit of them all!).

¶Interest in local government is small. American voters collectively must select over 500,000 local elective officials, often obscure personalities with inconsequential duties. While over 60% of the electorate vote in Presidential elections, less than 30% of American adults vote in separately held city elections, and even fewer vote in county, school, township, and special district elections.

Odd nuggets of interesting data are contained in the report:

¶Over half the population of all standard metropolitan statistical areas now live outside the central cities; if current trends continue, the majority of all Americans will live in suburbia before the year 2000. In 1962, each metropolitan area (there are now about 224 in the U.S.) contained an average of 87 local governments; the Chicago area alone had 1,060 local units.

¶The Midwest features the independent school district to an unusual degree, accounting for 18,000 of the 25,000 in the nation. These independent school districts account for 78% of public school

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enrollments. The boundaries of school districts are seldom coterminous with other units of government and their boards are usually elected at large, often in separate elections and commonly on "nonpartisan" ballots. Yet over 3,000 independent school districts do not maintain schools, sending whatever children they have to other districts on a tuition basis. By resisting consolidation, such districts are able to avoid or minimize school taxation. About half of all independent school districts have less than 50 pupils.

¶There are in the United States about 30,000 independent law enforcement agencies – the majority of which are one-, two-, and three-man departments. Most authorities agree that about 50 people are necessary to man a local police force with a bare minimum of modern specialization. Given the current fragmentation, only one-third of the departments require even high school diplomas for new recruits, and provide little training on the job.

¶Of all forms of local government, special districts have grown most rapidly in numbers in recent years. Many metropolitan area residents live under six or more layers of special districts, each with an independent government. They may receive water from one, have sewage collected by another, obtain health services from a third, support parks through a fourth, pay for street lights to still another, and gain protection from mosquitoes from a sixth. Between 1942 and 1962, the number of special districts more than doubled to over 18,000; their expenditures increased twenty-fold to more than $3 billion.

¶There are more than 3,000 counties in the United States, but over 60% have less than 25,000 residents; 2700 counties are outside the standard metropolitan areas, most of them entirely or largely rural. (Rural America, with 30% of the nation's population, is strung out thinly over 90% of the land.) About 1,225 counties, mostly in the Appalachian and South and Southwest parts of the United States, containing 49 million people, qualify for federal public works grants and regional development aid by reason of high unemployment and low average income. Under the Supreme Court "one man one vote" mandate, most counties – and counties have been the primary unit of political party organization – will lose their identification with legislative districts.

What can one do about this crazy quilt? The C.E.D. does not stop to consider the fact that the existence of 500,000 persons holding elective office in the United States, even such lowly posts as dog-catcher, while inefficient and costly in monetary terms, may, in the jargon of the sociologist, be highly "functional" for the stability of the political system. But cost-accounting and good government will have its day.

The C.E.D. considers three options. It finds that the present Federal efforts to use existing local governments as administrative agencies in executing national policy are a failure which can only lead to more direct federal management of local affairs. It rejects, secondly, the idea of expanding the administrative functions of the

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states, arguing that state capitals have been consistently unresponsive to local needs. The third path, of local consolidations and rationalization of overlapping, is the one it endorses. (But the argument that the number of towns in rural New England should be reduced, and the present counties abolished, brings a dissent from William Benton and Frazier Wilde on the ground that the long historic tradition and strong sense of identity entitles these townships to remain as entities.)

In general, the C.E.D. recommends:

¶That the 80,000 local governments in the U.S. be reduced by 80%.

¶That the 2700 counties outside the metropolitan areas be consolidated into no more than 500 units.

¶School districts should be consolidated (from 1962 to 1965 the number was reduced from 34,670 to about 25,000) until every unified school district has at least 1,500 students.

The most striking recommendation, almost in passing, relates to the states. Most states have difficulty in raising revenues. (More than 40% of all states aid to local units in 1963-64 came from the Federal government.) States such as New Jersey, Delaware, Rhode Island are hemmed in by their neighbors; a state such as Nevada has a smaller population than the electorate in a good-sized New York congressional district. Few of the boundary lines make sense in metropolitan or regional terms. The C.E.D. recommends that "the 50 state constitutions should be revamped – either by legislative amendment or through constitutional conventions concentrating on local governmental modernization – to provide for boundary revisions, extensions of legal authority and elimination of needless overlapping layers."

Economic Counselling

The Council of Economic Advisors in the last six years has become a powerful political instrument. Under Walter Heller, its theory of "fiscal drag" paved the way for the successful tax cut in 1965. Gardner Ackley's notion of guidelines has failed to hold wages and prices to the 3.2 percent productivity yardstick; yet the idea of government-sponsored restraints paves the way for some future powers and their application.

How permanent an institution is the Council? Will it, like the Bureau of the Budget, become "institutionalized" and a continuing instrument of regulation? Or could it, under a different President, recede in importance? Edward Flash, in his study *Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership* (Columbia University Press), leans to the latter point of view.

In studying the activities of Leon Keyserling (under Truman), Arthur Burns (under Eisenhower) and Walter Heller (under Kennedy), Flash argues that the Council, though "within the Office of the White House," is not a presidential institution like the Budget Bureau, "but rather a personal staff to the President. It has not developed as a permanent entity with bureaucratic formality, specified

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procedures and self-sustained operations." At the same time, Flash cites Arthur Smithies as saying that "hardly any economic theory can be ideologically neutral," and Arthur Burns that "the economist is inevitably influenced by his philosophical and ethical attitudes." For both these reasons, Flash concludes, the status of the Council is more dependent upon the whim of a President than on any embedded function, and that in a future Administration the Council's role could be reduced.

The difficulty with this reasoning is that it is based largely on conventional concepts of public administration, and ignores both economics and history. While the Council itself, like the National Security Council, might be re-organized by a President with a different working style, the functions of the institution remain, simply because full employment, the gauging of the effects of fiscal policy, the control of inflation, and similar regulative functions are today permanent tasks of government. At the same time, the new and varied *techniques* of economic analysis (e.g. program budgeting) make the economist more of a central figure in government today than ever before; and the Council, as the chief status position for economists, itself has a latent function which cursory analysis tends to miss.

The Purse Strings of Research

Until recently, most research arrangements between the U. S. Government and universities have been on a project or contract basis, in which the university has had to hew fairly closely to the specific items listed in the project or the contract. This has led to objections that under these arrangements (a) universities did not receive enough "free money" to sponsor research on more general objectives, and (b) universities have had to bear high overhead costs in administering or housing such projects.

Now the Government has, in part, decided on a major change in the funding of research. In a major document, *The Administration of Government Supported Research*, the Bureau of the Budget has just laid down some new ground rules. It proposes that unsolicited research awards be governed by a master agreement at each university. Federal agencies are urged to allocate relatively more money to broader forms of general support for research undertakings, and to give universities a small, fixed percentage of project funds, to be used as the university chooses, for "research related to . . . agency missions."

Will research be improved under this new system? Ironically, just at the time (March, 1966) that the Bureau of the Budget was issuing its new policy guidelines, Russian scientist Peter Kapitza deplored the Soviet system of giving general grants to research organizations, on the ground that the system strengthened the hands of the bureaucrats, and praised the American system whereby grants went directly to researchers on a project basis. There is a question whether American researchers will greet the gradual transfer of authority from benevolent professorial colleagues, who have usually served as juries

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or referees for research applications, to department chairmen, deans, business vice-presidents, and college presidents most closely at hand.

To some extent the entire shift in policy may become somewhat "academic" in that in recent months the Administration has been looking with a more jaundiced eye than ever before on large grants going for "basic research," especially the large sums being spent by the National Institutes of Health, where no immediate policy or possible practical result is specified.

Man the Destroyer

¶"In nineteen hundred years the world has lost 107 kinds of mammals and close to 100 kinds of birds. The extent of extinction of plants and the lesser animals is not known, but probably vastly exceeds that of birds and mammals. Nearly 70 percent of these losses have occurred in the past century and mostly through the activity of man."

— Ian McTaggart Cowan, "Conservation and Man's Environment," in *Knowledge Among Men,* edited by Webster Schott.

¶The National Academy of Sciences reports that "the average person" throws out about 4.5 pounds of garbage per day, and that the amount is increasing at a rate of about 4 percent a year — which is about the present growth rate of the Gross National Product. At a rate of 4 percent a year, the amount of garbage disposed per day will double in eighteen years.

¶The amount of carbon dioxide pumped into the air in 1962 was "almost 25 times the annual production in the mid-1860's. The rate of increase may be accelerating. During the eight years from 1954 to 1962, the average rate of increase was 5 percent." By the year 2000, if the increase of combustion continues at that rate, the amount of CO_2 injected into the atmosphere will be 60 percent above that of 1950.

— Report of The Environmental Pollution Panel, President's Science Advisory Committee.

¶"All civilization will pass away, not from a sudden cataclysm like nuclear war, but from gradual suffocation in its own wastes. The world's atmosphere will grow more and more polluted until, a century from now, it will be too poisonous to allow human life to survive . . . ."

— Dr. Morris Neiburger

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